Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Responding to a report of underage drinking in a home, officers found a group celebrating eighth grade graduation. Police asked the teens to step outside individually for breathalyzer testing. Seven tested positive for alcohol. Police arrested them and notified their parents. In the morning, a juvenile worker arrived at the police station, and, after speaking with a judge, indicated that the children were to be detained for a court appearance the next day. At the regional juvenile detention center, the minors underwent routine fingerprinting, mug shots, and metal-detection screening. During a hygiene inspection and health screening, they were required to disrobe completely for visual inspection to detect “injuries, physical abnormalities, scars and body markings, ectoparasites, and general physical condition.” A same-sex youth worker observed the juveniles for several minutes from a distance of one to two feet, recording findings for review by an R.N. The minors were required to shower with delousing shampoo. They were released the following day. The charges were dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the juveniles, based on a “clearly established right for both adults and juveniles to be free from strip searches absent individualized suspicion” that negated a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that no clearly established principle of constitutional law forbids a juvenile detention center from implementing a generally applicable, suspicionless strip-search policy upon intake into the facility.View "T. S. v. Doe" on Justia Law

The dismembered remains of Abby’s friend were found in plastic bags on a lawn in Buena Vista. Technicians found Abby’s fingerprints on the bag and bits of the victim’s flesh on a saw that Abby had borrowed. The police charged Abby with murder. Abby retained attorney Gust. Gust entered his appearance on Abby’s behalf. Abby retained another attorney, Piazza, weeks later. Both appeared on Abby’s behalf, sometimes separately and sometimes together. Only Gust was present when Abby’s trial began. After jury selection, Abby objected to proceeding without Piazza. The court indicated that it was inclined to proceed without Piazza. The next morning, both Gust and Piazza appeared. Piazza indicated that Gust was “lead counsel” but that “Abby is on a different plane with that.” The prosecutor rejected a proposal that he lead with less significant witnesses to accommodate Piazza’s schedule. Abby’s conviction was affirmed. The district court rejected a habeas petition in which Abby argued that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and that Gust was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has not held that a defendant’s right to counsel of choice is necessarily violated when his secondary retained counsel has a scheduling conflict precluding attendance at trial. Abby was not prejudices by Gust’s performance. View "Abby v. Howe" on Justia Law

Deleon, a 53-year-old Hispanic male, was employed by the Kalamazoo County Road Commission for 28 years. Beginning in 1995, he was an “Area Superintendent” and generally received positive reviews. Deleon alleges a pervasive atmosphere of racial insensitivity and derogatory comments. In 2008, a vacancy arose for an “Equipment and Facilities Superintendent,” described as being in a garage with exposure to loud noises and diesel fumes. After an interview, Deleon did not receive the position. His computer skills were insufficient. In 2009, Deleon was involuntarily transferred to the position. Deleon objected, claiming that, in applying for the position, he demanded a raise because of the “hazard posed by diesel fumes and poor ventilation.” He did not receive a raise. Deleon claims that he developed bronchitis, a cough, and sinus headaches, and would blow black soot from his nostrils. Deleon’s first evaluation indicated that his performance was “acceptable in most critical areas but [was] not sufficiently above minimum satisfactory level in all areas.” Days after a fractious meeting with his supervisor, Deleon was hospitalized for five days. He claimed a work-induced mental breakdown and took eight months’ FMLA leave. Deleon’s psychiatrist cleared him to return to work, but the Commission had terminated him. Finding that Deleon did not suffer an “adverse employment action,” the district court dismissed his claims of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence of conditions that would support discrimination claims and that the fact that Deleon applied for the position did not disqualify him from showing that the employment action was “adverse.”View "Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s neighbor, Yassine called the Dearborn police and reported that plaintiff was standing in the yard, staring into his window, and appeared to be intoxicated. Sergeant Peer arrived, interviewed Yassine, and approached plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff claims that he had chased his dog into the yard, then returned to his porch, where officers attacked him without warning. Plaintiff did not identify which officers took specific actions. Another neighbor testified that she saw two officers strike plaintiff and that the officers then departed and plaintiff got up and walked away. The officers and Yassine testified that plaintiff lunged at Officer Peer and that other officers took him down, arrested him, and drove directly to the police station. A video showed that plaintiff hit his head against the cage of the patrol car several times, contradicting plaintiff’s account. Medical examinations showed symptoms “suggestive of impaired consciousness.” Younes sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment on state law claims of gross negligence as to the officers and battery as to Peer, but denied summary judgment on other claims, finding that issues of material fact remained concerning immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that the officers did not concede the most favorable view of the facts to plaintiff. View "Younes v. Pellerito" on Justia Law

McGuire was convicted of the kidnaping, rape, and aggravated murder of Joy Stewart and was sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court summarized the evidence presented in mitigation and determined that the aggravating factors carried sufficient weight to support the sentence. Following sentencing, McGuire’s appellate counsel, which had not represented him at trial or at sentencing, did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the state appellate court affirmed the sentence of death. The Ohio Supreme Court deemed the claim forfeited. A federal district court denied a habeas petition and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a motion under FRCP 60(b), McGuire sought to re-open a claim asserting the ineffectiveness of trial counsel arising from their failure to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of trial, relying upon the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision, Martinez v. Ryan, and arguing that the procedural default for this claim should be excused because his counsel on state post-conviction review was ineffective. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial. McGuire did not demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances required to justify relief from final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).View "McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Individual plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally stopped, searched, or detained by the U.S. Border Patrol for the Sandusky Bay Ohio Station, based upon their Hispanic appearance, race and ethnicity. They claimed that in the three years the station has been open, 61.8% to 85.6% of those apprehended have been Hispanic, and use of racial slurs by agents. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief and monetary damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents and 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, and claimed that agents had violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged conspiracy between the Border Patrol and municipalities, police chiefs and individual officers, to violate the civil rights of Hispanics. An amended complaint added the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, as a source of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs settled their claims with local agencies. The district court denied plaintiffs’ request to add claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 and dismissed, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to establish waiver of sovereign immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The APA section 702 waiver of sovereign immunity extends to all non-monetary claims against federal agencies and their officers sued in their official capacity, regardless of whether plaintiff seeks review of “agency action” or “final agency action” as set forth in section 704.View "Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol" on Justia Law

Hocker drank a six-pack of beer and drove to the home of his sometimes-girlfriend. A protective order directed Hocker not to go to her house. The woman called 911, reporting that Hocker was “highly intoxicated” and “suicidal” and that he had just left her home in a red Honda. Officers saw a red Honda with its headlights off speed past their police cruisers. They gave chase, using lights and sirens. Hocker denies seeing or hearing the officers during the seven-mile pursuit. After Hocker pulled off the road into a gravel driveway and stopped, the officers exited their cruisers with guns drawn and ordered Hocker to show his hands and turn off his car. Hocker put his vehicle in reverse, accelerating, and rammed a cruiser, moving it 30 feet. The officers opened fire on Hocker’s vehicle and forcibly removed a severely wounded Hocker from his car. After pleading guilty to wanton endangerment, fleeing or evading police, and driving under the influence, Hocker sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on grounds of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep't" on Justia Law

Off-duty Richmond Kentucky Police Officers visited the apartment of April McQueen by invitation, where the four adults engaged in sexual activity that “included bondage and discipline, dominance and submission and sadism and masochism.” Later, McQueen visited her neighbor, and, concerned about her appearance because she was going to meet another man, explained what had happened and asked for an ice pack or medicine for her bloodied, swollen mouth. The neighbor insisted, over McQueen’s reluctance, that the incident be reported. An investigation ensued, but McQueen refused to cooperate. Her account of the extent of her consent varied. She stated that she wanted to “forget the whole damn thing.” During grand jury testimony, McQueen stated that she allowed the men to urinate in her mouth only because one had slapped her and scared her with his aggressiveness: “That part was not consensual.” She testified that she was still scared. McQueen also testified about pressure being applied by Sheriff Department personnel. After they were found not guilty, the officers filed suit against those who had been involved in the investigation and prosecution. The district court dismissed claims against two prosecuting attorneys, on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Rogers v. O'Donnell" on Justia Law

In 1993, Dixon and Hoffner beat their friend Hammer, tied him to a bed, stole his wallet and his vehicle, and then drove him into a remote area and buried him alive. One month into the investigation, Hoffner led police to Hammer’s body and Dixon provided a tape-recorded account of the kidnaping, robbery, and murder. At trial, Dixon presented no evidence and cross-examined only three of the government’s 15 witnesses. The jury convicted and recommended the death penalty, which the court imposed. Ohio courts rejected appeals and a post-conviction petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Dixon filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, improper jury instructions, improper exclusion of mitigating evidence at sentencing, and a violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state court thoroughly and thoughtfully reviewed the instructional error, and cured any error that may have occurred. Dixon presented no evidence of what his mitigation witnesses might have testified to and offered minimally helpful supporting affidavits. The state court’s conclusion that the exclusion of Dixon’s wrongful incarceration as a result of a prior false allegation was harmless was not contrary to clearly established federal law.View "Dixon v. Houk" on Justia Law

Ortega, a U.S. citizen, began an 11-day sentence of home confinement for driving under the influence on March 18, 2011. He had to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times. With prior approval, he could go to work, the doctor and church. The corrections department received a detainer for Ortega from federal immigration authorities, who issued the detainer after seeing Ortega’s DUI conviction and noticing that Ortega’s name and birth date resembled, but did not exactly match, those of an unlawful alien. As a matter of policy, the local department incarcerates any individual with an immigration detainer. On March 19, officers took Ortega to the local jail, where he remained until his release on March 22. The department did not conduct its own investigation of Ortega’s citizenship. Ortega filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. The district court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that city officers violated his rights against deprivations of liberty without due process and against unreasonable seizures when they carried out the detainer and that the immigration agent caused those violations by issuing the detainer, and stating that qualified immunity protects all but “the plainly incompetent,” View "Ortega v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law