Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Four-year-old Jaquari died from asphyxiation by an elastic band from a fitted bed sheet. That day, his mother, Harris, disciplined her sons for leaving the apartment while she out doing laundry. The state argued that Jaquari would not stop crying and that Harris strangled him while five-year-old Diante slept in the bunk above. The defense claimed that Jaquari had wrapped the elastic around his own neck and accidentally asphyxiated himself. A videotaped confession, recorded the day after Jaquari’s death following 27 hours of intermittent interrogation, was admitted. Diante, has maintained since the day after Jaquari’s death that his brother wrapped the elastic band around his own neck and that neither parent was present. The trial court determined that Diante (then six) was not a competent witness, improperly reversing a presumption of competency, requiring the defendant to prove competency. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected direct appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Exclusion of defense evidence violates the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause where evidence is material to the outcome and the exclusion is arbitrary or disproportionate to the state’s legitimate interests. Harris was denied effective assistance. Counsel did not interview Diante, did not secure a witness to show that Diante’s recollections were consistent, and did not challenge the burden of proof. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns properties in a mixed rural/suburban area in central Illinois and lives in a house on one parcel. The other parcels, about 190 acres and near the house, were zoned agricultural and very close to a hog farm. The owners of two other properties in proximity to the hog farm obtained rezoning to the “rural residential” classification, but the county declined plaintiff’s applications for rezoning. Plaintiff sued in state court; the court entered an “Agreed Order” that stated that the parcels should be rezoned, but did not order that they be rezoned. One year later, the zoning board held the required hearing and recommended approval. The County Board voted 11 to 10 in favor of the applications, less than a three-fourths majority, which functioned as a denial. In 2008, the Board granted the applications, but the real estate market had collapsed, and the parcels were no longer worth more zoned residential than they had been when zoned agricultural. Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that protection of agriculture was a rational, nonretaliatory motive for voting against the applications. View "Guth v. Tazewell County" on Justia Law

The Illinois inmate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that his cell was infested with mice and cockroaches, that a window pane was missing and rain came in through the window, and that a warden had seen the conditions, yet nothing had been done. The district judge dismissed on alternative grounds: that the defendants were immune from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to allege harm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after noting that the complaint alleged that allowing rain to enter the cell created a health hazard, adequately alleging harm. Depending on how extensive infestation is, what odors or bites or risk of disease the pests create, the prisoner’s known particular psychological sensitivities, and how long infestation continues, a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the prisoner had been subjected to harm sufficient to support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment even if he had not contracted a disease or suffered any pain. The suit is against a state and a state agency and Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under section 1983, as it could have done. A state and its agencies are not suable “persons” under section 1983. View "Thomas v. State of IL" on Justia Law

Gruenberg, who has accrued 230 misconduct reports since his incarceration for burglary in 1999, seized a set of keys from a prison guard and swallowed them. He was taken to a hospital, where an x-ray showed that the keys were lodged in his abdomen. A physician told the prison officials that Gruenberg would probably pass the keys naturally within five days. They returned him to the prison and kept Gruenberg naked and in restraints for five days until he passed the keys. After five days, Gruenberg had not yet passed them and surgery was needed to remove them. Gruenberg sued, claiming violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing qualified immunity. While the conditions were undoubtedly uncomfortable, there was no evidence that any member of the prison staff showed “deliberate indifference” to Gruenberg’s health or safety. Those conditions were a reasonable response to a “unique situation.” View "Gruenberg v. Gempeler" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago’s disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury. View "Thayer v. Chiczewski" on Justia Law

Naficy began working for IDHS in 1996. According to Naficy, her co-worker and eventual supervisor, Bailey, mocked her accent and suggested that Naficy should not have been promoted because she is Iranian. Naficy filed complaints of discrimination, relating to treatment during a layoff and unfavorable performance evaluations. In 2010, in connection with closure of another facility, IDHS followed provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Naficy and others received a letter alerting them to the possibility of a layoff and outlining potential bump options. Naficy was reassigned to a part-time position; she returned to her former position with the same schedule and salary two months later. Naficy filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory. She received a right-to-sue letter and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the claims, reasoning that as a state agency, IDHS is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Naficy had no direct evidence of discrimination by anyone involved in her reassignment, of retaliation, or of a similarly situated IDHS employee who received better treatment than Naficy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Naficy v. IL Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Charged with possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Dowell plead guilty in return for the government’s agreement to withdraw an information filed under 21 U.S.C. 851, alleging that Dowell had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense. Without that withdrawal, Dowell would have faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. The court nonetheless applied the “career offender” guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, and imposed a sentence of 180 months. Although Dowell claims to have instructed his attorney to file, a notice of appeal was not filed within 10 days, as required for timely filing. Dowell, therefore, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that failure to file constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Dowell’s agreement in his plea not to challenge his sentence on collateral attack precluded relief. The district court agreed with the government. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination as to whether Dowell told his attorney to file the appeal.View "Dowell v. Unted States" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005 brokers sued Merrill Lynch under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII raising claims of racial discrimination and seeking to litigate as a class. They alleged that the firm’s “teaming” and account-distribution policies had the effect of steering black brokers away from the most lucrative assignments and prevented them from earning compensation comparable to white brokers. That litigation is ongoing. Three years later, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and the companies introduced a retention-incentive program that would pay bonuses to Merrill Lynch brokers corresponding to their previous levels of production. Brokers filed a second class-action suit. The district court dismissed. The court held that the retention program qualified as a production-based compensation system within the meaning of the section 703(h) exemption and was protected from challenge unless it was adopted with “intention to discriminate because of race.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). The court then held that the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory intent were conclusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not enough to allege that the bonuses incorporated the past discriminatory effects of Merrill Lynch’s underlying employment practices. The disparate impact of those employment practices is the subject of the first lawsuit, and if proven, will be remedied there. View "McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Bell protested Operation Iraqi Freedom in Chicago. President Bush was at a luncheon at a nearby club. After one protestor was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a squadrol, Bell and two others, banner in hand, approached the squadrol, walking into the street. The police ordered the men to get back on the sidewalk several times. They refused and began chanting, “Hell no, we won’t go. Set him free.” Police arrested them for disorderly conduct. In particular, police arrested Bell pursuant an ordinance that criminalizes an individual’s behavior when he “knowingly . . . [f]ails to obey a lawful order of dispersal by a person known by him to be a peace officer under circumstances where three or more persons are committing acts of disorderly conduct in the immediate vicinity, which acts are likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” A state court acquitted Bell and he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and malicious prosecution and indemnification. Bell appealed adverse rulings by the district court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, invalidating the ordinance in part, as inhibiting protected speech and not amenable to clear and uniform enforcement. View "Bell v. Keating" on Justia Law