Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause. View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

At age 15 Jimenez was convicted of a murder he did not commit. He spent 16 years in prison before he was exonerated. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against the City of Chicago and former Chicago detective, Bogucki, for violating his constitutional right to due process of law and for malicious prosecution. Bogucki tainted an identification by showing the witness a picture of Jiminez in advance. A jury awarded him $25 million in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a Batson claim because the defendants did not show that a biased juror was seated or any harm. The court properly instructed the jury concerning Jiminez’s Brady claim and was not required to provide the entire transcript of the original trial. View "Jimenez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 a prisoner alleges that officials of an Illinois jail willfully failed to prevent other inmates from assaulting him. The district judge conducted a telephonic “merit‐review hearing” with the plaintiff shortly after the complaint was docketed and dismissed for failure to state a claim. There is no transcript of the hearing, and no explanation of why the judge thought the guards’ knowledge of the assault material. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the “inquisitorial” procedure employed by the judge has no basis in American law other than in proceedings before some administrative agencies, and was conducted without any safeguards. The judge may dismiss a frivolous complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(a), (b)(1), but, if the validity of a claim depends on the accuracy of the plaintiff’s factual allegations, as in this case, and their accuracy cannot be resolved without an oral hearing, those matters must be resolved in conformity with the procedures that govern trials. A judge may clarify an unclear pro se complaint by interviewing the plaintiff, but must not turn the interview into a judicial cross‐examination designed to elicit admissions. View "Williams v. Wahner" on Justia Law

Bolton was convicted of first degree murder for a 1994 shooting. On appeal, Bolton argued insufficient evidence; ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to join a stipulation between the state and a co‐defendant concerning an exculpatory pre‐trial statement; and that his 50-year sentence was excessive. The Illinois appellate court affirmed. Bolton did not appeal, but filed a state post‐conviction petition, claiming that the state fraudulently withheld photographs of the lineup and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial on that basis. The court rejected Bolton’s Brady claim because there was no reasonable probability that the photographs would have altered the outcome of the trial, characterizing the evidence against Bolton as “overwhelming,” and rejected Bolton’s Strickland challenge as waived because it was not raised on direct appeal. After unsuccessful appeals, Bolton filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming newly discovered evidence in support of his constitutional claims; prosecutorial misconduct in withholding photographic evidence of the lineup that was favorable to the defense; and that counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition, finding that Bolton did not preserve the claim that he was denied due process because the lineup was suggestive. View "Bolton v. Pierce" on Justia Law

In 1981, Hooper was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, but ordered a new penalty trial. That trial ended in another capital sentence, which was affirmed. State court collateral review left the convictions in place, but the Governor commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the Supreme Court of Illinois applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Batson decision unreasonably to Hooper’s situation in concluding that the evidence did not make out a prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection. The venire drawn for Hooper’s trial had 63 members; seven were black. Two of the seven were removed on challenges for cause. The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the remaining five. The decisions of the trial judge, who was subsequently convicted of accepting bribes, are entitled to no deference. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a fruitful Batson hearing may not be possible 32 years after the trial and that a new trial, 33 years after the crime, may be challenging. View "Hooper v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The inmate filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for using excessive force on multiple occasions. The trial court dismissed. He sought an order that he be given the trial transcript for free, to aid him in his appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, reasoning that he is not entitled to a transcript without charge as an appellant proceeding in forma pauperis. Regardless of poverty, he has three strikes (suits without merit) and has not shown that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, as described in 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Maus v. Baker" on Justia Law

Aponte sued four officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He brought one claim against each officer for unreasonably executing a warrant, and one against each for failing to prevent an unreasonable search and a state‐law claim for indemnification against the City of Chicago. See 745 ILCS 10/9‐102.) He claimed that because of damage done during the search, $9,462 was spent refurnishing his home. He also sought damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. The jury was instructed about compensatory damages and that if they found “in favor of Plaintiff but find that Plaintiff has failed to prove compensatory damages, you must return a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of one dollar ($1.00).” The jury form, however, had no space identified for the “one dollar” verdict. The jury found for Aponte on one claim against only one officer and awarded Aponte $100, which it recorded in the space designated for “compensatory damages.” Aponte sought attorney’s fees of $116,435 for 450 hours under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as a “prevailing party.” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the verdict as a mere nominal victory with no public benefit. View "Aponte v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After a collision, the driver of the struck vehicle chased the fleeing vehicle (Chandler), who turned into a dead-end alley. Rhodes, accompanied by Bridewell, Manuel, and Watkins, pulled up behind him and confronted Chandler. Hearing that Chandler had a gun, they backed off. Shots were fired. Chandler’s horn began to sound; his head was pressing the button. Witnesses indicated that two men, who may have been Manuel and Watkins, had a gun and left the scene. Police arrived. Bridewell and Rhodes told them that Chandler had shot at them. Detectives Eberle and Forberg, found Chandler dead, with a gun near his hand. They took Bridewell and Rhodes into custody, then located and arrested Manuel and Watkins. Rhodes and Watkins told police that Bridewell had shot Chandler. Bridewell, under indictment for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, was charged with murder. The others were released. After three years in custody, Bridewell pleaded guilty to a reduced drug charge; prosecutors dismissed the murder charge. Bridewell, Rhodes, and Manuel filed suit against Eberle, Forberg, and the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that their arrests were unlawful. Bridewell also claimed that the police took longer than the fourth amendment allows to present her to a judge, malicious prosecution, and emotional distress. The district judge granted summary judgment to all defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bridewell v. Eberle" on Justia Law

Bond was shot three times by her husband, who then killed himself. She survived and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, acknowledging that the state is not obliged to protect residents from crime but arguing that when the state chooses to provide protective services it cannot protect men while failing to protect women. She claimed that relatives of her husband had informed police that her husband was suicidal and potentially violent; that she reported that her husband had hit her and had acquired an arsenal of guns, some stolen, despite being disqualified from gun ownership; that she had an order of protection; that he was not arrested despite admitting violating that order; that she requested that the sheriff confiscate the guns; and that when he was arrested for domestic battery, her husband was released. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that the fact that officials assessed the risk to bond differently than Bond herself assessed the risk did not establish sex discrimination. View " Bond v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

In 2009, a political blog and a Chicago television station began reporting that Illinois State Rep. Froehlich offered his constituents reductions in county property taxes in exchange for political favors. The reports highlighted Satkar Hospitality, reporting that it and its owners donated hotel rooms worth thousands of dollars to Froehlich’s campaign. Satkar Hospitality and Capra appealed their tax assessments for 2007 and 2008 and won reductions, but after the publicity about Rep. Froehlich, both were called back before the Board of Review for new hearings. They claim that in these second hearings, the Board inquired not into the value of their properties but into their relationships with Rep. Froehlich. The Board rescinded the reductions. Satkar and Capra sued the Board and individual members under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district courts concluded that the individual defendants were entitled to absolute quasi‐judicial immunity and the Board itself is not. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but also held that the damages claims against the Board cannot proceed. They are not cognizable in federal courts, which must abstain in suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging state and local tax collection, at least if an adequate state remedy is available. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law