Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

During unrelated civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate, pro se, filed motions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? After Eichwedel was released, the court withdrew the certification as moot. While the underlying situation may occur again and may not be resolved before a prisoner’s release date, the chance of this situation happening to Eichwedel is simply too speculative to constitute a continuing controversy between him and IDOC. View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, age 67, worked for 16 years as a legal assistant at the U.S. Attorney’s Office until her voluntary retirement in 2007.Weeks before her retirement, Johnson had a verbal altercation with another legal assistant, Mosley. Management eventually decided that the office would best be served by Johnson’s reassignment to another floor, rather than by a formal reprimand. Johnson’s salary and benefits did not change. Her duties and some working conditions were altered. She sued the Department of Justice for discrimination based on her age, sex and race. She asserted that the trier of fact could infer discriminatory intent from a “mosaic of evidence” comprised of the DOJ’s arguably contradictory witness statements and from her assertions that similarly situated employees had received preferential treatment. She also contended that she could make out a prima facie case of discrimination because she belonged to a protected class, had met her employer’s legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse employment action when reassigned to the file room and was treated differently than similarly situated employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOJ. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Johnson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Porter, a civilian police department employee, worked the “auto desk,” where employees process information about towed, stolen, repossessed, or recovered vehicles, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. In 2005 she was assigned to a group that has Fridays and Saturdays off. She requested reassignment because she was involved in her church. The request was granted. She then requested to work a later shift to attend classes as a student minister. The request was granted. Weeks later, Porter took leave due to a car accident and pregnancy complications. Following three months of FMLA leave, Porter took a medical leave for another six months. She returned and was assigned to the Friday/Saturday days-off group. She was told that her request would be accommodated when an opening became available in the Sunday/Monday group. Between returning to work on July 16, 2006, and November 12, 2006, Porter was absent 34 days, including 16 Sundays. Porter claimed that she was harassed by her supervisors and filed internal grievances. Porter sued, alleging that the city failed to accommodate her religious practice, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Porter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officers were investigating gunshots heard near an intersection and learned that one person had been shot in the leg and was recovering at a hospital. An officer approached a backyard shared by two duplexes on one of the streets and noticed bullet holes and a trail of spent casings in the area, including five casings next to one of the duplexes and a casing in the yard itself. Without a warrant, he entered the backyard and found and seized a rifle, which belonged to Schmidt, who was subsequently indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)). The district court denied his motion to suppress. Schmidt pled guilty and was sentenced to 21 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that any danger had dissipated by the time of the search given the heavy presence of police and passage of a few hours’ time. A reasonable officer could have believed that there were other exigent circumstances, i.e., wounded victims in the backyard; the officer’s warrantless presence in the backyard was justified even if the backyard were curtilage and the scope and breech of the rifle were in plain view once he was there. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Sanchez testified that he, José, and friends were outside of José’s house when three unmarked police cars pulled up. Officers demanded to know what the men were doing and ordered them to empty their pockets for a pat-down. Officer Caballero seized keys and walked toward the dwelling. Sanchez protested. A swearing match ensued and Sanchez was handcuffed. Caballero nodded at officers who forced Sanchez to the pavement. Sanchez testified that the officers hit and kicked him. José called 911. The police left the scene without arresting anyone. The officers testified that they had tried to break up a fight between Sanchez and Jose; they filed contact cards without mention of a fight. Caballero wrote that José was “loitering”; Peterson wrote that Sanchez “made a suspicious movement as if to conceal something.” Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to intervene in misconduct of another. A jury found in defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the parties and the court apparently misapprehended the prospective liability of defendants for the acts of unnamed officers, and the jury was not properly instructed as to the potential liability of officers for failing to intervene, none of the errors warranted reversal. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

White created a website to advance white supremacy and included a statement that “everyone associated with the Matt Hale trial has deserved assassination for a long time.” The site also included information related to the foreperson of the jury that convicted Hale, a white supremacist, of criminally soliciting harm to a federal judge. Although a jury convicted him of soliciting the commission of a violent federal crime against a juror, 18 U.S.C. 373, the district court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that White was guilty of criminal solicitation, and that White’s speech was protected by the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the conviction and remanded for sentencing. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on the contents of the website, its readership, and other contextual factors, White intentionally solicited a violent crime against Juror A by posting Juror A’s personal information on his website. Criminal solicitation is not protected by the First Amendment. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

On December 23, 1980, police found a body in a ditch and another nearby; both had been shot in the head. Months later, an informant implicated Pamela Thompkins; she was arrested and confessed to assisting her former brother-in-law (Willie Thompkins) and a friend in a robbery that became double murder. Willie agreed to talk after receiving Miranda warnings. During interrogation, he took a phone call from an attorney, but continued to talk without invoking his right to counsel; in court for a bond hearing, he confessed. A jury convicted him, based on his confession, eyewitness testimony, and evidence from the scene. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessful direct appeal and years of state post-conviction proceedings, the Governor commuted the sentences of all death-row inmates, and Thompkins was resentenced to life. He exhausted remaining post-conviction claims. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply federal law in holding that the right to counsel had not yet attached when Thompkins confessed, so the trial court properly declined to suppress the confession, or in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance based on procedural default and lack of factual support. View "Thompkins v. Pierce" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, runs a number of youth detention facilities. Jamal, age 16, had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times when he arrived at one of those facilities in 2008. His intake assessment noted a history of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, major depression, bipolar disorder, psychosis, behavior disorders, and anger and drug abuse counseling. His behavioral history included delinquency, gang affiliations, anger, aggression, setting of fires, cruelty to animals, putting a gun to a cousin’s head, threatening to kill teachers, learning disabilities, alcohol abuse, and cannabis use. Jamal denied that he had manic or depressive symptoms, that he was depressed, or that he had experienced suicidal thoughts since his June 2008 attempt; the intake doctor prescribed Prozac and lithium. Jamal was noncompliant, had disciplinary problems, and was periodically evaluated for suicide risk before he committed suicide by hanging himself from a bunk bed. In his mother’s suit, alleging deliberate indifference to Jamal’s serious mental illness, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Miller v. Nordstrom" on Justia Law

Adams was sentenced, in Illinois, to 180 days in jail plus three years’ probation for a 1981 armed robbery; he committed a second robbery while on probation. He was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery. Paroled in August, 1984, he promptly violated, but was re-paroled in December. He committed another armed robbery in January 1985 and was sentenced to 25 years. While confined, Adams committed aggravated battery of a guard. He had not been out for long when he was caught with a firearm, convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Adams conceded that two convictions qualify as violent felonies but argued that two do not, given 18 U.S.C.921(a)(20), which provides that restoration of civil rights causes a conviction to be disregarded for federal felon-in-possession statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 1984 Illinois repealed statutes that had allowed criminals to possess firearms beginning five years after release from prison; his civil right to possess firearms was not restored and that right would not have been restored even under the pre-1984 version of Illinois law, since he has not spent any five-year period out of prison. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law