Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Shaw and two others were charged with aggravated battery after King was beaten to death outside a Fort Wayne motel. Shaw denied participating in the beating, but the other defendants, in exchange for prison sentences of less than three years, agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and to testify against Shaw. The court allowed the prosecution to elevate the charge against Shaw to murder over Shaw’s objection that an Indiana statute limits the time for amending charging documents. Shaw was convicted and sentenced to 60 years. On direct appeal, Shaw’s new attorney abandoned the argument that the information was amended too late and argued, unsuccessfully, insufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. Appellate counsel dropped the case and did not file with the Supreme Court of Indiana. Shaw unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in state courts. The federal district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed that the lawyer’s decision to forgo challenging the amended information in favor of a frivolous challenge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Indiana appellate court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington (1984), and the 2000 elaboration in Smith v. Robbins. View "Shaw v. Mize" on Justia Law

In 1999, Quintana and his friends lured a woman into a van. Quintana restrained the woman, while his friend sexually assaulted her. The victim escaped by jumping nude out of the moving van. Quintana was arrested and charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. After a year in prison awaiting trial, the state offered Quintana a plea deal of a four-year sentence on the kidnapping charge and a four-year sentence on the sexual assault charge to run concurrently at 50% good time, so that Quintana could plead guilty and serve one more year in prison. Quintana declined the deal, opting to go to trial and face a minimum of two six-year consecutive sentences. He was convicted and the district court sentenced Quintana to a term of six years and a consecutive term of 21 years. After 13 years, Quintana sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea under the Illinois “accountability law,” under which his sentence had to be served at 85%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that Quintana did not establish deficient performance or prejudice. View "Quintana v. Chandler" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials retaliated against him for speaking up about two guards allegedly assaulting him. He was placed in segregation and forbidden to discuss the alleged assault. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, by not filing a grievance that conformed to prison rules. He responded that he interpreted the prohibition against speaking about the alleged assault to extend to filing a grievance and was afraid to file it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. While the duty to exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to suing under section 1983 is limited to those remedies that are “available,” and a remedy is not available to a prisoner prevented by threats or other intimidation from seeking an administrative remedy, Wisconsin regulations limit the offense of making false statements to prison staff to statements made “outside the complaint review system.” The inmate had no reason to fear filing a grievance about alleged retaliation. View "Schultz v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Smego agreed to civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. During intake, he was seen by Mitchell, a dentist who found that 12 of his teeth had cavities. Throughout 2006, Smego’s cavities worsened and became painful, but he was not given a follow-up appointment. He made healthcare requests for unrelated medical issues, but not for his teeth. He claims that he believed requests were not necessary for problems already known to medical staff. During a chance encounter in 2007, Smego asked a dental hygienist who worked with Mitchell why he had never been called for the follow-up appointment. Smego, claims that she responded that the suction machine was inoperable and that Mitchell could not work on his teeth without it and warned that being a “pest” would not help him get an appointment. Smego saw Mitchell again 18 months after she told him about his cavities, but Mitchell repeatedly delayed treatment until 30 months after the first appointment. In Smego’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, stating that Smego offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that some of the defendants violated his constitutional rights. View "Smego v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Blackout performs asphalt paving work and other construction services and had contracts with the Chicago Transit Authority that were terminable at will. The CTA informed Blackout that it would not do business with the firm for the next year (debarment) and did not give a reason. Illinois law allows judicial review of debarment by public bodies, but Blackout did not avail itself of that process, nor did it sue for libel, although it insists that public announcement of debarment is defamatory, but filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deprivation of “occupational liberty” without due process. The district court dismissed, noting that that inability to work for a single employer is not deprivation of occupational liberty and that there was no allegation of inability to work for public or private entities other than the CTA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Blackout won a school district contract after the CTA debarment. View "Blackout Sealcoating, Inc. v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Hobgood was the subject of repeated, intensive investigations that resulted in disciplinary proceedings and termination of his employment with the Illinois Gaming Board, though another state agency ultimately ordered that he be reinstated. Hobgood contends he was targeted because he helped a fellow Board employee with suits against the Gaming Board under Title VII and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. Hobgood sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Hobgood was fired, not because he had assisted his friend, but because the “nature” of that assistance involved providing confidential information. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting genuine issues of fact concerning the defendants’ motives for investigating, disciplining, and terminating Hobgood, who presented a “convincing mosaic” to show that his employer acted for unlawful reasons. When the evidence is viewed as a whole, a jury could reasonably infer that the Board investigated and fired him because he assisted in lawsuits against the Board. View "Gnutek v. IL Gaming Bd." on Justia Law

Officer Kermon charged Gutierrez with public intoxication and resisting arrest. According to Gutierrez, he was walking home from work, minding his own business, when Kermon, who never identified himself as a police officer, stopped him at gunpoint, pepper sprayed him, placed him in handcuffs, delivered gratuitous kicks to his torso, and uttered a racially derogatory slur. Officer Kermon says that Gutierrez was a belligerent drunkard, unsteady on his feet, who yelled at Kermon, and assumed an aggressive fighting stance. Gutierrez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Kermon violated his fourth amendment. The district court concluded that Kermon had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative detention but that a finding of qualified immunity was precluded genuine issues of material fact on the issue of probable cause. Because Kermon’s argument depends on a disputed fact, the Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction..Tinde View "Gutierrez v. Kermon" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of drug offenses, was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, which the district court found to be the statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Simpson’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had furnished ineffective assistance, was rejects. Three years later he filed another collateral attack, which the district court rejected as lacking required appellate authorization. At the time of Simpson’s sentencing, either the jury or the judge could decide whether a defendant’s conduct met requirements for a mandatory minimum sentence. In 2013 the Supreme Court held that a judge cannot make that decision unless the defendant waives entitlement to a jury. Simpson argues that the decision entitles him to a second collateral attack because it establishes a new constitutional rule, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2), and proposes another ineffective assistance attack, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) and a claim based on the jury clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that section 2255(h)(2) applies only when the new rule has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the Supreme Court. View "Simpson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin reduced subsidies for the Wisconsin Care Program, which funds grants for organizations administering programs for disabled persons who live in group homes. The plaintiffs are developmentally disabled and suffered the largest cuts. Persons who had received smaller payments bore smaller cuts. For some (frail elderly) per capita payments increased. Plaintiffs claim that making larger absolute cuts for persons whose care is most expensive violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act and that reduction in payments increases the risk that they will be moved from group homes to institutions. The district judge noted that states have waived sovereign immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, as a condition to receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has held that the portions of the ADA that are not designed to implement disabled persons’ constitutional rights cannot be used to override states’ sovereign immunity. The district court concluded that the relevant provisions of the ADA do not concern the Constitution and that other claims were premature because no plaintiff has been moved to an institution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without information about care provided to other disabled persons, there is no useful theory of discrimination. View "Amundson v. WI Dep't of Health Servs." on Justia Law

Thompson, convicted of a gun crime based entirely on the testimony of Chicago police officers, claimed that the officers planted a gun in the vicinity of his stop and arrest to fabricate a case. While he was imprisoned, the State’s Attorney uncovered widespread corruption in the department, implicating the officers who testified against Thompson. His conviction was vacated. Thompson sued the arresting officers, alleging due-process violations under Brady v. Maryland and sued the city. During discovery, the defendants and other potential witnesses from the department invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thompson had to rely on his own testimony and the adverse inference from assertion of the Fifth Amendment. The court excluded much of Thompson’s proferred testimony from other victims of police misconduct and the guilty-plea testimony of officers who were convicted. The jury found one of the officers liable, only on the Brady claim. As damages for more than three years of wrongful imprisonment the jury awarded $15,000. Thompson challenged the evidentiary rulings and certain trial tactics by defense counsel that he claims were improper. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While none of the errors were prejudicial standing alone, their cumulative effect had a substantial and injurious effect. View "Thompson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law