Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2005 petitioner was convicted, under Michigan law, of felony murder for his role in the robbery, fire, and homicide at a gun shop. He had initially invoked his right to counsel, after which an officer made a remark about the possibility of the death penalty. A day later, petitioner stated that he had planned the crime. The trial court refused to suppress the statement. After exhausting state appeals, petitioner was denied habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision, that the death penalty statement did amount to an impermissible interrogation and that the coercive effect of this interrogation had subsided by the next morning, so that petitioner had validly waived his right to counsel before giving his statement, did not reflect an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court noted that it is not clear that the death-penalty comment qualified as the functional equivalent of interrogation, as opposed to a type of "subtle compulsion" to cooperate that is not foreclosed by precedent.

Following their termination from appointed county positions, plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they were terminated without due process of law. The positions were "unclassified" and not protected under the Tennessee Civil Service Merit System. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and its officials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had no legitimate property right to their positions and nothing for the Due Process Clause to protect. Plaintiffs, in their positions five to 21 years, never previously challenged the unclassified nature of their jobs

Defendant was discharged from the U.S. Army due to a personality disorder. He was later charged under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. 3261(a), and sentenced, by a federal district court, to life in prison for participating in a sexual assault and multiple murders while stationed in Iraq. Co-conspirators, still on active duty and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(1), were tried by courts-martial and each sentenced to between 90 and 110 years imprisonment; they are eligible for parole in ten years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first noting that Iraq could not prosecute the defendant and that prosecution in the U.S. did not violate international law. The Army completed a valid discharge of defendant, so that he was no longer subject to courts-martial. His trial under MEJA did not violate the separation-of-powers principle or his due process or equal protection rights. Defendant was no longer similarly situated with his co-conspirators when charges were filed.

The district court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254) by an Ohio death row prisoner, convicted of two 1992 murders. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that he could not make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial because the jail doctor had him taking an anti-psychotic drug. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a substance abuse expert, any such evidence would have been cumulative. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence from defendant's upbringing, the rationale for not presenting the materials is consistent with concerns about some of the damaging elements that might have been introduced. The decision not to suppress defendant's confession, even though he was in drug and alcohol withdrawal at the time, was reasonable.

After exhausting state appeals from his conviction for crimes including felony murder, defendant unsuccessfully petitioned the district court for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial. A claim that defendant was required to walk in front of the jury in shackles was procedurally defaulted and defendant did not demonstrate prejudice that would excuse the default. A claim that failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel was also defaulted.Defendant failed to allege any facts sufficient to make out an access-to-courts violation in regard to his prison's law library.

Defendant admitted to participating in the 1984 robbery and to shooting husband (who survived), but claimed not to have shot wife. He entered a plea of guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder. At a penalty hearing, defendant argued that he had participated in the plot only under the influence of Wesley, who shot wife. The panel sentenced defendant to death. When Wesley was tried, the state presented evidence that he, not defendant, was the principal offender in the murder. Wesley was sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole after 20 years. Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or vacate the death sentence was rejected. The Sixth Circuit's 2004 grant of habeas corpus was remanded by the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit again remanded with instructions that the district court issue a conditional writ of habeas corpus unless the state holds a new sentencing hearing within 90 days. Defendant's due process rights were violated by arguments leaving the impression with that he was the principal offender in the murder, even though the state had evidence and a belief that Wesley was actually the triggerman. It is likely that the panel would not have imposed a death had the state not persisted in its efforts.

Plaintiff, an inmate, failed to stand during a head-count and was pulled from his cell, handcuffed, and placed in an observation cell for more than 12 hours with his hands restrained behind his back. He claims that he missed a meal and was unable to push a button for water or pull down his pants to use the toilet; his requests for mental health services went unanswered. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the facility and 11 employees on grounds of qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the institution had waived its defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity by failing to properly raise it. Claims for monetary damages from employees in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but claims for declaratory and injunctive relief may proceed. Defendants had fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional and the alleged facts were sufficient to find that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm and that defendants disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

Plaintiff, serving a non-parolable life sentence in a Michigan prison, sued the parole board (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming that its change in policies concerning when it recommends commutation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Both the former and current policies give the parole board complete discretion in deciding whether to recommend commutation of a prisonerâs sentence to the governor. Commutation is left entirely to the discretion of the governor and plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to show a significant risk of an increased prison term because of the changes in policies.

Defendant was convicted in Tennessee in 1998 of especially aggravated robbery and state courts upheld his conviction. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse an African-American prospective juror The conclusion that the prosecutor provided legally sufficient, race-neutral reasons for striking the individual and application of a sole-motivation standard, rather than a per se approach or mixed-motive standard, were not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established legal principles. Defendant's claim that he felt he had no choice but to represent himself because he was unhappy with his appointed counsel is not a basis for granting habeas corpus; the court reasonably concluded that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Husband and wife married in 1996, when husband was a training officer at a juvenile correctional facility and wife was working as the youth-services administrator at the same facility. In 2005 husband was terminated, after a disciplinary incident. He was later reinstated. Wife was subsequently demoted. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs' right of intimate association was clearly established long before husband was terminated and wife was demoted and transferred; it was objectively reasonable to require defendants to be aware of and observe the constitutional right. There was sufficient evidence that defendants were substantially motivated by wife's marriage in removing her from her position. Defendants did not present sufficient evidence that wife would have been demoted and transferred absent her protected association.