Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After Janet Hahn died of diabetic ketoacidosis when she was a pretrial detainee at a correctional center, her husband and the administrator of her estate filed suit alleging that various government officials and private contractors failed to provide her adequate medical treatment. The district court dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the remaining claims. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the wrongful death claim but erred in dismissing it with prejudice where plaintiffs produced insufficient evidence to permit their claims against Sheriff Walsh and the jail's medical contractor to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed the wrongful death claim with prejudice. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Hahn, et al. v. Walsh, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that her employer and several managers retaliated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court rejected the idea that the passage of a particular amount of time between protected activity and retaliation can bar the claim as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff has offered evidence of other retaliatory behavior between her 2003 sexual harassment complaint and the 2006 reorganizations and demotion that bridged the gap between the two events, leaving the issues of causation for a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial. View "Malin v. Hospira, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Before entering his mother’s wedding reception, Miller smoked marijuana. At the reception, Miller drank three shots of vodka in an hour and a half. Miller then dropped off his girlfriend and went to a Kenosha bar. He smoked more marijuana and had three beers. He left for another bar, where he drank more beer, then bought a final Heineken for the road. He drove to a gas station to use a phone to call his girlfriend. At the same time, Kenosha police received a call about a stabbing that occurred two blocks away from the same gas station. Responding to an inquiry by Officer Gonzalez, Miller denied seeing anyone running. Gonzalez asked Miller his name. Miller, who was driving without a license and had been seen exiting his car with a beer, replied with the fake name. Miller admitted that he was on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. Gonzalez told Miller, who was becoming increasingly fidgety and nervous, to take his hands out of his front pockets and not to run. Miller took off running with Gonzalez in pursuit. Another officer captured Miller, who was on the ground when Gonzalez jumped a fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw. The district court rejected Miller’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Miller, if believed, presented evidence from which a rational jury could determine that Gonzalez deliberately inflicted the blow that broke his jaw. View "Miller v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In 2003, Light was convicted in Minnesota district court of firearm possession by a felon. The presentence report suggested that Light was subject the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR referred to two qualifying juvenile acts of violence and prior adult convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, third-degree burglary, a third-degree controlled substances crime, and a felony conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The court used a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, rather than the 120-150 months range without the ACCA enhancement. In sentencing Light to 235 months, the court did not specify which three convictions supported the armed career criminal designation. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Light filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, challenging the use of the drug offense as a predicate offense. The court held that Light’s “criminal history include[d] a sufficient number of other predicate offenses to support an armed career criminal status without any reliance upon the objected to offense.” In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, concluding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit denied leave to file successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions. He then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in Indiana, where he is incarcerated, claiming that, under Begay, he was entitled to sentence reduction. The district court dismissed, stating that relief under section 2255 had been available to him and had not been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Light v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fenton v. Dudley" on Justia Law

After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions. View "Llovet v. City of Chicago " on Justia Law

Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury. View "Ashburn v. Atchison" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review. View "Webster v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Dewitt’s eye problems began in 2007 during his first incarceration at an Indiana Department of Corrections facility. Dewitt submitted the first of many Requests for Healthcare to Corizon stating something was wrong with his bloodshot left eye. After attempts to receive treatment from IDOC providers, Dewitt was released on parole in 2008. A doctor determined that Dewitt had a form of glaucoma and advised that he undergo laser-eye surgery to prevent future attacks. He underwent a surgical procedure on his right eye. His left eye continued to have higher than normal intra-ocular pressure. Dewitt was again incarcerated in 2009 and filed another Request for Healthcare. After several more attempts to obtain care, in 2012, he underwent surgery to remove part of his left eye’s ciliary body. Dewitt filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting deliberately indifference to his glaucoma condition. The district court denied three requests for appointed counsel, finding that Dewitt’s claims were not overly complex or meritorious. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions for recruitment of counsel and that those denials affected Dewitt’s ability to develop and litigate his case. View "DeWitt v. Corizon, Inc." on Justia Law

A warrant was issued for Ball’s arrest based on an affidavit prepared and signed by Indianapolis detective Jones. Law enforcement had been investigating a drug trafficking gang, the Detroit Boys, and had obtained authority to monitor telephone “call centers” that took calls from customers and directed them to one of two drug distribution houses. According to the Jones affidavit, 13 of the intercepted calls either were placed by or made reference to “MamaToni.” Based in part on Jones’ and another detective’s familiarity with Ball’s voice, Ball was believed to be the person making or referenced in these calls. The affidavit also averred that Ball had been seen at the drug distribution houses. Ball was arrested by Jones and charged with narcotics possession. She posted bond. Prosecutors concluded that the wrong person had been arrested and charged. The state dismissed all charges. Ball filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed claims against the state defendants and granted judgment on the pleadings to the municipal defendants, leaving only a Fourth Amendment claim against Jones. Ball then was allowed to amend her complaint to abandon remaining federal claim and assert only state-law claims against Jones. The court remanded the case to state court, where it had originated. Ball appealed the adverse rulings on her other claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Ball v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law