Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Re and Leach owned warehouses in Englewood, Florida. After leasing space in Leach’s warehouse, Daughtry told his agent that he did so because Leach stated that a sewer line essential to Re’s warehouse crossed Leach’s property without permission and lacked permits. The agent shared the information who Re, who hired assailants to beat Leach and threaten worse unless he broke the lease. Re was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for using extortion to injure Leach’s business in interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Re claimed that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance: trial counsel by stealing from Re and appellate counsel by omitting an argument certain to prevail. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that threatening someone without “obtaining” money, or value, in return, does not meet the Hobbs Act definition. A jury could find that Re’s goal in having Leach beaten was to obtain Daughtry as a tenant to get rental payments. A post-trial crime by a lawyer against his client does not spoil the trial as a matter of law; prejudice must be shown. Re could not establish prejudice. The lawyer who embezzled his funds played only a peripheral role in the trial. View "Re v. United States" on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) investigated Burkhardt, a correctional officer at LCC and determined that Burkhardt had taken his cell phone inside and used it to make 30 calls from inside the facility, in violation of IDOC policies and of Illinois law. State’s Attorney Hahn filed felony charges against Burkhardt. A few days later, another correctional officer told other employees that Burkhardt was being prosecuted for accidentally bringing a cell phone into LCC. In response, Volkman, a casework supervisor, called Hahn and left a message that “as a citizen” he did not believe that incarceration should be pursued in Burkhardt’s case, and that Hahn should consider allowing the matter to be handled through the IDOC disciplinary process. Hahn called Volkman back. News of the conversation reached the internal affairs investigator at LCC, who investigated. Volkman received a written reprimand and was suspended for five days. Volkman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, even if they were not, Volkman had not proven his case as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Volkman v. Ryker" on Justia Law

Hamilton claimed that Lorincz, dying of Parkinson’s disease, hired her to help him at home. She was a friend of Lorincz’s daughter, a former physician who was serving jail time. After Hamilton had worked 88 hours, Lorincz gave her a check for $10,000. Hamilton told Lorincz’s other adult children, by phone, that their father was dying and had given her a $10,000 check. Knowing that Hamilton had a criminal conviction, they told the police that Hamilton was taking advantage of their impaired father and went to their father’s house. Although Lorincz told the police that he wanted Hamilton to have the money and wanted the police to leave, they remained for about two hours and learned that Hamilton had been a psychologist, but her license had been revoked after her felony conviction for a $435,000 Medicaid fraud, and that Lorincz already had professional home health aides when Hamilton had “rushed” to his side. Hamilton had a history of bizarre lawsuits against government officials. Hamilton claims that the police would not allow her to leave while they were there and, when they left, required her to leave without the check, although she wanted to stay. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging police misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hamilton v. Village of Oak Lawn" on Justia Law

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.View "Morrow v. May" on Justia Law

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law

Serino was employed as a soccer coach at Oakland City University in Indiana. In September 2008, the university’s Vice President informed Serino that he was suspended from his position then contacted Hensley, Chief of the Oakland City Police Department, and told him to come to the university athletic center to speak to Serino. Hensley complied. He confronted Serino and told him that he was trespassing. Serino refused to leave and Hensley then arrested him. Serino was arraigned on charges of trespass and resisting law enforcement. The state ultimately dismissed both charges. In 2012 Serino sued Hensley and Oakland City, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution, with Indiana tort claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding the section 1983 and state‐law false arrest claims time‐barred; that the section 1983 malicious prosecution claim was not cognizable as a constitutional claim; and that his state‐law claims for malicious prosecution and IIED were barred by the defendants’ immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Serino v. Hensley" on Justia Law