Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Thomas was sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for murder. Indiana courts affirmed the conviction and rejected collateral attack. A federal district judge denied Thomas’s petition for habeas corpus, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that the appeal had been taken in bad faith, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). Thomas sought to proceed in forma pauperis. Under section 1915, appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the prohibition does not apply to collateral attacks. Appellate fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1913, which predated the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). If Section 1915 were entirely inapplicable to collateral attacks, just because several of its subsections were rewritten by the PLRA, then there would be no basis for excusing prepayment of the fees and prisoners would be worse off. View "Thomas v. Hank" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

Vaughn started working for the U.S. Forest Service in 1974. Vaughn filed internal complaints in 1997, 2004, 2005 and 2006, asserting discrimination based on race and age, and retaliation for exercising his right to bring such complaints. Vaughn filed suit, but in 2007 signed a settlement agreement. Two days later, he received a “letter of direction” describing a change in his work schedule. He would no longer work regular weekday hours. After receiving the letter, Vaughn was passed over for a temporary assignment and was denied overtime. During roughly the same period, Vaughn’s relationship with a co-worker ended, she accused him of harassment, and he was placed on administrative leave. She continued to complain after he returned and filed an EEOC complaint and a state court order of protection. Vaughn sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, claiming retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vaughn failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he has failed to demonstrate that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. The employer put forward, and he failed to rebut, a legitimate reason for the action that was taken. View "Vaughn v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Hudson filed suit in an Illinois district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, charging that medical personnel at a federal prison in Kansas, where he had been incarcerated, had negligently failed to diagnose a blood clot in his leg and that, as a result, he experienced serious health problems. The government moved to transfer the case to the federal district court in Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), on the ground that the principal witnesses are in Kansas and that the Kansas court has a lighter caseload. The district court granted the motion. Hudson has petitioned the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the case should remain in Illinois because he lives here, as do his current treating physicians, who will testify about his current health problems and causation. His Illinois relatives will also testify to his continuing health problems. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that about two-thirds of the witnesses are closer to Kansas, that the medical records are in Kansas, and the ease of electronic communications. View "Hudson v. Baker" on Justia Law

Engel was convicted in 1991in Missouri state court for a drug-related kidnapping and was sentenced to 90 years in prison. In 2010 the state’s highest court vacated the conviction, based on the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that a police investigator had paid a key witness to testify. The state declined to retry him and Engel was released after 19 years in prison. He sued the police department, the United States, individual officers, and the FBI agent claimed to have fabricated evidence. The district court denied the FBI agent’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding a “Bivens” action is available for “Brady” violations and that qualified immunity did not apply because the Brady obligations at issue were well-established at the time of the events at issue. View "Engel v. Buchan" on Justia Law

Hale, former head of a racist church, was convicted of putting a contract on the life of a federal judge who ruled against the church in a trademark case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then rejected Hale’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hale defaulted claims relating to the trial judge excluding him from a portion of jury selection that dealt with pretrial publicity concerning Hale’s praise of an individual who shot at least 11 people belonging to minority groups. Hale’s lawyer agreed that inquiries would best be made out of Hale’s presence and Hale did not raise the issue on direct appeal. With respect to a claim of ineffective assistance, the court noted that lawyers are forbidden to use peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors based on race and it that it would not second-guess trial counsel’s choice to defend by claiming entrapment or that Hale’s instructions to kill the judge were a misunderstanding. View "Hale v. United States" on Justia Law

The owner (an Asian Indian) of 60-room hotel in a manufacturing district near a major highway in Oak Forest, a Chicago suburb, sued the city, charging racial discrimination in zoning (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982) and that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, based on the city’s refusal to allow it to sell the hotel for conversion to a retirement home to be owned by a church in which most of the membership is African-American. The city claimed that a retirement home would not be “highway oriented” and, after the plan was proposed, amended its ordinance so that the hotel became nonconforming, and denied a special use permit. The owner later lost the hotel in foreclosure; it is now operating as a hotel under new ownership. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting numerous irregularities in the zoning process, but stating that the owner presented no evidence that any comparable facility, serving a white clientele, has ever been permitted by Oak Forest in a comparable district. View "Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak Forest" on Justia Law

Officers stopped a truck after they witnessed occupants apparently engaging in a drug deal. Hunter fled from the passenger seat with something resembling a gun in his hand. Officers ordered Hunter to stop, but Hunter continued to run. The officers heard a gunshot and fired at Hunter, striking him in the left buttock and in the foot. Hunter fell to the ground and was handcuffed. Police recovered a revolver from the ground close to Hunter, with one spent shell casing in the cylinder. Hunter was transported to a hospital by ambulance. Detective Karzin accompanied Hunter, who was handcuffed to the hospital gurney at all times. Doctors administered narcotics, but a treating nurse later testified that he had remained “alert and oriented.” While Hunter was receiving treatment, Karzin sat silently in the room until Hunter initiated interaction. Karzin read Hunter his Miranda rights. At some point, Hunter gave the name of his lawyer and asked if Karzin would call him. Karzin did not do so. Hunter made incriminating statements to officers who arrived after the conversation. The district court suppressed the statements. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the interrogation occurred after Hunter unambiguously invoked his right to counsel. View "United States v. Hunter" on Justia Law

An inmate of the Illinois Danville Correctional Center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The inmate suffers from scoliosis and the prison rejected his “incessant” requests for a lower bunk and for a medical mattress, a back brace, and orthopedic shoes. The district judge granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, in an opinion that included references to a Wiki-How article on bunk-climbing and to the recent discovery of the skeletal remains of Richard III of England and a picture of inmates in bunks. The court noted “overwhelming” evidence that he had no medical need for any of the requested items, except, possibly a lower bunk. Noting the inmate’s claim that he was injured trying to get into the upper bunk after being refused permission to sleep in the health care unit, the court remanded for a determination of the facts on that claim. View "Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

After drinking very heavily and accelerating to 80-90 miles per hour on a road with a posted limit of 35 mph, to escape alleged pursuers, McNary woke up in a hospital and learned that he had killed a pedestrian and then two occupants of a vehicle, during a police chase. He claims that he has no memory of speaking to officers at the hospital, of receiving Miranda warnings, or consenting to blood alcohol test. He is serving two life sentences, without the possibility of parole, in an Illinois state prison. State courts rejected arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on failure to prove that McNary was in custody while speaking to officers by eliciting testimony from his sister about her observations at the hospital and eliciting prejudicial testimony from McNary. The district court denied a habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the conclusion of the Illinois appellate court. View "McNary v. Hardy" on Justia Law