Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Masked law enforcement agents, dressed in black, with guns drawn, broke into a Detroit home and allegedly assaulted and terrorized the plaintiffs. The agents were part of a multi-agency effort targeting drug trafficking and other crimes in the “8 Mile Corridor.” When the plaintiffs asked the intruders to identify themselves, the agents refused, responding instead that they were “Team 11.” In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of state and local officials and, after the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, granted the federal agents judgment as a matter of law. Undisputed testimony indicated that the state and local defendants were not part of the entry team but provided only perimeter security. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to state and local defendants, but reversed with respect to the federal agents. Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the personal involvement of the federal officers in the raid and their alleged conduct in violating plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The circumstances of this case, which include an intentional concealment of identity, coupled with an “I wasn’t there” defense, warrants shifting the burden of production onto the federal agents to establish their lack of involvement. View "Burley v. Gagacki" on Justia Law

In 1994 an Ohio jury convicted Mason of aggravated murder, rape, and having a weapon while under disability; the court adopted a recommendation that Mason be sentenced to death. Mason’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal; state court collateral attack was unsuccessful. In 1999, Mason sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit granted a conditional writ to “result in the vacation of his death sentence unless the state of Ohio commences a new penalty-phase trial against him within 180 days from the date that the judgment in this matter becomes final.” On remand, the district court entered its own conditional writ recalculating the date on which the 180-day period began. The period set by the Sixth Circuit expired, and no retrial had commenced. Mason was subsequently removed from death row, and a new sentencing proceeding was scheduled. The district court rejected an argument that the state should be prevented from seeking the death penalty for failure to comply with the deadline. The Sixth Circuit modified, holding that the district court erred by recalculating the beginning of the 180-day period without authority, but that the state may, nonetheless, seek the death penalty at the penalty-phase retrial. View "Mason v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

After her child was murdered by his father, the mother sued employees of county and state Child Protective Services (CPS) and others,, alleging negligence; violations of constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. 1983); and violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act--Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. 670, and of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. 5106. The complaint alleged that from 1998-2007, CPS received numerous complaints about the father’s abuse and neglect of the child and his siblings. The district court rejected a defense of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contours of the substantive due process right to be free from government action increasing the risk of harm was not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that pursuing the father for use of a cattle prod, while failing to immediately remove the child, would violate the child’s substantive due process rights. Given previous cases, it is not clear that a reasonable CPS official would understand that failure to seek termination of parental rights would constitute denial of procedural due process. Without ignoring the father’s role in causing the child’s death, CPS employees’ conduct cannot be said to be the “most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the injury. View "Jasinski v. Tyler" on Justia Law

Droganes is a Kentucky fireworks dealer. In 2007, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) agents raided his business on suspicions that he was illegally selling “display” fireworks and seized more than 800,000 pounds of merchandise, only part of which proved to be contraband. Display fireworks are more powerful than consumer fireworks and are subject to greater regulation. Droganes pleaded guilty to distributing explosives without a license (18 U.S.C. 842(a)(1)) and agreed to forfeit the seized items determined by ATF to be display fireworks.” The government tendered a proposed forfeiture order encompassing all such fireworks, which the district court accepted. Droganes objected to the breadth of the order and the classification standard the government used to classify the fireworks and sought monetary sanctions for alleged failure to return the legal fireworks in a timely manner or to reimburse him. The district court rejected all of his claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court’s determination of forfeiture was consistent with Droganes’s plea agreement. The court acknowledged the “seemingly interminable delays in testing the seized fireworks, many of which the government knew not to be display fireworks.” View "United States v. Droganes" on Justia Law

After a physical altercation in 1993, his wife (Carol) told O’Neal and his sons to leave the house. She filed a domestic complaint and planned to change the locks. O’Neal later returned to the house, broke through the front door and fired three shots Carol, one of which fatally wounded her. Carol’s son alleged that O’Neal also attempted to shoot him but that the gun jammed. A police canine unit later found him hiding in a nearby house where he surrendered. He confessed to the shooting. A forensic examination linked the bullet removed from Carol’s body to the pistol in O’Neal’s possession at the time of his surrender. Convicted of aggravated murder, O’Neal was sentenced to death. Ohio courts affirmed and denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that three sub-70 IQ scores were insufficient on their own to prove O’Neal had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning. The court rejected claims, aimed at the aggravated burglary specification, that O’Neal received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to present the actual lease to support his assertion of contractual privilege to enter the house, and of spousal privilege. View "O'Neal v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Three-month-old Jiyen was killed when 11 shots were fired into his home in a drive-by shooting. Prosecution witnesses testified to overhearing Drummond, discussing a retribution for the death of a fellow gang member, seeing Drummond with an assault rifle 15 minutes before the fatal shots were fired, and to hearing Drummond say that “he didn’t meant [sic] to kill the baby. A search of Drummond’s house yielded ammunition consistent with the shooting and a variety of items tying him to the gang. During the trial, the court twice closed the courtroom, once stating that witnesses felt threatened by some of the spectators. A jury found Drummond guilty on all counts; the trial court sentenced Drummond to death. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State courts denied post-conviction relief. A federal district court granted habeas corpus in part, holding that the state trial court violated Drummond’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Drummond’s family was removed from the courtroom after objection without any explanation regarding the scope of the closure and without considering any alternative options. View "Drummond v. Houk" on Justia Law

In 2008, the FBI issued its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) to implement newly revised Department of Justice guidelines, addressing use of race and ethnicity in investigations. Under this guidance, the FBI may identify and map “locations of concentrated ethnic communities” to “reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities … assist domain awareness,” and collect “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU submitted a Freedom of Information Act request, seeking release of documents concerning policy on collecting such information, and records containing information actually collected. The FBI initially released 298 pages (48 partially redacted) of training material, previously released for a similar request by the ACLU’s Atlanta affiliate. The ACLU filed suit. With additional releases, the FBI identified 1,553 pages of potentially responsive records: training materials, “domain intelligence notes,” “program assessments,” “electronic communications,” and maps. The district court held that the FBI appropriately withheld records under a FOIA exemption for law enforcement information whose release could “interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(A). The Sixth Circuit affirmed; release of publicly available information selectively used in investigations may reveal law-enforcement priorities and methodologies and interfere with enforcement. The ACLU’s proposed procedure for resolving the dispute was inadequately protective of sensitive information; in camera review was appropriate. View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

Scozzari was fatally shot by two police officers. Plaintiff, as representative of decedent’s estate, brought a civil rights action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to a known medical need. After the officers’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was denied, a jury found in favor of the officers. The district court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was required to prove that deliberate indifference proximately caused decedent’s death. The district court later granted plaintiff a new trial on the deliberate indifference claim because our circuit has held that “in delay-of-treatment cases, it is not necessary to show that the delay in providing medical care proximately caused the injury” when it would be obvious to a layperson that there was a risk of serious harm without immediate medical attention. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for interlocutory appeal. Defendants cannot satisfy the requirement that “a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists regarding the correctness of the decision.” View "Miedzianowski v. City of Clare" on Justia Law

Vandiver filed a pro se civil action against Prison Health Services (PHS) and five medical professionals, alleging that the defendants violated and are continuing to violate his Eighth Amendment rights by deliberate indifference to the health care needs associated with his serious chronic conditions, including Hepatitis C and diabetes and that as a result, he has undergone partial amputations of his feet and suffered visual impairment. He claimed that he is at risk of further injury, including additional amputations, coma, and death. He acknowledged having previously filed three complaints that were dismissed as frivolous. The district court denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis, applying the three-strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that alleging a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being presently denied adequate medical treatment for a chronic illness satisfies the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. Allegations of incremental harm culminating in serious physical injury may present a danger equal to that of an injury that occurs all at once. View "VanDiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Danou is a naturalized U.S. citizen from Iraq. He, his family, and his trust own several real estate ventures, including Southfield, Triple Creek, and Danou Technical. In 2006 Southfield borrowed $13 million from Flagstar Bank. Danou, Triple Creek and Danou Technical guaranteed the loan; Southfield and Triple Creek put up collateral. Southfield did not repay the loan in full when it came due in 2009 and the parties restructured the loan. In 2011, Chambless, a Flagstar employee charged with work on the bank’s “troubled assets” and loans, investigated Southfield’s finances, although Southfield claims it was current on all of its restructured obligations. Chambless told Danou that Flagstar “would under no circumstances ever consider an application” to refinance the loan again. The following year, when Danou requested an extension, the bank refused to provide an application, despite Danou’s offer of additional collateral and his wife’s guarantee. The district court dismissed a claim of national origin discrimination under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Between the obvious alternative explanation for the denial and purposeful, invidious discrimination a court will not infer discrimination. View "16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law