Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

An inmate at a maximum security facility brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that he was injured by prison guards and received inadequate treatment. The district court entered a stay of discovery, based on defendants' claim that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and later dismissed the case without lifting the stay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims related to medical care, stating that the evidence was sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent. The court reversed and remanded summary judgment on the excessive force claim, stating that the inmate's request for a video of the incident was not vague and goes to the essence of the claim.

A social worker employed by the Department was the primary case worker for plaintiffâs son, who was removed from his motherâs custody by the Department. After boy was adjudicated neglected by the juvenile court, custody was granted to his maternal great aunt and uncle. Plaintiff, who wished to take custody, claimed that the social worker misrepresented his desire and ability to parent and impeded his ability to participate in custody proceedings. The district court denied the social worker's motion for summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the social worker is absolutely immune from suit for her participation in juvenile court proceedings, regardless of whether she conducted an inadequate investigation or knowingly made false statements. Because the social worker's conduct neither caused any deprivation of the plaintiff's interest in family integrity, nor interfered with the process, qualified immunity barred remaining claims. The juvenile court was responsible for the "deprivation" and the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard.

After leaving the scene of an accident, severe enough to deploy airbags, the plaintiff was located in his vehicle under the canopy of a hospital. An officer attempted to block his vehicle, but the plaintiff attempted to escape by driving over a curb. The officer succeeded in blocking the car, pulled the plaintiff out of the car, ran after the rolling car, ordered the plaintiff to "go down," knocked the plaintiff to the ground, then drove the plaintiff home. The district court refused to dismiss plaintiff's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the officer was protected by qualified immunity for his actions, which were reasonable and did not violate the plaintiff's rights.

The district court declared an amendment to Kentucky Revised Statutes Sect. 393.060 unconstitutional. The amendment shortens the period for presumption of abandonment on travelerâs checks from 15 to seven years, accelerating the date at which the issuer must remit outstanding funds to the state. The company claims that the amendment limits its ability to earn interest by investing unclaimed funds. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, applying the "rational basis" test. Although the legislative history did not reflect it, the court the court considered the state's "rational claim" that the amendment was intended to facilitate its legitimate interest in assuming control of abandoned property. The court declined to invalidate the amendment simply because it may be unwise to deviate from the 15-year presumptive abandonment period of the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, followed by 48 states. The court remanded for consideration of other constitutional claims.

The district court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus to an inmate serving 18 years to life for complicity in a drug-related murder. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Ohio court's determination that the inmate was not denied effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations was not contrary to clearly established federal law. The inmate exhausted state remedies as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, and did not default her claim by failing to present it in a separate post-conviction proceeding in the trial court, as the Ohio Court of Appeals advised her to do. The court made a determination on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim, regardless of its procedural suggestion. It was not unreasonable for the court to hold that the evidence did not establish a reasonable probability that the inmate would have accepted a plea offer if her counsel had told her that she could be convicted of complicity.

The representative of the estate of a deceased individual filed a civil rights suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The court denied the motion of another (Gresham) for joinder, amendment of the complaint to include Gresham's claims, and class action certification. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal. Gresham was not a party to the case, in which there has been no entry of a final or appealable order disposing of all issues. The court declined to treat the filing as a petition for mandamus.

Petitioner, serving 387 months for drugs and weapons offenses, filed a pro se action he characterized as habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2241). The district court characterized the suit as a civil rights action and dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. The petitioner has a long history of abusive litigation and may not proceed in forma pauperis, under the "three strikes" rule, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly characterized the claim, which stated that it was asserting a âcivil tort action for civil rightâs violation,â alleged violations of the First Amendment, and sought monetary damages. The district court effectively warned the petitioner about the consequences of recharacterization in a 2002 order, stating that he âshall not be permitted to file any further actions in forma pauperis without first obtaining leave."

The plaintiff and her four-year-old daughter, Muslim U.S. citizens, were returning from Canada in 2006 when a Customs and Border Protection computer mistakenly identified them as armed and dangerous. She was handcuffed and questioned for several hours; her car was searched and damaged. The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit to obtain unredacted Treasury Enforcement Communications System and Automated Targeting System (ATS) documents from DHS and for failure to maintain accurate records under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. The Sixth Circuit vacated in part and remanded. Noting a split in the circuits, the court held that an agency may exempt a system of records from civil remedies provisions of the Act only if the underlying substantive duties fall within the Act's general exemption provision. Claims concerning improper disclosure and records of First Amendment activity do not fall within the general exemption, but DHS properly exempted the records from other provisions of the Act. The court further noted that the effort to exempt the all of the records may have been ambiguous and procedurally inadequate. A challenge to exemption of documents from the ATS was properly rejected for failure to claim "adverse effect" as a result of alleged procedural deficiencies.

The city amended its code to prohibit sexually-oriented businesses in downtown and planned development districts and later published notice of intent to prohibit such uses in a development authority district and imposed a temporary ban on issuance of new licenses. While the ban was in place, the owner sought permission to operate a topless bar in the area. The ordinance requires the clerk to act within 20 days; the clerk rejected the application after 24 days. The amendment prohibiting the use was enacted about two weeks later. The district court rejected the owner's civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The city's evidence showed that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to deal with secondary effects, blight and deterioration of property values, and leaves open reasonable opportunity to operate an adult business. Even if only 27 sites are available, rather than 39 as the district court concluded, the number is adequate in a city that had only two applications in five years. The 24-day decision period did not amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint; prompt judicial review was available.

In order to participate in a pre-trial release program, the defendant agreed to random drug testing. He submitted to five tests that involved urination in full view of an employee of the private company that conducts tests for the Kentucky courts. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first acknowledging that the company acted under color of state law. The direct observation method of urine collection was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The manner of collection is a matter of judicial administration, not law enforcement; the court's interest in ensuring accurate testing outweighs the defendant's diminished expectation of privacy. Cheating is pervasive and there is no requirement of suspicion that an individual defendant will cheat. Rejecting tort claims of false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intrusion into solitude, the court stated that the conduct did not go beyond the bounds of decency and that the defendant had no right to privacy under the circumstances.