Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

An officer found a tool bag outside the McNamara Federal Building. Thinking it was lost property, the officer stored the bag in the building for three weeks without inspecting it. Eventually, someone x-rayed of the bag and discovered objects consistent with an explosive device. The Detroit Police Bomb Squad detonated the bag, resulting in a sizable secondary explosion. The bag containing the bomb was sold exclusively at a chain hardware store that also sold the particular timer used in the device. Investigation led to identification of Mikulich, who was charged with attempting to destroy a government building by means of explosive while creating a substantial risk of injury to a person, 18 U.S.C. 844(f)(1)–(2); using and carrying a destructive device during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(B)(ii); and possessing an unregistered destructive device, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). Mikulich exhibited erratic behavior during his first appearance. After he was adjudged incompetent and remanded for treatment, the government requested that he be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs. The district court rejected Mikulich’s argument that the government lacked a sufficiently important interest in trying him, that he faced civil confinement in the absence of criminal sanction, and that he intended to raise an insanity defense The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mikulich did not demonstrate that any special circumstances weaken the government’s clear interest in trying him for the serious crimes of which he is accused.View "United States v. Mikulich" on Justia Law

Rachells, an African-American account executive in the Cleveland region since 2001, received numerous sales awards, consistently exceeded company sales goals by the greatest margin among his co-workers, and, in 2003, earned the top performance review among his Cingular peers. In 2004, Cingular acquired AT&T and eliminated five of nine existing Cingular and AT&T account executive positions. Although Rachells exceeded his 2004 sales goals by a greater margin than in 2003, he received the lowest 2004 performance review score of any candidate for retention and was ranked seventh out of nine in the overall selection process. Rachells was notified that he would be terminated and sued for racial discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Cingular on all claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Rachells had produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. View "Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Nurse Turetzky and Doctor Desai opened a clinic in 1976. They fought, and sometimes the fights turned physical. In 1983, they agreed to dissolve their partnership once Desai repaid Turetzky’s investment. Weeks later, police found Turetzky dead in a parking lot, having been strangled. Gorski and Adams worked at Desai’s clinic. Gorski testified that, before the murder, Adams told him repeatedly that Desai wanted Turetzky killed. After the murder, Adams confessed to Gorski that he had killed Turetzky and that Desai wanted him to leave Michigan. State prosecutors charged Desai and Adams with first-degree murder in 1995. The month-long joint trial began in 2001. There was evidence that Desai solicited a hitman in 1982, took out insurance on Turetzky in 1983, asked whether Turetzky’s body had been found before it was discovered, drove to the crime scene that day, and gave Adams $2,000 after the murder. A jury found Desai guilty of murder; the judge imposed a life sentence. The jury failed to reach a verdict for Adams. Desai’s challenge to reliance on Adams’ confession was rejected by Michigan courts. A federal district court granted Desai’s habeas petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Confrontation Clause no longer applied to non-testimonial hearsay such as confession from Adams to Gorski. On remand, the district court granted Desai’s habeas petition based on his due process claim, after it was rejected by state courts. The Sixth Circuit again reversed. View "Desai v. Booker" on Justia Law

Peoplemark is a temporary-employment agency that used an application form that asked applicants whether they had a felony record and conducted an independent investigation into the criminal records of all applicants. Scott, an African American with a felony conviction, submitted an application and was not referred for employment. She filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Peoplemark’s attorney stated that clients knew of the policy and some had told Peoplemark not to refer felons. A review of more than 18,000 documents showed that Peoplemark had referred felons to job opportunities. The EEOC sent a letter indicating that Peoplemark had violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(A), based on its conclusion that a companywide policy of rejecting felon applicants had a disparate impact on African Americans. Attempts to conciliate failed. The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Scott and a class of similarly situated persons. Additional discovery revealed that there was no company policy and the case was dismissed. The district court awarded Peoplemark $751,942.48 in fees and costs, including attorney’s fees from October 1, 2009, finding that as of that date the claim was unreasonable. The award also included Peoplemark’s expert fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award.View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Peoplemark, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, Henderson was stopped for speeding. The officer discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen. A Detroit Police Officer attempted to organize a live lineup, but could not locate five males of defendant’s description. The officer then conducted a photographic lineup, at which Henderson was identified as the suspect in a carjacking. Police records indicate that an attorney representing Henderson’s interests, Corr, was present for the photographic lineup. After Henderson’s conviction, Corr wrote a letter to Henderson stating that he had not been present at the lineup. At trial, Henderson’s counsel challenged neither admission of the photographic lineup, nor testimony regarding it and presented no evidence. Henderson was convicted of armed robbery and carjacking. State court efforts were rejected as untimely because the filing arrived one day late due to failings in the prison mail system. Henderson filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court found several claims to be procedurally defaulted based on the lateness of Henderson’s application for leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of his first motion for reconsideration, which caused the Michigan Court of Appeals to dismiss his application. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Sixth Circuit law, Maples v. Stegall, (2003), provides that “[w]here a pro se prisoner attempts to deliver his petition for mailing in sufficient time for it to arrive timely in the normal course of events” that circumstance “is sufficient to excuse a procedural default based upon a late filing.” View "Henderson v. Palmer" on Justia Law

An internal investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office found evidence suggesting that during the Jefferson trial on drug-conspiracy charges, the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense the extent of the promises of leniency that the prosecution made to cooperating witnesses. In a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, Jefferson alleged that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor violated his obligation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material impeachment evidence. Following a remand, the district court again denied Jefferson’s motion, finding that Jefferson’s claims were not timely filed, that equitable tolling was not warranted, and that even if timely, Jefferson’s Brady claims failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the claims filed on the merits, because the material at issue was not prejudicial. The court rejected the conclusion that Jefferson failed to exercise due diligence in these circumstance. A section 2255 petitioner is permitted to rely on the government’s representation that it has fulfilled its Brady obligations. Reasonable diligence does not require a section 2255 petitioner repeatedly to scavenge for facts that the prosecution is unconstitutionally hiding from him. View "Jefferson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dixon and Hoffner beat their friend Hammer, tied him to a bed, stole his wallet and his automobile, drove him to a remote area, and buried him alive. One month into the investigation, Hoffner led police to Hammer’s body and Dixon provided a tape-recorded account of the events. Dixon was indicted for aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. At trial, the defense presented no evidence and cross-examined only three of 15 prosecution witnesses. The jury convicted Dixon on all charges and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed. The Ohio Court of Appeals consolidated Dixon’s direct appeal and post-conviction appeal, arguing ineffective assistance, and affirmed. The Ohio Supreme Court also affirmed. Dixon then filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing, and violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit ruled that his confession was coerced, deeming his remaining claims pretermitted. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed. After review of the remaining claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instruction, and exclusion of mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing, the Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas corpus. View "Dixon v. Houk" on Justia Law

In 2007, Gillis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 4.12 grams of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 860(a) and sentenced to 262 months of imprisonment. On remand for reconsideration of the career-offender sentencing guidelines, in 2009, the district court resentenced Gillis to 191 months. Six months after the deadline to appeal his resentencing, Gillis wrote to the judge, acknowledging that his appeal was not timely and requesting that the court permit late appeal. His attorney subsequently filed a belated notice of appeal. The Sixth Circuit dismissed that appeal as untimely filed. Gillis filed a pro se motion to set aside his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not timely appeal. Gillis did not respond to a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed because Gillis had not filed his 2255 motion within the one-year limitation period. The Sixth Circuit held that, although Gillis did not file his appeal for 201 days, there was appellate jurisdiction; when a district court fails to issue a separate judgment in denying a 2255 motion, a petitioner effectively has 210 days to submit an appeal. However, the district court properly dismissed Gillis’s 2255 motion as time-barred under 2255(f). View "Gillis v. United States" on Justia Law

A “millionaire party” involves betting on games of chance customarily associated with a gambling casino, using imitation money or chips that have a nominal value equal to or greater than the value of the currency for which they can be exchanged, Mich. Comp. Laws 432.103a(8). Millionaire-party licenses may be issued to a “qualified organization” for up to four consecutive days at a single location. Proceeds from a millionaire party, less “reasonable” expenses incurred to operate the event, must be “devoted exclusively” to the charitable purposes of the licensee. Following denial of licenses for millionaire parties to be held at adult businesses, plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that they were deprived of their constitutionally protected status as an “approved lessor” for millionaire parties without due process of law. They claim that the state adopted a blanket policy of denying all such applications in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ exercising their First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that plaintiffs’ allegations concerning retaliation must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, but that being an “approved lessor” is not a protected entitlement. View "Top Flight Entm't, Ltd. v. Schuette" on Justia Law

Good, a Michigan inmate, claims he was convicted based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state trial court denied his motion to suppress without holding an evidentiary hearing, and a state appellate court denied his appeal. Good sought, and was denied, a federal writ of habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the prohibition on federal habeas review of exclusionary rule claims that applies to prisoners who received “the opportunity for full and fair consideration” of their claims in state court. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals has rejected Good’s due process argument on the merits, Good may prevail only by showing that the decision was contrary to or unreasonably applied U.S> Supreme Court precedents, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). Good identified no Supreme Court holding establishing that the Due Process Clause ever requires an evidentiary hearing on a Fourth Amendment suppression motion. View "Good v. Berghuis" on Justia Law