Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

McDaniel arrived at the emergency room in May, 2001, with a gunshot wound to the head. She died two days later. Her death was ruled a homicide, and Brady, her boyfriend and the father of her child, became a suspect. After several weeks on the run, Brady was arrested in Los Angeles, extradited to Illinois, and convicted. Brady claims the shooting was an accident and has identified four witnesses to corroborate his story. None of them testified at trial, because Brady’s lawyer did not call them. State courts were not persuaded that the omission was serious enough to undermine his conviction, and the federal district court held that their decision was not so unreasonable that federal relief was possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the performance of Brady’s lawyer fell below constitutional standards, he cannot show prejudice. The court characterized the proffered testimony as only “marginally exculpatory.” View "Brady v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are correctional officers and were part of a specialized unit, the Special Operations Response Team (SORT) that guarded inmates in the Cook County Jail’s Abnormal Behavioral Observation Unit (ABO). In 2006, six violent felons escaped from the ABO, raising suspicion of inside assistance. A correctional officer, Gater, confessed to allowing the escape and named three others as assisting him or having advance knowledge of the escape. Those officers were investigated and reassigned after disbandment of SORT. They filed suit, claiming psychological and emotional injuries from the investigation and that they were investigated due to their political support for a then-candidate for Sheriff. Following a remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact relating to the political retaliation claims, the veracity of Gater’s confession and the fact that no other officers were investigated for the jailbreak. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Authorities had probable cause to investigate the officers, making other possible motivations for their treatment less relevant. While the defendants may have expressed negative opinions regarding the officers’ support of the candidate, it was objectively reasonable to investigate officers implicated in a multi-felon jailbreak. View "Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Burge joined the Chicago Police Department in 1970 and rose to commanding officer of the violent crimes section in the 1980s, but his career was marked by accusations from more than individuals who claimed that he and officers under his command tortured suspects in order to obtain confessions. Burge was fired in 1993 after the Office of Professional Standards investigated the allegations, but he was never criminally charged. When asked about the practices in civil interrogatories served on him years later, Burge lied and denied any knowledge of, or participation in, torture of suspects. A jury heard overwhelming evidence to contradict that assertion and convicted Burge for obstruction of justice and perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) and 1621(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence showed that Burge lied when he answered the interrogatories, his false statements impeded an official proceeding, and the statements were material to the outcome of the civil case. Burge received a fair trial and hearsay reference to a victim impact letter was admissible at sentencing.View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law

Although Hall has been a plumber for the City of Chicago since 1995, she was on disability leave from 1999 to 2003 due to a work-related injury. Hall returned to the City’s employ with the limitation that she could not lift over 25 pounds. Hall and the City agree this restriction precluded her from resuming work as a plumber, so Hall began working in the House Drain Inspectors Division of the Department, which was composed of 13 male house drain inspectors and the supervisor’s female secretary. Hall claims that the supervisor created a hostile work environment by assigning her menial work and prohibiting coworkers from interacting with her. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in her Title VII suit, finding that the conduct was not hostile in comparison to other employees’ responsibilities and that Hall failed to produce evidence that the supervisor’s conduct was because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a jury could infer that deliberate isolation of Hall was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment and that the supervisor’s comments to Hall could indicate that Hall’s gender played a part in his actions. View "Hall v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

An inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, complaining that officials denied him an accommodation of his religious observances. He is a member of a religious sect, the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, and took the “Nazirite vow,” which committed him not to cut his hair. He wore his hair in dreadlocks, which form naturally in some people who do not cut their hair. His previous suit, based on the prison’s refusal to allow him to have visitors unless he consented to a haircut, settled in 2003; the parties agreed that he could receive visitors, if he allowed prison staff to search his hair before and after any visit for concealed contraband. In 2004, for appearance in court in a case he had filed, the prison gave the inmate a choice: a haircut, or segregation as punishment for eluding his scheduled trip to court. He chose the haircut. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent recognizes the need for and validity of rules regulating the hairstyles of prisoners in the interest of security; the Nazirite vow is an optional rather than mandatory observance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem. View "Peter Lewis v. Jerry Sternes, et al" on Justia Law

Westmoreland was convicted first for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and in a second trial, for additional counts stemming from the murder of the wife of his partner in drug-dealing: causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime; using interstate commerce facilities to commit murder for hire; conspiring to commit murder for hire; tampering with a witness by committing murder; and causing the death of a witness through use of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed in 2001 and 2002. In 2002 he moved for a new trial, based on outrageous conduct, including the fact that a state police officer had an affair with his wife and a recantation. The court took no significant action before denying the motion in 2010. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Westmoreland did not present “newly discovered evidence” and was not prejudiced by allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba’s video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser’s story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba’s room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba’s claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba’s civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

The Pekin Board of Fire and Police Commissioners determined that Simmons, an officer of the city’s police department, had disobeyed an order. It suspended him without pay for 20 days. A state court of appeals reversed, concluding that the chief of police lacked authority to issue the order. Campion, a psychologist, had concluded that Simmons was unfit for duty. Simmons told the chief that he had been evaluated by other psychologists who thought him able to serve. The chief ordered Simmons to ensure that these other psychologists provided Campion with their conclusions, supported by evaluations and data. The appellate court held that the chief could require an officer to provide no more than a psychologist’s bottom line. Simmons then sued under 42 U.S.C.1983, contending that the due process clause requires the city to make up the pay he lost. The district court dismissed, holding that Illinois requires back pay only when the board rules in an officer’s favor, while here the favorable ruling came from a court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the district judge should not have used a section 1983 suit to resolve a claim that rests entirely on a proposition of state substantive law. View "Simmons v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

Bracey, an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, was injured in a 2005 altercation with officers after refusing to exit his cell as requested by officers executing a random search. Two days later, Bracey filed a complaint claiming that an officer “viciously attacked” him; by the time he notified the prison that tapes of the incident probably existed, the tapes had been recorded over. Bracey filed suit in 2010 alleging that corrections officers used excessive force and spoliation in failure to download and preserve video from the prison security cameras. Bracey requested court assistance in recruiting counsel, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). The district court concluded Bracey had made adequate efforts to find counsel but found the allegations sufficiently straightforward and Bracey sufficiently competent to handle the case himself. It denied a motion to compel disclosure of information relating to the destruction of the videotapes and denied requests for spoliation sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bracey did not meet his burden of establishing a duty to preserve the videotape and destruction of that video in bad faith. View "Bracey v. Grondin" on Justia Law