Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Okoro was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of a misdemeanor property crime. For unknown reasons, Okoro never received a “Gerstein hearing” to determine probable cause during his two months of incarceration. Okoro, then 23, had Type I diabetes, which he could control by monitoring his blood sugar levels. While he was in college, however, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, which compromised his ability to care for his diabetes. Immediately after his arrest, Okoro’s relatives began calling to inform correctional employees and medical staff of his conditions. Okoro was detained in his cell, usually in isolation, and was dependent on jail employees and medical staff to monitor his blood sugar level and provide insulin shots. On December 23, 2008, Okoro collapsed in his cell. An autopsy revealed that Okoro’s death was the result of diabetic ketoacidosis, a buildup of acidic ketones in the bloodstream that occurs when the body runs out of insulin. A doctor and a nurse, employed by the healthcare company that contracts with the jail, moved for dismissal of the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied their qualified immunity claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record easily supports a finding of deliberate indifference to Okoro’s serious medical condition. View "Currie v. Chhabra" on Justia Law

In 2005, 10‐year‐old “Jessica” reported that she had been sexually assaulted by a man named “Ron” several years earlier. Based on her description, where she lived at the time, and the sleeping arrangements of the home, Jessica’s mother identified McElvaney, who had been her live‐in boyfriend and estimated that the assault occurred between August 2001 and February 2002. Based on additional information, McElvaney was charged with assaulting Jessica between September 26, 2001, and December 19, 2001. McElvaney’s attorney Celebre, moved to require the district attorney to indicate with greater particularity the time of the alleged assault and to prohibit modification of the time period at trial so that McElvaney could formulate an alibi and identify potential supporting witnesses. At a hearing, Celebre conceded that the state had authority to allege the three‐month date range. The trial court judge said that he would not allow the state to amend at trial. Convicted under Wisconsin law, McElvaney was sentenced to 15 years. Wisconsin courts rejected appeals asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on Celebre’s failure to object to the way in which Jessica’s videotaped testimony was presented. State courts then denied post-conviction relief based on failure to pursue the more-specific-date issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of a federal habeas petition. View "McElvaney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Norman Green was convicted of first-degree murder. While an inmate, Green decided to adopt a spiritual name: Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil. Atum-Ra was an Egyptian deity representing a fusion of the gods Atum and Ra; uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom; and al-Mutawakkil was an Abbasid caliph who ruled in Samarra. The addition of “Prince” is a mystery. He does not contend that he chose the name as part of his devotion to a particular faith. Wisconsin’s current policy is to permit an inmate to use the name on the conviction (the committed name), or the committed name in conjunction with a second name, but not to use a second name by itself unless a court grants a petition for change of name. Green claims that he suffers injury because, for example, a letter addressed to “Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil” will be returned to the sender, while a letter addressed to “Norman Green” or to both names will be delivered to him. The Seventh Circuit rejected an equal protection claim and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, finding that the policy does not create a “substantial burden.” View "Green. v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

Cooney divorced; she obtained sole custody of their sons. Later, her ex‐husband petitioned for change of custody. A court‐appointed expert diagnosed Cooney as having Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, in which a person produces or feigns physical or emotional symptoms in another person under her care. A therapist reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services that Cooney was abusing the children; DCFS investigated and entered an indicated finding of mental injury. Cooney filed an appeal, during which the ALJ recorded proceedings on microcassettes. Cooney retained a private court‐reporting company to transcribe the hearing as it occurred, creating the “Fishman transcripts.” After the appeal was denied, Cooney sought judicial review. Ultimately, Cooney filed a federal complaint, alleging that the DCFS representatives conspired to deprive her of her due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983; she claimed that the DCFS transcripts were “altered” at defendants’ direction, and that this caused delay and expense to convince the court to use the Fishman transcripts. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that no reasonable jury could infer conspiracy from the mere existence of discrepancies in the transcripts, and ordered Cooney to show cause why a Rule 38 award should not be entered against her. View "Cooney v. Casady" on Justia Law

In 1999 Obriecht was convicted of attempted second‐degree sexual assault of a child, five counts of fourth‐degree sexual assault and one count of disorderly conduct and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and probation. He was released pending his appeal, but probation was revoked when he violated its terms. In 2001, he was sentenced to seven years of consecutive imprisonment for the probation revocation. He exhausted direct appeal of the 1999 convictions. In 2002, Obriecht sought habeas relief in the district court, which was denied, because he had not exhausted state remedies. The court warned him concerning deadlines. Obriecht’ attorney apparently believed that an extension granted for appeal of the state parole violation conviction tolled the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations for the 1999 convictions. Obriecht was the placed in medical segregation and later in a mental health facility. His attorney withdrew and, when declared competent, Obriecht began to act pro se. The district court rejected his habeas petition as untimely and finding that he had not demonstrated entitlement to equitable tolling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Obriecht could not establish that an extraordinary circumstance prevented his timely filing and that he pursued his rights diligently. View "Obriecht v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Frey has owned the Peoria commercial property, which contains a shopping center, for more than 40 years, without prior incident. In 2009, a tenant, ShopRite, was found to be illegally selling Viagra without a licensed pharmacist. The city took legal action against Patel (the franchisee) personally, and the business, then revoked the liquor license for the store and “site approval for the retail sale of alcoholic liquors at the location.” Frey asserted due process violations. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. Frey did not adequately explain a substantive due process claim and had no property right such that it was entitled to any process at all before revocation of its site approval, but Frey nonetheless received due process of law before the Peoria Liquor Commission. View "Frey Corp. v. City of Peoria" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit previously held that Kaufman’s request to form an atheist prison study groups must be treated as a request for a “religious” group rather than a nonreligious activity group. Kaufman was later moved to another prison and encountered similar resistance to creation of an atheist group. After submitting grievances, he filed suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, and the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, also citing denial of his request to wear a “knowledge thought ring,” which he regards as a religious symbol, and failure to make donated atheist books available in the prison library. The district court recognized that the atheist study group is a religious one, but found that the prison supplied a legitimate secular reason for its actions: Only two inmates were thought to have any interest. The court found that prohibition of the ring did not impose a substantial burden on religious practice and was justified by the secular interest in security. There was no evidence that the defendants were responsible for losing the books Kaufman donated or that the loss was more than isolated negligence. The Seventh Circuit vacated with respect to the study group, but otherwise affirmed. View "Kaufman v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Belbachir, an Algerian citizen, 27 years old, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 2004. She overstayed and, in 2005, flew from Chicago to England, where immigration authorities returned her to Chicago. She was placed in the McHenry County Jail, which has a contract with the federal government to house detainees. She planned to seek asylum on the ground that she had a well‐founded fear of being persecuted if returned to Algeria. She committed suicide by strangling herself with her socks about eight days after arriving at the jail. Her estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that defendants had deprived Belbachir of her life without due process of law, and under Illinois tort law. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of defendants with respect to the section 1983 claims. The plaintiff appealed only with respect to McHenry County; the county sheriff and the director of the jail; and three employees of Centegra, a private firm, hired to provide medical services at the jail. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to one Centegra employee, who was aware of Belbachir’s suicidal thoughts and depressed condition, but failed to take action. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Belbachir v. McHenry Cnty., IL" on Justia Law

A child services case worker and detectives went to the home Hurlow shared with his fiancée, Funk, to check on Funk’s children. Hurlow claims that he requested that they leave unless they had a search warrant; the detectives asked Funk for permission to search, stating that her children would be taken if she did not consent. Funk gave written consent. The detectives found methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. In custody, Hurlow stated that all of the illegal items were his and that Funk had no knowledge that drugs were in the home. Harlow claims that his attorney did not listen to his version of events, did not investigate, and persuaded him to plead guilty to avoid a sentence of “30 years to life.” Hurlow entered a plea with an agreement not to contest his conviction or sentence in a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The stipulated basis for the plea stated that Funk granted consent to search in writing. Hurlow affirmed the factual basis for the plea before the district court and stated that he was satisfied with his representation. The district court denied Hurlow’s subsequent request for an evidentiary hearing and concluded that his 2255 motion was barred by the plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit remanded for a hearing, finding that the waiver did not bar his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in negotiating the agreement. View "Hurlow v. United States" on Justia Law

Bates, a black firefighter, joined the Chicago Fire Department in 1977 and rose through the ranks. In 2000, Fire Commissioner Joyce appointed Bates to one of seven District Chief positions. A District Chief is a member of the personnel management team and holds an at-will position. Bates’s work was well-regarded. Joyce resigned as Fire Commissioner in 2004, and Trotter, also black, became the new Fire Commissioner and chose his own management team; he issued a personnel order that contained eith black and 10 non-black promotions, three black and five non-black demotions, and four lateral reassignments for at-will positions. Bates was demoted to a Deputy District Chief position in Operation Relief, which is a floating assignment. The district court dismissed Bates’s 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 claims of racial discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of pretext. Trotter had sufficient experience with Bates and the Chicago Fire Department to support his assertion that Bates’s demeanor and level of enthusiasm were not compatible with his management style. View "Bates v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law