Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of a murder, committed to prevent testimony in a criminal case, and was sentenced to death. After Ohio courts denied appellate and post-conviction relief, the federal district court denied 47 claims of error asserted in a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The defense argued that the prosecution wrongfully withheld evidence of prior inconsistent statements made to the police by state witnesses and plea-agreement deals, grants of immunity, and other inducements given to such witnesses in violation of its "Brady" obligation. The court concluded that the defense did not establish prejudice to excuse procedural default of some aspects of the claim and did not show that the undisclosed evidence was sufficiently material to warrant relief. Defense counsel's representation of a witness did not adversely affect his representation so that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, nor was he prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to hearsay evidence during the penalty phase or to adequately prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court also rejected claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Petitioner, arrested for rape on July 6, 2001, was not tried until February, 2003 because of continuances and motions by both parties and the court, some of which concerned DNA testing and unavailability of a defense expert. He was received four consecutive life sentences. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected a claim under speedy trial provisions in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.71 and the supreme court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the deference owed state court decisions under the pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Ohio's manner of looking at the reason for delay is thus not contrary, or diametrically opposed, to federal precedent. The state court reasonably considered relevant factors and its finding that petitioner was not prejudiced was supported. At most, the delay in holding trial constituted official negligence, but petitioner did not put forth any facts to show that the continuances, failing to submit DNA samples on time, and failing to submit a bill of particulars were a calculated attempt to gain an advantage at trial.

Petitioner, convicted of the first degree murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, unsuccessfully sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254), arguing that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing present an insanity defense, despite knowledge of petitioner's long, well-documented history of severe mental illness. The Sixth Circuit reversed The Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and unreasonably determined facts. That court acknowledged that counsel did not sufficiently investigate the insanity defense by obtaining an independent evaluation to rebut that provided by the forensic center, but instead relied on a self-defense strategy that was contradicted by the evidence. The court improperly looked at petitioner's actions after the shooting, rather than his state of mind at the moment of the offense, resulting in "a thinly veiled and unsupportable conclusion that it simply did not believe" that petitioner was legally insane, a factual issue that it should not have addressed. There is an "overwhelming probability" that knowledge of petitioner's history would have shed a different light on testimony that petitioner killed a complete stranger with minimal or no provocation, but then testified clearly and consistently that he believed the victim was trying to kill him and did shoot him.

A state court issued a judgment in forcible detainer and a notice of eviction, which was executed by defendants. Although the warrant did not mention personal property, the landlord and county attorney advised the officers that the landlord had the right to sell tenant's personal property. Tenant was threatened with arrest for his efforts to prevent removal of his personal property. Officers apparently assisted in removing the property to a truck and sent away state police officers called by the tenant. In tenant's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers' motion for judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The officers' participation amounted to an unconstitutional seizure of property in violation of a clearly established right; there was nothing extraordinary about the situation that entitled the officers to rely on advice given by the county attorney by phone.

Plaintiff, a witness in a gang-related racketeering case, was detained for 12 days, based on the prosecutor's representation to the trial court that plaintiff was unwilling to testify. She was not given an opportunity to be heard or to post bond. Entering judgment for the defendant in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for conduct falling within her role as a prosecutor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When making statements at a preliminary examination about the availability of a witness, the prosecutor functioned as an advocate for the State of Michigan and performed acts intimately associated with the judicial process; she was absolutely immune from suit for her prosecutorial conduct.

In 1988 defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated felony murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to death. A federal district court concluded that the prosecution had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, requiring the state either to set aside the convictions and sentences or conduct another trial within 180 days. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. About a week before retrial was to begin, the prosecutor notified defense counsel of additional evidence, including blood and soil samples. Defense counsel sought additional time. The court changed the scheduled trial date, which was within the 180 days, to May 4, 2009, which was not. The district court denied the state's motion for more time, issued an unconditional writ, ordered expungement of defendant's record, but declined to bar reprosecution. On remand, following the death of the state's key witness, the district court barred reprosecution.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court continued to have jurisdiction, despite the fact that defendant was no longer incarcerated, based on the collateral consequence: the threat of reprosecution.

A Caucasian high school football player (H) accidentally hit an African-American team member (D) with his car, causing D to suffer a sprained ankle. H got out and apologized. D threatened to kill him. The principal had instructed staff to be lenient with African-Americans because too many were serving suspensions. Although the Code of Conduct prohibits threats, the school did not discipline D. D's parents threatened suit. The principal admitted suspending H for 10 days to "cover" himself and the school. H's witness statements were not provided to panelists in advance. H's attorney was limited to passing notes and not allowed to present witnesses. Employees were informed that they would lose their jobs if they attended the hearing. The board sustained the charge of reckless endangerment and suspension, so that it went on H's record. An appeal was denied. Before his suspension, college recruiters had approached H and a congressman had offered an appointment, the first step to attend a military academy. H alleges he lost those opportunities. The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for substantive due process violations, failure to train, and negligence; claims by H's parents; claims against individuals in their official capacities; claims against the board of education and the public school system. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss procedural due process and equal protection claims based on the conduct of three defendants and that those defendants are not protected by qualified immunity.

Petitioner was convicted of murdering a man and raping his daughter, setting their house on fire, and related offenses. At the mitigation hearing, his parents testified about an unpleasant childhood, but defense counsel did not present evidence of "horrific" conditions in records from Childrenâs Services and in affidavits from his siblings, including evidence of rape, incest, and sexual abuse, or present evidence of petitioner's attempt to help his younger sister. A psychiatric consultant, employed despite the fact that he was not a trained mitigation specialist, advised the attorneys to obtain those records, but they did not do so, nor did they prepare witnesses to testify. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel at the mitigation hearing and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus vacating the death sentence, unless the State of Ohio begins a new mitigation hearing within 180 days. Despite gruesome crime, there is a reasonable probability that, had the three-judge panel heard the true horror of petitioner's childhood, at least one of the judges would not have sentenced him to death; the Ohio court's conclusion to the contrary was unreasonable,

Larry Gibbs was convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin and was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years' imprisonment. Later, Gibbs filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that a prior state conviction for narcotics possession had been improperly assessed as a predicate trafficking offense under federal sentencing guidelines. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that Gibbs's failure to raise this claim during his direct appeal constituted a procedural default. Gibbs subsequently filed a motion to set aside the Court's judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), claiming that his procedural default should be excused because (1) he was "actually innocent" of the sentence he received, and (2) the claim he pursued was unavailable during his direct appeal. The district court denied Gibbs's motion. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Gibbs's argument was available to him on direct appeal, his procedural default was not excused; and (2) because a court could have reasonably believed a thirty-year sentence was appropriate in this case, Gibbs could not rely on "actual innocence" to excuse his procedural default.

The executor of the estate's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims that decedent was killed while riding a motorcycle across an empty field, in the middle of the night, after a low-speed chase, when a deputy intentionally rammed that motorcycle. The district court held that the deputy's actions, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, violated decedent's clearly established constitutional rights, precluding qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. If a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.