Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin police recruits must complete probation. Statewide requirements are set by the Law Enforcement Standards Board (LESB), Wis. Stat. 165.85. Milwaukee has interpreted Wis. Stat. 62.50(3)(b) as authority to adopt additional requirements; no new recruit becomes a full officer before 16 months of “actual active service.” Ramskugler’s probation in Milwaukee began in October 2007. Days later, Ramskugler injured her knee during training. The Department assigned Ramskugler to clerical duties. In November, she was given 2.5 months of leave for knee surgery. Ramskugler returned to duty in a clerical capacity for several months. She obtained medical clearance for unrestricted duty, but had to wait for the next recruit class to begin. Before graduating in November 2008, Ramskugler re-injured her knee. She had completed the course. After more leave and a second surgery, Ramskugler returned to clerical duties in January 2009. Although Ramskugler was a “law enforcement officer,” as defined by the LESB, she was on probation in Milwaukee, which did not consider clerical duties “actual active service.” The district court rejected a suit and, while appeal was pending, Ramskugler accepted a settlement. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the union lacked standing to bring suit on its own behalf. View "Milwaukee Police Assoc. v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Mann operated a home day care center. While she was gone, her husband, a licensed day care provider, and Thompson, a newly-hired assistant, remained at the center. The children were left alone in the basement for about 10 minutes. One child hit another with a tray. A complaint was made to DCFS, which determined that Thompson was working without a background search or a medical evaluation. DCFS determined that Mann had failed to provide proper supervision, shut down the center, and prohibited Mann and her husband from providing child care pending full investigation. DCFS entered Mann’s name into the Illinois database concerning child abuse and neglect. DCFS concluded that the violation was “substantiated,” and after supervisory review, recommended license revocation. After another level of review, a corrective plan was recommend rather than revocation. Mann entered into a plan and had the report expunged and her name removed from the database. Mann sued DCFS employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Mann was not unconstitutionally deprived of a protected liberty interest relating to imposition of the protective plan or deprived of due process when she was prohibited from running her facility during the investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Mann v. Vogel" on Justia Law

Smith was arrested with narcotics on his person. Smith alleges and the officers deny that the officers stomped on his hand and beat him. When Smith arrived at the police station around he had an obvious finger injury. Officers delivered Smith to a hospital; a doctor determined that Smith’s finger needed to be moved back into place and that painkiller should be administered. Smith declined local anesthetic and instead requested “Dilaudid” (a morphine derivative similar to heroin). A doctor administered Dilaudid, and splinted Smith’s finger. Smith returned to the hospital days later; his finger was swollen and infected. It was no longer medically alive. The doctor told Smith that amputation might be necessary. Before Smith could return for another appointment, he was arrested and again alleged mistreatment (officers kneeling on and slapping his injured hand), which the officers again deny. After processing Smith at the station, officers returned him to the hospital, where the finger was amputated. At trial on Smith’s claims of excessive force and failure to provide medical attention, the district court allowed the defense to present evidence of Smith’s heroin use prior to one of the arrests. The jury found for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Smith v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Wells shot his gun into the air several times to celebrate the New Year, 2008. Arriving to investigate, Officer Coker shot Wells three times, seriously injuring Wells. Coker claims that Wells turned toward him and pointed a gun in his direction; Wells denies doing so. Through an agreement with the state to dismiss a felony count, Wells pleaded guilty to reckless conduct that he “discharged a firearm multiple times . . . and then pointed the firearm at [Coker].” Before entering the plea, Wells sued Coker and the City of Springfield, alleging that Coker used excessive force in shooting Wells. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Wells was judicially estopped from denying that he had pointed the gun at Coker because Wells pleaded guilty to a charge that included the statement that he had pointed the gun at Coker. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither judicial estoppel nor other doctrines of preclusion apply to the particular facts of Wells’s plea agreement. The discussion of the facts supporting the charge was brief and that Wells’s guilty plea was not specific with respect to what he admitted. View "Wells v. Coker" on Justia Law

Gutierrez was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Raymond. After pursuing his Illinois state court avenues for post-conviction relief, Gutierrez brought a federal action for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that: Gutierrez received two trials in state court; that his testimony was contradicted by testimony witnesses and by the physical evidence at trial; and that, before the second trial, the court heard extensive testimony as to Gutierrez’ history of treatment for mental illness. The Illinois appellate court held that even if evidence of Gutierrez’ mental illness had been presented, there was no reasonable probability that the court would have found that Gutierrez had a genuine, though unreasonable, belief that it was necessary for him to use deadly force to defend himself from Raymond. That court properly analyzed the evidence and reasonably applied the law. View "Gutierrez v. Anglin" on Justia Law

Since 2006 Ray has experienced pain in his shoulder. He contends that the pain stems from an injury and that an MRI scan would point the way toward successful treatment; Shah, Ray’s treating physician at the correctional center, believes that the pain stems from arthritis and that a scan would not help in diagnosis and treatment. The district court rejected Ray’s suit under 42 U.S.C.1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Ray has been examined often, x-rays have been taken, and physicians have prescribed painkillers; staff also has arranged for Ray to be assigned a lower bunk. Because Ray’s claim fails the objective component of cruel-and-unusual-punishments analysis, his contention that Dr. Shah displayed subjective antipathy is irrelevant. View "Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate of a federal prison, filed a “Bivens” suit against seven named prison staff members plus several unnamed defendants, complaining that in retaliation for the plaintiff’s going on hunger strikes, they used excessive force to force feed him and extract blood samples, placed him in a cell infested with feces, denied him minimal recreational opportunities, refused to allow him to have a Bible, refused to allow him to file grievances, and tried to block his access to the federal courts. The district judge dismissed the complaint before a responsive pleading was filed on the ground that the “99-page complaint defies understanding, rendering it unintelligible” and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that a complaint may be long not because the draftsman is incompetent or is seeking to obfuscate, but because it contains a large number of distinct charges. The 28-page complaint, with a 71-page appendix, is not excessively long given the number of separate claims and is “not only entirely intelligible; it is clear.” View "Kadamovas v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald had not eaten all day, had not slept in three day, and drank some wine. Feeling “down,” Fitzgerald attempted to call a hospital help line, but instead dialed a police non-emergency number. She proceeded to talk to the desk officer. Though Fitzgerald denied suicidal thought or intention, the desk officer described a “very depressed,” possibly suicidal, intoxicated female caller. As officers approached the building, Fitzgerald abruptly hung up on the desk officer. This information was relayed to the officers. Upon entering the apartment, officers and paramedics found Fitzgerald unsteady on her feet and slurring her words. For 30 minutes, they talked to her. She denied wanting to harm herself, but admitted being upset and told them that she had been taking anti-depressants. They, along with Fitzgerald, unsuccessfully attempted to contact Fitzgerald’s friends. The decision was made to take Fitzgerald to the hospital. Fitzgerald would not go voluntarily. She screamed and physically resisted. Eventually, the officers and paramedics lifted Fitzgerald onto the stretcher and handcuffed her right hand to the stretcher. She continued to resist, eventually breaking bones in her wrist. Surgical repair was necessary. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fitzgerald v. Santoro" on Justia Law

Devbrow entered the Indiana prison system in 2000. During intake, he told the medical staff that he had prostate problems and would need to be tested for prostate cancer within two to four years. In 2004 a test revealed an elevated PSA, but the medical staff did not order a prostate biopsy for more than a year. In a biopsy six months later, Devbrow was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had spread to his spine; treatment options were severely limited. Devbrow sued prison doctors and a nurse practitioner under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered judgment for the defendants based on the two-year statute of limitations, construing the claim as a constitutional violation that in April 2005 when the biopsy was ordered. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations for a section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows of his injury and its cause. Devbrow did not know of his injury when the defendants ordered a biopsy; he discovered it six months later when he learned he had cancer that might have been diagnosed and treated earlier. View "Devbrow v. Kalu" on Justia Law

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law