Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Some of Kaplan’s students obtain financial aid through the U.S. Department of Education. Some Kaplan employees have access to those students’ financial information. About 10 years ago, Kaplan discovered that some financial-aid officers had stolen students’ payments and that some of its executives had engaged in self-dealing, using relatives as vendors. Kaplan implemented measures to prevent abuses, including credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions and positions with access to company financials, cash, or access to student financial-aid information. Reports include whether: an applicant has ever filed for bankruptcy, is delinquent on child-support, has any garnishments, has outstanding judgments exceeding $2,000, or has a social-security number inconsistent with what the credit bureau has on file. The report does not note the applicant’s race. When the EEOC sued Kaplan, alleging disparate impact on African-Americans, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (a)(2), (k), EEOC relied on statistical data compiled by Murphy, who holds a doctorate in industrial and organizational psychology. The district court excluded Murphy’s testimony as unreliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the EEOC uses the same criteria for hiring. EEOC presented no evidence that Murphy’s methodology, which involved Murphy looking at copies of drivers’ licenses to determine race, satisfied any of the factors that courts consider in determining reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Murphy himself admitted his sample was not representative of Kaplan’s applicant pool as a whole. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp." on Justia Law

After 20 years on Ohio’s death row, D’Ambrosio was granted habeas corpus relief on the grounds that the Cuyahoga County prosecutor violated his obligations under Brady v. Maryland. The state attempted to reprosecute him through mid-2009, but continued to fail to disclose exculpatory evidence and failed to alert D’Ambrosio or the court that its key witness had died. Ultimately, the district court granted an unconditional writ of habeas corpus, citing “extraordinary circumstances” and barring Ohio from reprosecuting. The state conviction was never vacated. After his release, D’Ambrosio filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that defendants violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the complaint did not plausibly allege any viable constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after rejecting a statute of limitations defense. The prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial and the complaint’s allegations were insufficient to plausibly allege the existence of an official county policy of violating criminal defendants’ constitutional rights. View "D'Ambrosio v. Marino" on Justia Law

In 1993, a Tennessee jury convicted Sutton of premeditated first degree murder and felonious burning of personal property. Sutton’s trial counsel represented him through direct appeal, and filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In 2000, Sutton dismissed his trial counsel. New counsel amended his petition, raising ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time. The state trial court denied relief. Sutton was appointed new counsel for his federal habeas petition, which included new claims that his trial counsel failed to object to jury-selection procedures and to use of a “moral certainty” standard in jury instructions regarding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court denied the petition, finding the newly raised claims procedurally defaulted and that Sutton did not show “cause” for the default and “prejudice” from the error, or that a manifest miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Days later, the Supreme Court heard argument in Martinez v. Ryan, ultimately holding that ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel can establish “cause” to excuse procedural default of an ineffective assistance at trial claim where state procedural law prohibits defendants from raising such claims on direct appeal and requires they be raised in post-conviction proceedings. The district court found Martinez inapplicable because Tennessee’s procedural law does not prohibit ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court considered Trevino v. Thaler, and held that the rule also applies where state procedural law permits defendants to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal, but makes it highly unlikely that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise such a claim. The Sixth Circuit remanded, holding that the Trevino ruling applies to Tennessee decisions. View "Sutton v. Colson" on Justia Law

Laster is an African American male who worked as a Public Safety Officer for the KDPS for 23 years. He alleges that KDPS subjected him to heightened scrutiny, selectively enforced policies, and was complicit when individual employees harassed and discriminated against him, and that the disparate treatment was attributable to race or to his complaints about discrimination. He specifically cited a 2006 performance evaluation downgrade, followed by a grievance and reversal; denials of a request to attend outside training and of other requests; reprimands; and tampering with his Obama screensaver. Laster filed two charges with the EEOC. While those were pending, Laster was involved in a conflict with other KDPS officers at an event during which President Obama was present. Information about the incident was released to a newspaper. Laster resigned and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court analyzed the claims for “Race Discrimination” and “First Amendment Retaliation” and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that activity protected by the First Amendment is different than the type of activity protected by Title VII. Analysis of the Title VII race discrimination claim was insufficient for dismissing the Title VII retaliation claim; the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the “adverse employment action” element of a Title VII race discrimination claim. That Laster cannot show that he was constructively discharged is not dispositive of the retaliation claim, given evidence of other adverse actions. View "Laster v. City of Kalamazoo" on Justia Law

Driving a stolen vehicle and wearing face masks, Jackson and Ivery arrived at a bank, intending to commit robbery, but were confronted by an off-duty Canton police officer working security. The officer drew his weapon and yelled “police!” After gunfire between Ivery and the officer, Jackson ran across the street. In a parking lot, he approached Sara Binegar, driving her car. Jackson opened the door, pointed a gun, and told her to “scoot over,” then tried to sit on her. Bineger escaped through the passenger door. Jackson drove away in Bineger’s car. Jackson was convicted of aggravated robbery and attempted kidnapping. At sentencing, Jackson argued that the convictions were for allied offenses of similar import under Ohio law and requested merger. The court denied the request, after comparing the elements of the offenses and stating that “one could [commit] the offense of kidnapping without committing the offense of aggravated robbery and vice versa.” The court imposed consecutive sentences of 10 years for aggravated robbery and five years for attempted kidnapping. State courts rejected appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the state court decision was not contrary to or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law concerning Double Jeopardy. View "Jackson v. Smith" on Justia Law

Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims.View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law

King pled guilty to armed robbery and bank robbery while on parole for a prior felony offense. As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed that consecutive sentencing would not apply and the court imposed concurrent sentences for the armed robbery and bank robbery convictions. As required by Michigan law, the court imposed those sentences consecutive to King’s parole sentence. King sought to withdraw his plea, arguing only that the prosecutor impermissibly reneged on the plea deal by failing to abide by his promise of leniency. The state trial court found that the prosecutor never promised something that was not within his power: having the parole sentence run concurrently with the newly-imposed sentences. King then sought habeas relief. The federal district court denied the claim, finding the state court’s determination that there was no breach of King’s plea agreement was not objectively unreasonable. On appeal, King claimed that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered under the Supreme Court’s holding in Boykin v. Alabama. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that, with respect to this new claim, King failed to exhaust state remedies. View "King v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

PTM provided the services of a CEO to the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) to control daily operations, while ultimate management authority remained with SORTA’s Board of Trustees. PTM hired Plaintiff as SORTA’s Chief Operating Officer. Plaintiff, an African American woman, a graduate of West Point and University of Michigan Business School, had no prior industry experience. Two years later, PTM changed hands and Plaintiff became CEO on an at-will basis. Within months, PTM began questioning her allegiance to PTM. Plaintiff repeatedly declined to participate in PTM programs. Tensions escalated during negotiations for renewal of PTM’s management contract, which prohibited PTM employees from working for SORTA within a year of its expiration. Plaintiff’s PTM contract contained the same prohibition. PTM suspected that Plaintiff and SORTA were conspiring to have SORTA hire Plaintiff directly. The contract was extended and the one-year hiring prohibition was removed from the contracts. PTM executives continued to regard Plaintiff as a “prima donna” and exchanged several emails critical of Plaintiff. Following a dispute concerning unionization of SORTA workers, PTM fired Plaintiff, purportedly for lying about the dispute. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding PTM’s investigation inadequate to establish that Plaintiff lied.View "Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Miller was convicted in Michigan of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole. The evidence included email and instant-message conversations between Miller and her lover, Cassaday, in which Miller lied to Cassaday that she was pregnant with his children but that her husband abused her, causing her to miscarry; convinced Cassaday that her husband was involved in organized crime and that her life was in danger; and plotted her husband’s murder. Cassaday told his brother Mike that he was leaving town and that, if he did not return, Mike should look for a briefcase under Cassaday’s bed. Bruce Miller was murdered on November 9, 1999. Miller promptly ended her relationship with Cassaday and started dating someone else. Cassaday committed suicide. Mike found the briefcase and notes, which he opened in the presence of an attorney. The case contained copies of the emails and IM conversations. Its contents were admitted into evidence with evidence linking the communications to Miller’s and Cassaday’s AOL accounts. Cassaday’s suicide note was also admitted. Miller claimed that admission of the note violated her clearly established Sixth Amendment right to confront her accuser and sought habeas corpus. Following a remand, after the Supreme Court vacated an earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision upholding the note’s admission did not violate clearly established law. View "Miller v. Stovall" on Justia Law

Reed, who suffers from seizures as the result of a motorcycle accident, filed suit based on two incidents. In the first, inside Reed’s cell at the Franklin County Corrections Center, deputies were unable to handcuff Reed for transport to a hospital following a seizure, due to his resistance. They twice used a Taser to subdue him. The incident was captured on videotape. Later that day at the hospital emergency room, a deputy used a Taser on Reed after Reed lunged at the deputy. Reed argued that the deputies used excessive force and that the county failed to train the deputies on the proper use of Tasers, creating a policy and practice of abuse. Finding that “no rational fact finder could conclude that the defendant deputies acted with conscience-shocking malice or sadism” toward Reed during either incident, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it would not put the onus on the deputies to assess the seriousness of Reed’s seizure in order to determine whether it warranted immediate medical treatment. The decision to use a Taser to subdue Reed to take him to the hospital “might have been unwise, but it was not unconstitutional.” View "Shreve v. Franklin Cnty." on Justia Law