Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity.

Petitioner was convicted in 1993 of a 1991 aggravated murder, was sentenced to death, and exhausted Ohio state court remedies. He filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas corpus in 1999 and amended his petition in 2003 to set forth 28 claims for relief, some with multiple subclaims. After filing, petitioner obtained information that the prosecution had withheld evidence that, before trial, a witness had been adjudicated delinquent for marijuana trafficking, contradicting his testimony that he never sold drugs. The district court held proceedings in abeyance while he exhausted state law remedies on the new Brady claim, then denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court decision on the Brady claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. The court rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct (vouching, inflaming the jury, and denigrating defendant and defense counsel) and ineffective assistance.

In 1975 federal court held that the city had discriminated against minorities in hiring entry-level firefighters. In 1977, the court approved a consent decree that included racial classifications as a remedy. A 2000 amendment noted that the percentage of minority firefighters had increased from four to 26 and set a goal of 33-1/3 percent; the court required that one of every three hires be minority applicants. During the years that followed, the city did not hire, but laid off firefighters. In 2009, the court declined to extend the decree and its racial classifications for another six years. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the district court did not make findings concerning whether the racial classifications continue to remedy past discrimination.

Checking accounts were opened in the name of Diallo by a man with a passport bearing that name. The IRS deposited $3,787 into the account. Diallo withdrew $2,500 before the bank discovered that the money was a tax refund belonging to another. The account was blocked and the bank notified the IRS. The IRS made additional deposits for tax refunds. Diallo attempted to make a withdrawal, but the transaction was blocked. Later that day, at the airport, defendant was flagged for additional screening. The search revealed envelopes containing large amounts of cash and unsealed envelopes containing passports bearing defendant's picture but different names, including the name Diallo. He was indicted for possession of a false passport, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344 and 1028A(a)(1). The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the government failed to establish that the search was constitutional, and barred admission of the bank records. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although actual documentation seized during the search must be suppressed, evidence obtained legally and independently of the search is not suppressible, even if the government cannot show that it would have discovered its significance without the illegal search. The minimal deterrent effect of suppression is outweighed by the burden on the truth-seeking function of the courts.

In 2002 defendant was tried in Michigan for the stabbing death of a police officer after a traffic stop. The jury sent a note to the judge asking to re-hear testimony from five witnesses. Without consulting with counsel, the judge denied the request. Defendant was convicted and exhausted appeals without raising the court's failure to consult with the parties before denying the request. State courts also rejected collateral attacks that did raise the issue. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus, holding that defendant procedurally defaulted all his grounds for relief, except for his ineffective-assistance argument, because he did not raise them on direct appeal. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance argument on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant made no argument that he suffered actual harm from the failure to consult the parties; the trial court had good reason to conclude that the request to re-hear testimony was unreasonable. Not all communications between a judge and jury are critical or per se harmful. The state court reasonably concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate his appellate counsel's deficiency.

Indicted for rape of an 11-year-old, defendant was convicted of attempted rape, a second-degree felony (O.R.C. 2923.02/2907.02). At the time, statutes included a rebuttable presumption in favor of minimum sentences for second degree felonies (two years) unless the court determined that probation adequately satisfied the purposes of sentencing or supported a longer sentence; trial courts were required, in some cases, to make additional, findings. The trial court found that defendant had served time for a prior conviction, was a sexual predator, and posed the greatest likelihood of recidivism, and imposed a sentence of eight years. While appeal was pending, a 2006 Ohio supreme court case gave courts discretion to impose any sentence within the ranges without making specific findings. On remand, the trial court again imposed a sentence of eight years, finding only that defendant is a sexual predator. After exhausting state remedies, defendant sought habeas corpus asserting that retroactive application of the 2006 decision violated the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant was always at risk for the eight-year maximum sentence, based on his history. The change in law did not limit the right to appellate review.

Defendant, a sheriff's deputy, was convicted of falsifying a document (18 U.S.C. 1519), with respect to the death of a pretrial detainee. Following transport from a hospital, where the detainee had been treated for seizures, deputies subdued the detainee, shoved him so that he hit his head on a wall, then put him in a "sleeper hold" that rendered him unconscious. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the structure of the indictment was duplicitous and that the district court's failure to provide the jury with a specific unanimity instruction violated his right to a unanimous verdict.

Defendant, sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend and her two children in 1988, exhausted state remedies. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal district court denied his petition for habeas corpus in 2001; the Sixth Circuit held appeal in abeyance while he exhausted "Atkins" claims in state court. Tennessee courts rejected his claim of mental retardation. The district court also denied an Atkins petition. The Sixth Circuit vacated the decision on the Atkins claim and affirmed on all other claims. On remand, the court must consider the relationship between mental retardation and mental illness and whether defendant displayed deficits in adaptive behavior by the time he was 18. Rejected claims concerned the court's failure to answer jury questions regarding whether defendant could be paroled from a life sentence; ineffective assistance in counsel's failing to object to the prosecution's penalty-phase closing argument that giving a life sentence would reward him for the additional killings of the children and by failing to hire a psychiatrist regarding his mental-health issues; and the court's determination of his competency to stand trial.

The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Secret Service agents staked out plaintiff's home to execute an arrest warrant for her boyfriend. After seeing the boyfriend outside the house, officer knocked. When he answered the door he was cuffed and taken to a vehicle. At roughly the same time, five agents entered the house and conducted a protective search, without a warrant, in the presence of plaintiff, who was visibly pregnant, and her sister. They seized a shotgun, ammunition, and (according to plaintiff) $9,600 in cash. Plaintiff alleges that the officers refused to let her use the bathroom during their search, forcing her to urinate on herself, that they pushed and pulled her from room to room, that they used racial epithets, and that they threatened to arrest her. She filed several "Bivens" claims and a civil conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court rejected some claims, but awarded $3,000 in damages for the search and property seizure. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not establish a civil conspiracy.