Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Animal control officers responded to a complaint about the Abbotts’ dog running loose. Travis interfered with efforts to capture the dog and made threats, prompting a call to police. After his mother, Cindy, coaxed him out, Officer Sweeney informed Travis that he was under arrest for obstruction and assault. Travis attempted to evade the officers. Sweeney handcuffed Travis and placed him in a cruiser. A taser was used. Seeing Travis struggling in the moving car, with no partition, Sweeney reached to gain control. His foot slipped and his cruiser rolled into Cindy’s vehicle. Cindy became upset and began screaming. Sweeney, concerned that she was trying to help Travis escape, ordered her to stop, but she continued toward the vehicles. He shot her in the abdomen with his taser. Cindy fell; after another jolt, she was handcuffed. Cindy was never informed of charges against her. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part; Sweeney had probable cause to arrest Travis and is entitled to qualified immunity on Travis’s excessive-force claim. Qualified immunity also applies to Cindy’s false-arrest and false imprisonment claims, but the court vacated with respect to her excessive-force claim.View "Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty." on Justia Law

In 1983, Matamoros was sentenced to 10 years in prison, with a three-year special parole term to follow. When his ordinary parole term expired in 2005, Matamoros’ parole officer issued a Notice of Discharge, explaining that he was no longer subject to supervision by the U.S. Parole Commission. Neither the Commission nor Matamoros’ parole officer noticed that Matamoros still had the special parole term left to serve until a month later, when the Commission issued a Certificate of Special Parole, nunc pro tunc. About six hours after the Commission issued the Certificate, Matamoros participated in an armed robbery, for which he was later sentenced to jail in Wisconsin. The Commission issued a warrant for Matamoros’ arrest for violating the conditions of his special parole. The warrant later lodged as a detainer that remains in effect. Matamoros sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of the special parole term imposition, the detainer, and the delayed dispositional review of the detainer. Matamoros argued that the government should be estopped from enforcing the detainer because he was mistakenly told he was no longer subject to the Commission’s supervision. The district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Matamoros v. Gram" on Justia Law

Starting in 2002, Smith sought a place on Beloit’s “tow list,” to be called when police required towing services. Chief Wilson denied these requests. Smith, who is African-American, attributed his exclusion to racial bias. In 2008, Wilson’s subordinates made allegations that, in everyday conversation, Wilson referred to “niggers,” “towel heads,” and “spics.” Several officers specifically recalled that Wilson used such slurs about Smith. Smith filed claims under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 42 U.S.C.1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict finding that race was a “motivating factor” in Wilson’s decision not to include Smith on the list, but that Wilson would not have added Smith to the list even if race had played no part in Wilson’s thinking. The district court concluded that the mixed verdict precluded relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s second finding (that his company would have been left off the tow list regardless of race) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; that Smith was entitled to some relief because he succeeded in demonstrating that improper racial considerations at least partially motivated Wilson; and that instruction on the allocation of the burden of persuasion was incorrect. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2001, Suggs was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 300 months. He challenged his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, succeeding on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced him to 240 months. After his 2009 resentencing, Suggs obtained new information that he argues was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland. A key witness has recanted and claims that his first statement to law enforcement did not implicate Suggs. The government agreed that if this were Suggs’ first 2255 motion, the evidence would require an evidentiary hearing, but sections 2244(a) and 2255(h) restrict “second or successive” motions to circumstances that do not apply. The Seventh Circuit denied permission to bring a second challenge, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), finding that his new evidence did “not come close to showing that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.” Suggs filed a new 2255 motion, arguing that the new evidence challenge should not be barred because his resentencing imposed a new judgment. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Magwood v. Patterson, did not address this situation. View "Suggs v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011, BEST fired Aslin, a securities broker, to remain compliant with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “Taping Rule,” which requires securities firms to adopt monitoring measures when too many of their brokers have recently worked for “Disciplined Firms.” Instead of adopting such measures, the employer may terminate brokers. FINRA, a private corporation, is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a “national securities association.” The Maloney Act provides for establishment of private self-regulatory organizations to oversee securities markets, 15 U.S.C. 78o. The SEC must approve FINRA’s rules and may abrogate, add to, and delete FINRA rules. Aslin filed suit alleging that FINRA violated his due process rights by including him on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms without providing him the opportunity to challenge the designation. The district court dismissed, concluding that Aslin failed to state a claim because he was not deprived of a protected property or liberty interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Since Aslin sought only injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent application of the rule to him, the controversy ended in 2012, after which Aslin was no longer included on the list of brokers from Disciplined Firms and the case was moot. View "Aslin v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc." on Justia Law

Poole, an Illinois prisoner, believed that a required $2 co-payment for dental care furnished at the prison violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment. After paying the fee, he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Poole’s complaint “frivolously” accuses defendants of “committing strong arm robbery” against a “captive market of inmates.” After screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A, the district court dismissed Poole’s claims against several defendants with prejudice, but allowed the action to proceed against Isaacs, the prison healthcare administrator, because Poole alleged that he “didn’t have any money” for the co-payment. That allegation was false, and following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Isaacs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that both the original lawsuit and the appeal were so lacking in merit that they warrant the imposition of two strikes under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Isaacs did not deny dental care for Poole, nor is she to blame for the delay in treatment. Poole had sufficient funds in his trust fund account but opted to refuse treatment rather than part with his money. View "Poole v. Issac" on Justia Law

School administrators approved a seventh grade field trip to Mauthe Lake. Students were not required to attend. The school district forbids swimming on field trips unless a lifeguard is present. The administrator, present at the lake, knew that there was no lifeguard and that there were places in the swimming area where water would be over the children’s heads. Several students entered the lake at the beach. The chaperone told the children not to go deeper than their chests, Kamonie, with others, walked until the water reached his chest, and was pulled down to water over his head. He drowned inside the designated swimming area. His parents sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that the defendants deprived Kamonie of his life in violation of the due process clause. The district judge dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A state does not deprive a person of his life in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to prevent death, but only if the death was caused by the reckless act by a state employee acting within the scope of employment. Negligence enhanced the risk to Kamonie, but negligence is not enticement, or deliberate indifference, or blindness to obvious dangers. The parents may have state law claims, but damages would be capped at $150,000. View "Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs.of the City of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Humphries applied to Milwaukee County to renew her child care provider certificate. Muniz reviewed her application, sent a standard inquiry to a state agency as part of the background check, learned that Humphries had a substantiated finding of child abuse from 1988, and, after conferring with his supervisor, Muniz denied Humphries’s application. Humphries claims that she was not aware of the finding; she had been certified as a child care provider in the past. The abuse finding was later overturned and Humphries was certified. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Muniz and his supervisor on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a due process claim. Muniz and his supervisor had no involvement in the investigation or determination of the 1988 finding of substantiated abuse and did not violate Humphries’s constitutional rights when they relied on that finding to deny her child care provider renewal application.View "Humphries v. Milwaukee Cnty." on Justia Law

On Halloween 1996, Parish, age 20, was arrested by Elkhart police as he prepared to take his three children trick-or-treating, and charged with attempted murder and armed robbery. No physical evidence tied Parish to the crime. Based mainly on eyewitness testimony, the jury convicted Parish. For eight years, Parish pursued appeals. In 2005, the appellate court ordered a new trial based on his attorney’s failure to properly investigate and introduction of an improper jury instruction. Parish was then 30 years old. The government offered a plea that involved no additional jail time, but Parish refused. The government then dismissed the case. Parish sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The jury found in favor of Parish, but awarded only $73,125 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. In his unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Parish presented evidence that the average jury award was nearly $950,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the court admitted testimony of eyewitnesses identifying Parish, but refused to allow Parish to present significant evidence that he was not guilty, including identification of other individuals as possible perpetrators, and recantations by the eyewitnesses. View "Parish v. City of Elkhart, IN" on Justia Law

In 1995 Chicago administered a civil-service examination for the fire department and initially hired those with scores of 89 to 100. From 2002-2006 it hired from the group who had scored 65 to 88. Plaintiffs contend that drawing a line at 89 had an unjustified disparate effect on black applicants, violating Title VII. Following a 2000 remand, in 2006 the district court held that the city had not proved justification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the charge had been filed after the limitations period expired. In 2010, the Supreme Court, reversed, holding that a new claim accrued with each use of the list to hire. The district court held that 111 class members must be hired; others receive damages. Prospective intervenors have worked as firefighters since 2005. Each contends that he thought that he would receive extra seniority, pension credits, or back pay in this litigation and that he is entitled to intervene, after judgment, because he did not know that class counsel had decided not to seek relief for persons hired from the 65-88 pool. The district judge found their motion untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Lewis v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law