Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

On December 7, 2009, Burd pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to attempted burglary. He had 30 days to withdraw the plea. For the first 29 days of this period, he was held at prison facilities that had no library resources. On the thirtieth day, he was transferred and immediately asked to use the library. Officials told him the library was closed. Burd missed the filing deadline, but continued to seek access to the law library. He filled out request slips, but each time he was denied access because the library was closed. When he explained to Sessler, the prison educational administrator, that he wanted to research withdrawing his plea or an appeal of his sentence, she told him that any such action would be untimely and denied him access to the library. Burd also requested that a fellow inmate be permitted to assist him with his motion. He never received a response. Burd did not seek to set aside his conviction through federal or state habeas corpus before filing under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of his request for damages as for failure to seek collateral relief.View "Burd v. Sessler" on Justia Law

Woolley was charged in Illinois state court with murder, armed violence, armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, arising out the fatal shootings of two victims in 1995. After initially confessing, he later recanted, claiming he had falsely implicated himself in order to protect his wife, Marcia, who committed the murders out of jealousy toward one of the victims. The jury convicted him on all counts. In state post-conviction procedures, Woolley produced an expert who pointed out flaws in expert evidence introduced at trial. After obtaining no relief and exhausting review in state court, Martin filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Woolley’s counsel was ineffective, remaining nearly passive in the face of damning, impeachable testimony from the crime scene investigator, that effectively hollowed out the core of his client’s defense, but Woolley was not prejudiced by the error. View "Woolley v. Gaetz" on Justia Law

Escobedo became suicidal and ingested cocaine. He dialed 911 and told the operator he had taken cocaine, had a gun to his head, and wanted to kill himself. An emergency response team was dispatched to negotiate with Escobedo and to try to get him to put down his weapon and leave his apartment voluntarily. Negotiations were unsuccessful and the police opted to deploy a tactical response to remove Escobedo, as they thought he presented a danger to the community around him. After deploying two volleys of tear gas into Escobedo’s seventh-floor apartment, a team of six officers wearing gas masks and other protective equipment broke into the apartment. The officers found him in his closet with a gun to his head. The officers ordered him to put down the weapon, but Escobedo did not comply and was shot by two officers. Escobedo’s Estate brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claim against the police and the City of Fort Wayne. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Escobedo v. Martin" on Justia Law

Harney and Muldoon occupy one unit of a three-unit Chicago building; DeVarela occupies another. In 2004, DeVarela contacted police to complain about damage to her vehicle. Midona’s police report noted an “unknown offender.” Months later, DeVarela’s dog bit Harney. Harney reported the incident. Days later, DeVarela telephoned Midona, claiming that Harney and Muldoon chased her up the stairs and pushed her. Months later DeVarela again called Midona and showed officers a videotape that may have shown Harney and Muldoon damaging the car. The next day Midona went to the building with detectives, and, outside the unit, told Harney that he was under arrest. While outside of his unit, Harney told the officers that he would get Muldoon. The officers followed Harney into the unit. Harney did not invite them in, but did not instruct them to remain outside. While Harney was speaking with Muldoon, the officers instructed them that they needed to come out of the bedroom. Harney did not know that they were in the unit until then. Harney and Muldoon were found not guilty of damaging the vehicle and sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) Midona and the city. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Harney v. Devarela" on Justia Law

In 2006, B.T., 14 years old, was failing in high school. Her friends accused her of making a bomb threat. She attempted suicide. In July 2006, B.T. told police that Dietrich, a family friend, had sexually assaulted her between June and August 2004 when she was 12 years old. Dietrich was charged repeated first-degree sexual assault of a child and intimidation of a child victim. Dietrich sought in camera review of B.T.’s counseling records. Dietrich believed the records would show that though the alleged sexual assaults occurred in 2004, B.T. did not tell her therapist about the assaults until after her April 2006 suicide attempt. The state trial court declined. Dietrich was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Wisconsin courts, Dietrich sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether Dietrich’s due process rights were violated when the state trial court did not conduct the requested in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The state court reasonably applied precedent, as Dietrich failed to make a plausible showing that the victim’s counseling records contained evidence material to his defense. View "Dietrich v. Smith" on Justia Law

An officer responding to a report of gunshots, saw a Hispanic male running toward a building. A witness told the officer that her cousin had been shot by a black male and was hiding in an apartment in that building. Officers approached the apartment. Delgado, the Hispanic male, and the shooting victim, with a visible graze wound, emerged from the apartment. Officers detained Delgado and, without a warrant, searched his apartment, finding firearms. Delgado was indicted as a felon in possession and for possessing an unregistered firearm. The district court agreed that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances, but found that it was a valid protective sweep and denied a motion to suppress. Delgado entered a conditional plea. The government conceded that the search was not a valid protective sweep, but argued that a reasonable officer could have believed that the shooter was in the apartment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that, absent any indication that anyone was in the apartment or had been subjected to violence inside the apartment, the mere fact that the shooter was at large was not enough for a reasonable officer to believe that the shooter was in the apartment. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

In 2007 Calumet City’s Mayor Qualkinbush appointed Embry commissioner, to oversee construction and repair of streets, paving, sidewalks, and other public improvements. Embry supervised day-to-day work, prepared the department’s annual budget, managed payroll and scheduling for 40 employees, and met with the mayor and other department heads to brainstorm improvements. During the 2009 municipal election, Embry campaigned for a team of candidates that included Mayor Qualkinbush and three of the four defendant-aldermen. The three broke party ranks to support Munda. Munda won, creating a rift between the defendant-aldermen and the mayor. Defendants urged Embry to stop supporting the mayor. Embry declined. After the election, the city council merged Embry’s department with the Sewer and Water Department; the Sewer Superintendent planned to retire, and Embry thought that he would be appointed commissioner of the new department. Defendant-aldermen vowed not to ratify Embry’s appointment, so the mayor nominated someone else. The city council approved the new appointment. Embry filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. . Applying the Elrod-Branti line of political-patronage cases, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that the commissioner is a policy-making position and that Embry could be removed because of his political affiliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Embry v. City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

Holloway was arrested without a warrant and detained. Although Holloway had a probable cause determination the day after his arrest and an initial appearance in front of a judicial officer within three days, he was detained for nine days without having any charges filed against him. During his time in jail, Holloway received care from the medical staff. Before his detention, Holloway had been taking prescribed Oxycontin and other medications to treat chronic pain caused by his Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome. The jail physician did not believe that Oxycontin was necessary to treat Holloway’s chronic pain and, instead, prescribed non-narcotic pain medications and other medications to prevent narcotic withdrawal symptoms. After the prosecutor did not file charges against Holloway within the time allowed by the court, Holloway was released from jail and was admitted to a hospital, where he resumed his regimen of Oxycontin. Holloway sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the sheriff violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days and that the jail physician and two attending nurses violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Ray was convicted of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment, arising from a retaliatory shooting that left an 11-year-old girl dead and two others injured. At trial, the state called Detective Phillips to describe a signed statement that Ray gave during his police interview. Phillips read from Ray’s statement and recounted his own out-of-court statements informing Ray that co-actors had implicated Ray. Neither co-actor testified, but defense counsel did not object to Phillips’s testimony. Wisconsin courts rejected direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. In his first federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit found that Ray’s constitutional rights were violated when the state introduced out-of-court statements made by individuals who did not testify, but remanded to allow the state to assert that Ray’s state post-conviction motion was untimely. On remand, the district court placed the burden of proof on Ray, finding that he did not timely give his motion to a prison official for mailing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner mailbox rule governs whether a state post-conviction document is “properly filed” because Wisconsin has not clearly rejected it. The state failed to rebut Ray’s testimony and documents showing that he timely gave his state post-conviction motion to a prison official. View "Ray v. Pollard" on Justia Law