Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs a pro-life, non-profit corporation engaged in anti-abortion activities, including publicity campaigns, and an individual, challenged government policies that, they allege, target individuals defendants deem to be "rightwing extremists" for disfavored treatment. The district court dismissed claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that despite many conclusory and irrelevant allegations, plaintiffs did not identify any policy aimed at their constitutionally-protected rights. Plaintiffs did not address affirmative conduct undertaken by defendants, did not allege any time, place, or manner restrictions imposed on speech, did not allege that they were taxed or punished for First Amendment activities, did not allege any prior restraint on protected, and did not allege any form of retaliation for exercise of protected speech on identified occasions. There was no plausible evidence of disparate treatment

The inmate, serving a life sentence for first-degree murder and carrying a gun while attempting to commit a felony, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and violations of state law. He claims that defendants improperly rejected his incoming mail and filed two false misconduct reports against him after his success in an earlier retaliation suit. The district court dismissed most of the claims as unexhausted, and granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to exhaustion, but reversed summary judgment on a retaliation claim because the inmate had not received requested discovery materials. The inmate was required to file individual grievances challenging all but one of the mail rejections; the state was not on notice of an ongoing problem because the rejections were based on different policies. Michiganâs rules provide that the only avenue for challenging major misconduct reports is a hearing, which the inmate did not request.

Defendant, a police officer, noticed a Tahoe that looked like a Michigan State Police vehicle and suspected that it was being used for impersonation of a law-enforcement officer. After state police advised that it was not theirs, defendant parked behind the vehicle, and approached plaintiff. Plaintiff stated that that he was a security guard, had a concealed-carry permit, and owned a handgun that was on the seat. Defendant handcuffed plaintiff. A check disclosed a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. Plaintiff was in custody for two hours before it was determined that the warrant was for another individual. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiff was not seized at the initial encounter or was subjected to a brief, reasonable "Terry" stop. A reasonable person would have felt free to continue walking after defendant's vehicle was parked behind the Tahoe; defendant neither displayed a weapon, nor touched plaintiff and did not use language or a tone of voice compelling compliance. The use of handcuffs and detention were justified because defendant was in a threatening situation. Failure to loosen the cuffs did not constitute excessive force.

While pursuing a vehicle that fled from the scene of a drug raid, officers saw a 12-year-old, apparently crouched behind a car while walking the dog, and ordered him to stay put. The boy ran into a house, an officer pursued, and "chaos ensued" because the boy's mother did not realize that her son's pursuer was an officer. Officers cuffed and removed mother and son and, subsequently, punched and pepper-sprayed the mother. In a suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, the district court denied the officer qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the denial was based on a finding that material facts were disputed.

Proposal 2, a successful voter-initiated amendment to the Michigan Constitution, became effective in 2006 and prohibited public colleges from granting "preferential treatment to[] any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin." The district court entered summary judgment upholding Proposal 2. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and applying strict scrutiny because the enactment changed the governmental decision-making process for determinations with a racial focus. Proposal 2 targets a program that "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority" and reorders the political process in Michigan in such a way as to place "special burdens" on racial minorities. Admissions committees are political decision-making bodies and the Proposal is more than a mere repeal of desegregation laws. The court noted the procedural obstacles that would be faced by minorities favoring race-based admissions.

Plaintiffs filed suit under the federal Driverâs Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725, and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that personal information, as defined by the DPPA, was disclosed by individual defendants while acting as agents of the Ohio Department of Public Safety or the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV). The BMV apparently made bulk disclosures of personal information from motor vehicle records to a company, for an asserted permissible purpose, and the company resold or redisclosed the information. The district court determined that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. On interlocutory appeal. the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The DPPA is not a strict liability statute and the defendants made the disclosures for a purportedly permitted purpose; they did not violate plaintiffs' "clearly established" rights. The DPPA does not impose a duty to investigate requests for disclosure nor does it clearly prohibit bulk disclosures.

After receiving assurance that her 72-acre farm operation complied with Michigan Agriculture Environmental Assurance Program cropping system requirements and with cost-effective pollution prevention practices and environmental regulations, which provides protection against nuisance suits, plaintiff planned a composting operation. State litigation concerning the plan was pending and a stop-work order was in place when neighbors started to complain about odors. After various inspections and orders, the owner received notice that the MAEAP certification was being withdrawn and filed claims against the township, its supervisor, state officials, and citizens. The district court dismissed claims against state officials, except an equal protection claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the officials were shielded by qualified immunity. An allegation that the plaintiff is a woman and that a man was treated more favorably was insufficient to state an equal protection claim; there was a basis for each of the state's actions with respect to the plaintiff's operation and no evidence that the same facts applied to the man's operation. Nothing suggested that the defendantsâ actions were not taken in good faith and pursuant to applicable statutes.

Officers went to the house at 11:40 p.m. to execute a warrant on the son, who had failed to appear on drunk-driving charges. Waiting in a breezeway, they saw the father in the kitchen and yelled to drop the gun. The father, with poor sight and hearing, asked who the officers were. An officer fired four shots. The father died. Mother and son were cuffed and detained. The district court dismissed several claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but held that the officers were not shielded by qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity for the officer who fired. If he shot while the man was trying to comply, as claimed by the son, he violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from deadly force. The court reversed with respect to the officer who was not a supervisor and did not shoot. The court properly retained the mother's Fourth Amendment claims; the officers had fair notice of constitutional violations inherent in subjecting a bystander to detention, excessive in duration and manner. The district court erred in not dismissing state-law gross-negligence and intentional tort claims. Although the officers may have been objectively unreasonable, they did not act in bad faith under Michiganâs subjective standard for governmental immunity.

Each summer, plaintiff leads a group of Christians at the Arab International Festival with a goal of converting Muslims to Christianity. In 2009, Dearborn police instituted a restriction that prohibited leafleting from sidewalks directly adjacent to Festival attractions and on sidewalks and roads that surround the Festivalâs core by one to five blocks; it allowed leafleting at the Festival only from a stationary booth and not while walking. The district court denied a temporary restraining order before the 2009 Festival and granted summary judgment to the defendants in 2010. The Sixth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal for the 2010 Festival, permitting leafleting from outer sidewalks and roads, but not on sidewalks directly adjacent to attractions, then reversed with respect to the "free speech" claim. The restriction on sidewalks adjacent to attractions does not serve a substantial government interest. The city keeps those sidewalks open for public traffic and permits sidewalk vendors, whose activity is more obstructive than leafleting; the prohibition is not narrowly tailored to the goal of isolating inner areas from vehicular traffic. The city can be held liable because the Chief of Police, who instituted the leafleting restriction, created official municipal policy.

African-Americans residing near a contaminated landfill claim that municipalities knew that well water was contaminated, warned Caucasian families and provided alternate sources of water, but did not warn African-Americans. In their suit under the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and state laws, a magistrate compelled testimony by plaintiffs' former counsel; the city asserted that, if plaintiffs consulted the attorney in 2000, the action is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. During a deposition, the attorney refused to answer some questions. The court granted a motion to compel. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs were not appealing a final judgment and did not qualify for interlocutory review under the Perlman exception or the collateral order doctrine. Immediate review is appropriate if an order conclusively determines a disputed issue separate from the merits that is too important to be denied review and will be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Privilege is important and the attorney is a disinterested non-party, so the contempt-citation avenue of review is practically foreclosed, but plaintiffs, asserting the privilege, ultimately can avail themselves of a post-judgment appeal that suffices to protect the rights of the litigants and preserve the vitality of attorney-client privilege.