Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Peele worked for the Portage Police Department as a detective. In 2007 he supported Charnetzky’s Democratic primary campaign to become mayor. Charnetzky lost. Peele spoke to a local reporter and criticized Sheriff Lain for endorsing the opponent, apparently stating that Sheriff Lain “won’t get any support here.” The day after the comments were published, Peele was reassigned to the more deskbound position of “Station Duty Officer.” Peele sued, claiming that he was demoted and constructively discharged without due process; retaliation for his support of Charnetzky; and defamation. The defendants counterclaimed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to retaliation, noting that the district court did not address conspiracy, immunity, or the city’s liability. View "Peele v. Burch" on Justia Law

Police saw Rabin carrying a holstered gun on his hip in public. He was handcuffed and detained for about 90 minutes while officers sought to confirm the validity of his carrying license. None of the detaining officers were familiar with Rabin’s unique license, carried primarily by private detectives and security officers. When it was confirmed that the license was legitimate, Rabin was released. Rabin sued the officers for unlawful arrest and excessive force. The district court denied the officers summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding the officers entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful arrest claim, because even if they had known about the type of license, it would have been reasonable under clearly established law to detain Rabin while they verified its legitimacy. The length of Rabin’s detention was “unfortunate,” but was caused by the government’s failure to have an efficient system of license verification. One officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that unnecessary tightness of the handcuffs exacerbated Rabin’s preexisting medical conditions. Rabin only told that officer about his medical issues. View "Rabin v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Turley is serving a life sentence in an Illinois state prison. Between January 7, 2008, and October 4, 2010, administration 25 times placed the prison on lockdown, confining prisoners to their cells without yard time; the longest continuous lockdown was 81 days, for a total of 534 lockdown days, more than 50% of the period at issue. Turley brought Eighth Amendment claims and a Due Process claim, claiming that lockdowns were often imposed for non-penological purposes, such as isolated fights, rumors of a potential fight, or no reason at all. Turley claimed that he suffered injuries including irritable bowel syndrome, headaches, tinnitus, sleep deprivation, colon spasms, nosebleeds, weight loss and extreme stress; that there was of a conspiracy among prison officials and union employees to create a staff shortage, negotiate a pay raise, and allow staff to take vacation; and that his $10 monthly idle pay stipend was withheld during lockdowns without due process. Turley’s grievances were denied; he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Turley exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the Eighth Amendment claims, that those claims are not time-barred, and that they sufficiently state a claim. The Due Process claim was properly dismissed. View "Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour, et al" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hill filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that the district court had erred in deeming him a career offender when calculating his sentence in 1999. The Seventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) forecloses resort to 2241, because Hill could have used section 2255 to present the same argument, if he had acted promptly after the decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). Hill did not seek rehearing or Supreme Court review, but sought relief in the district court under F.R.C.P. 60(b), arguing that the Seventh Circuit overlooked that he had earlier lost a 2255 motion The district court denied the motion, concluding that failure to apprise the court of important facts is not “excusable neglect,” permitting reopening of a judgment. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that 2241 may apply under specific circumstances when 2255 does not allow successive collateral attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, reasoning that legal developments after a final judgment do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances for a litigant who bypassed arguments on appeal. The court noted that Hill did not argue that he is in prison for an act that is not criminal; his sentence is within the range that would have prevailed had the judge not applied a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Rios" on Justia Law

Taylor, convicted of murder in Illinois state court, was sentenced to 35 years in prison. In his habeas corpus petition, Taylor claimed that his counsel operated with a conflict of interest by jointly representing him and his brother, Lowell, in simultaneous murder trials. He claimed that the conflict adversely affected his representation because his lawyer refused to call certain exculpatory witnesses, because they might implicate his brother in the murder. The Illinois Supreme Court denied relief, finding that Taylor’s interests did not conflict with those of his brother and relied upon a purported credibility finding by the trial court that any conflict did not adversely affect the performance of Taylor’s lawyer. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict of interest between Taylor and Lowell adversely affected Taylor’s representation. The state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in holding that Taylor’s interest in presenting exculpatory witnesses did not conflict with his brother’s interest in preventing admission of inculpatory testimony and unreasonably determined that the trial court’s bare rejection of the claim must have constituted an implicit credibility finding concerning the motivation of the lawyer. View "Taylor v. Ground" on Justia Law

Vitrano pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm while under a domestic abuse injunction, 922(g)(8)(B). The prosecution argued that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), he should have faced a minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment based on three prior “violent felony” convictions for escape and recklessly endangering safety. On remand, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 360 months; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vitrano moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing Fifth Amendment violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the court erred in sentencing him under ACCA. Vitrano claimed that he had located a discharge certificate restoring civil rights he lost due to his 1977 conviction for endangering safety. The prosecution determined that the certificate was forged. Vitrano was indicted for perjury and corrupt influence, 18 U.S.C. 1623(a); 1512(b)(1) & (c)(2). Instead of filing a reply, Vitrano sought leave to amend his 2255 motion, claiming that the earlier convictions were not violent felonies for ACCA purposes. The government argued that, not filing a reply to his initial 2255 filing, Vitrano had abandoned his claims. The district court denied Vitrano’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Vitrano v. United States" on Justia Law

Swanson purchased a lakeside home, next to the home of Whitworth, the elected mayor of Chetek. Swanson obtained a permit for “remodel-repair” and began work, including installation of a three-foot high fence between his property and Whitworth’s and along the street. Whitworth repeatedly told a building inspector that he should not have issued a permit; repeatedly entered the Swanson house without permission; used his influence to cause another inspector to delay a fence permit; told the fence installation team that Swanson was a drug dealer and unlikely to pay; and caused municipal prosecution of Swanson for construction of the fence in violation of a five-foot setback that did not apply to Swanson’s fence. Meanwhile, another neighbor of Swanson, installed a fence that encroached on part of Swanson’s property, without a permit, and was not prosecuted. Swanson filed a class-of-one equal protection suit and defamation and slander claims. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Whitworth, finding that Swanson did not show a similarly situated individual who received more favorable treatment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A clear showing of animus, absent a “robust comparison” to a similarly situated individual, may sustain a class-of-one equal protection claim. View "Swanson v. Whitworth" on Justia Law

Serrano pled guilty to attempted first degree murder and possession of cannabis in exchange for a total sentence of 15 years in prison. In an unrelated case, Villanueva pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a 25-year sentence. Each claims that the plea agreements did not mention supervised release even though Illinois imposes a mandatory three-year term of supervised release (MSR) on murder and attempted murder charges. At the time, Illinois law did not require listing MSR on the conviction and sentencing order. At both plea hearings, however, the state judges mentioned MSR and obtained the defendants’ understanding that the law imposed such a term. Illinois law now requires that the term of MSR be specified in the sentencing order. Serrano’s conviction became final in 2002; Villanueva’s conviction became final in 2004. The two claim to have learned of the MSR while in prison. After extensive proceedings, state courts denied their petitions for post-conviction relief, which argued that the state denied them the benefit of their plea bargains in violation of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied petitions for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Villanueva v. Anglin" on Justia Law

Findlay and his uncle, Howey, live on adjacent lots. Findlay found a surveillance camcorder set up near the property line and called the Sheriff’s Office to file an abandoned property report. Howey had set up the camera because he suspected Findlay of trespass and vandalism. Deputy Lendermon responded. With video running, Findlay made comments suggesting he had trespassed. Lendermon decided to confiscate the memory chip containing the statements as evidence. The memory chip separated from the camera and fell to the floor. Findlay says Lendermon tackled him as he reached for the chip. Lendermon says he simply grabbed Findlay’s arm to prevent him from picking up the chip. Findlay sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive use of force. The district court denied Lendermon’s motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Findlay did not carry his burden of showing the violation of a clearly established right, so Lendermon is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Findlay v. Lendermon" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officer Cates sexually assaulted Lemons while responding to her 911 call and was convicted of violating the woman’s civil rights while acting under color of law, 18 U.S.C. 242. Cates reported problems with his attorney. The district court delayed sentencing. Two months after appointment of new counsel and five months after the deadline for filing post-conviction motions, Cates’ new attorney requested an extension of time to file post-conviction motions. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Cates to 288 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the circumstances did not warrant a finding of excusable neglect. View "United States v. Cate" on Justia Law