Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Tennessee law mandates mediation in certain contested divorce proceedings. Now-Judge Martin was appointed and performed mediation in plaintiff's divorce as part of his private legal practice. The divorce was granted, allowing wife to take the children to Japan during vacations but requiring her to live within 100 miles of husband. Husband believed that wife planned to abduct the children to her native Japan, petitioned to modify the parenting plan, and sought a restraining order. The hearing, initially assigned to another, was re-assigned to Judge Martin. The parties agreed to have Judge Martin hear the motion, despite the judge raising the issue. Judge Martin ruled in favor of wife, who subsequently took the children out of the U.S. with no apparent intent to return. Husband was awarded full custody; wife was charged with felony custodial interference. Husband filed suit against Martin as both judge and mediator; the law firm as his employer; and a court-ordered parental coordinator, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law negligence and contract theories. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

Perkins was convicted of a fatal stabbing. He exhausted appeals. The conviction became final in 1997. He did not file a petition for habeas corpus within one year, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). In 2008, he filed a habeas petition, raising sufficiency of the evidence, jury instruction, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance claims. Arguing that the petition should be governed by AEDPA’s "new evidence" statute of limitations, Perkins introduced new affidavits that alluded to his innocence and to the guilt of a witness. The latest was signed in 2002, so that the limitations period expired in 2003; Perkins argued that the period should be equitably tolled because he is actually innocent. The district court denied the request because the evidence was not of the sort needed to pursue an innocence claim, was substantially available at trial, and pointed to the same theory argued at trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While equitable tolling generally depends on the petitioner's diligence in pursuing his rights, a petitioner with a credible claim of actual innocence should be treated differently.

In 2003, petitioner pled guilty to unarmed robbery of $10 that occurred when he was 17 years old and had no prior criminal history. He suffered from A.D.H.D. and had been in special education since first grade. After being sentenced to “boot camp,” petitioner returned to court for violating rules. After a 20-minute hearing, at which supporters offered counseling and employment, the judge sentenced him to 1 to 15 years in prison. He served six years. He did not pursue direct appeal. The judgment became final in 2005. Efforts to obtain post-conviction relief in state court were unsuccessful. In September, 2006, a Michigan court rejected a second post-conviction motion as prohibited by state law. The supreme court denied appeal. In 2007, petitioner filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus. The district court found that the limitations period was tolled while the second motion was pending in state court despite the motion being barred. The court issued an unconditional writ on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due-process grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of whether equitable tolling of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2) applies. The second motion could not be accepted and, therefore, was not “properly filed,” so the petition was not timely.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, felonious assault, (with firearm specifications) and possession of cocaine and sentenced to 258 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice due to the failure to suppress the photographic array identification, and insufficient evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner did not file a timely appeal, but almost six years later, filed an unsuccessful motion for leave to file a delayed appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. He also pursued post-conviction relief in state courts without success. The district court denied a habeas corpus petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Petitioner was aware of the factual predicate of his claims at the time of his direct appeal, and the claims do not implicate sections 2244(d)(1)(B) or 2244(d)(1)(C). The limitations period began to run on the date that his judgment became final, at the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. Neither statutory nor equitable tolling apply and petitioner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. .

A 1998 settlement (MSA), between states and large tobacco companies (OPMs) included incentives for non-parties to join, but OPMs retained the most favorable payment terms. The MSA permitted states to enact statutes requiring nonparticipants to make deposits into escrows to be held for 25 years, in case a state obtained a future judgment against that nonparticipant. The MSA ensured that OPMs retained favored treatment over other participants. Plaintiff entered the market in 2000, as a nonparticipant, paying into state escrow accounts. As escrow payments became more burdensome, Plaintiff joined the MSA after negotiating a back-payment and future payments. During negotiations, defendants denied Plaintiff information about payment reductions granted to grandfathered companies. Plaintiff, unhappy with the disparate treatment and unable to meet its obligations, was unable to negotiate better terms because of an MSA provision that would entitle other participants to more favorable terms if such terms were granted to a late-joiner. Plaintiff sued tobacco manufacturers and attorneys general, alleging antitrust (15 U.S.C. 1, 3 (a)) and constitutional violations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Manufacturer defendants were immunized under the Noerr-Pennington and state-action doctrines. Plaintiff's waivers were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, regardless of representations made during negotiations.

In 2000 plaintiff, a Caucasian, began working at a juvenile detention facility. He was a member of the Michigan State Employees Association Union and could only be terminated for cause. Between 2005 and 2007, plaintiff was the subject of incident reports, referred to formal counseling, and suspended several times. In 2007, a co-worker filed a Confidential Discriminatory Harassment Report with the Michigan Department of Human Services. Plaintiff responded by filing an EEOC claim of discrimination. He obtained a right-to-sue letter. After his termination and unsuccessful arbitration, plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1),(2)). The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, with respected to the Title VII claims, but vacated with respect to the FLMA. Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant retaliated against him for exercising his FMLA rights.

The Festival is an annual event at a 200-acre public park. Two private organizations rent the park. The city provides a number of facilities and services and the park remains open to the public. The organizations rent booth space to exhibitors; the application prohibits sales or solicitation outside the booth. Plaintiffs are Christians who attended the Festival to speak on their religious beliefs and carry sandwich board signs. After lengthy discussions, with Festival workers and police, plaintiffs decided to avoid arrest and leave. They sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and nominal damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The district court denied a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit reversed. City officials engaged in state action by supporting and actively enforcing the solicitation policy. The policy was content-neutral, but not narrowly-tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.

Petitioner was indicted in state court on two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.04(A), and one count of gross sexualimposition, Ohio Rev. Code 2907.05(A)(1). During trial, the court allowed the prosecution to amend the indictment to conform dates to testimony and declared a mistrial. The state proceeded toward another trial. The court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. The district court denied a pretrial petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed after conducting de novo review. The court rejected a double jeopardy argument, finding that the mistrial resulted from prosecutorial negligence, and not from an intentional action by the prosecution because its case was going badly. The court concluded that the prosecution gained no advantage.

John was a ninth grade special education student. Jane, in eighth grade, believed that she was John's girlfriend. Jane's mother claims that John sexually harassed Jane by shoving her into a locker out of jealousy, requesting oral sex, and making obscene gestures during a basketball game. After confronting John, who became hostile, Jane's stepfather wrote to administration. John's IEP team created a plan requiring constant adult supervision at school for the next 30 days. Seven weeks after the supervision ended, after school, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds. John, who had a long disciplinary history, including harassment and assault, and had been arrested twice, was then expelled. A school he previously attended had agreed not to expel John and to purge disciplinary records in exchange for his withdrawal. Jane's mother filed sued the school and officials, alleging violations of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered judgment for defendants on all counts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff abandoned her 1983 claim, did not establish animus for a 1985 claim, did not establish deliberate indifference, or a special relationship that would create a duty to protect her daughter, or that Jane was deprived of access to educational opportunities.