Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Davis, an insulin-dependent inmate chosen to participate in an off-site public works program, claimed that he was removed from his public-works employment because of his sexual orientation. He claimed that officers supervising his work crew ridiculed and belittled him and that when he believed he was suffering a low blood sugar incident at the work site, the supervisor refused to directly hand him a packet of honey. Supervisors had Davis complete a medical health care request and meet with a nurse upon his return to the correctional facility. Although the nurse determined that his blood sugar levels were normal and that the episode was a false alarm, the health unit manager, ordered that Davis be removed from the public-works program. Davis claimed that non-homosexual, insulin-dependent diabetic inmates were allowed to continue working in the program and filed a grievance, which was denied. The district court screened his pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed.

In 2005, Surles, a prisoner, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Michigan DOC officials confiscated legal papers and computer disks. The district court dismissed without prejudice, finding that he failed to show that he exhausted administrative remedies available through the MDOC grievance process. In 2007, the court denied a motion to reconsider, again because Surles failed to include documentation that showed exhaustion. In 2007 he filed another pro se 1983 complaint alleging confiscation of legal documents; damage or destruction of legal and religious papers and property; actions to deprive him of access to the courts, violation of First Amendment rights; retaliation by false misconduct charges and transfer; and conspiracy. Surles attached eight grievances, filed in 2006, relating to incidents in 2004-2005, all denied as untimely. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the burden was on defendants to show that the prisoner did not exhaust administrative remedies and that they failed to meet the standard for summary judgment.

The center provided care for children of low-income parents and sought license renewal in 2005. The application remained pending for 15 months. During that period, the state agency, ODJFS, reduced its capacity from 88 to 38 children. The agency responsible for funding under Title XX, which provides government assistance for child care, 42 U.S.C. 1397, discontinued public assistance for its services, based on a proposed adjudication, which would reject the renewal application based on alleged improper use of physical discipline and failure to adequately ensure that employees did not have disqualifying criminal convictions. While the matter was pending, the center experienced difficulty with third-party contracts, including liability insurance and workers compensation renewal certification, and went out of business. The center sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, claiming tortious interference with business relationships, based on racial animus. After the center also filed in the Ohio Court of Claims, the district court dismissed the claims against ODJFS. The center continued to amend its federal pleadings, including addition of an antitrust claim, but the claims were ultimately dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that any unwaived claims were barred by the Local Government Antitrust Act.

Plaintiff, an employee of the city since 2006, began training for a position at city hall under the supervision of the then-city recorder, Williams. Plaintiff and Williams are friends and landlord-tenant. In 2008, based on a recommendation from Williams, plaintiff was assigned to a deputy clerk position. A few months later, the city fired Williams. The mayor told plaintiff not to call or text Williams, forbade her from promoting any allegations by Williams, and specifically ordered her not to participate in or assist with any lawsuit. He followed up several times, asking plaintiff whether she had been in communication with Williams. Williams did file suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for speaking out against alleged acts of public corruption. Plaintiff then filed suit against the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the mayor summary judgment of qualified immunity on a claim of First Amendment prior restraint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff's right to speak publicly and participate in a lawsuit addressing workplace discrimination and public corruption in city government was clearly established.

Charged with possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver in 1988, petitioner was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. At the time, the offense required a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole. The court held that that sentence violated the state constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment and sentenced him to 40 to 100 years in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the sentence. The court held a new sentencing hearing in 2004. Despite changes in stated law that eliminated mandatory life sentences in such cases, the court imposed a sentence of life without parole. The state appeals court affirmed; the supreme court denied appeal. The federal district court denied habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting the state's argument was untimely because the conviction was affirmed in 1993. Petitioner was no notice that he could be convicted of possession, even though the state charged only possession with intent to deliver. Federal law does not entitle him to retroactive application of amended sentencing laws

The city accepted a proposal to develop city-owned property. The developer formed companies to develop and own the affordable housing portion of the project. The city gave the developer an option to purchase the property under certain conditions. The developer failed to meet a condition that it obtain a demolition permit by a specific date. The city terminated the agreement. The developer alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601, and state laws, claiming that the city knew or should have known that the condition was impossible to meet and actually terminated the agreement because the project would accommodate handicapped tenants. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The facts alleged do not plausibly support findings: that the city designed the agreement to fail by including a condition it should have known that plaintiffs, sophisticated developers, could not meet; that the city did not want to house the handicapped; or that termination caused handicapped individuals to suffer disproportionately more than others.

In 2006, petitioner was convicted of rape and unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, friend of his girlfriend's daughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. The Ohio Court of Appeal rejected a challenge to a ruling that denied him the opportunity to present evidence of the minor's sexual history through her friend's testimony, arguing that the state waived protections of Ohio's rape-shield law when it chose to introduce evidence about the minor's lack of past sexual activity. The Ohio Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law on petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

During the 2008 campaign, Joe, a plumber working near Toledo, asked then-candidate Obama about a proposed tax plan’s impact on Joe’s ability to own a business. The interaction was replayed by national media. Joe later accepted media requests and criticized Obama’s policies, resulting in Senator McCain’s reference to "Joe the Plumber." After Joe’s media moment, employees of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Obama supporters, searched his name in databases and that the Inspector General found no legitimate agency purpose for those searches. Defendants were suspended from their positions. Joe filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of privacy rights. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not suffer sufficient adverse action: he did not suffer a threat to his livelihood, was not defamed, did not endure a search or seizure, and did not experience the public disclosure of embarrassing information. He did not allege continuing investigation or "chilling" of First Amendment rights; "a person of ordinary firmness" would not be deterred or chilled. In his privacy claim, Joe did not identify an interest "fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."

In 1972, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Paroled 20 years later, he was arrested in 1997 for aggravated robbery. Petitioner faked inability to walk and had to be transported to court in a wheelchair. During transport he attacked the officer, stole her pistol, carjacked a vehicle and killed the owner. He carjacked another vehicle and attempted another carjacking before surrendering and giving a lengthy, videotaped, confession. He was convicted of aggravated murder by prior calculation and design, aggravated murder during commission of a felony and 10 other counts. The jury recommended a death sentence. On direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, finding that defendant was improperly prevented from presenting voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor but that any error was harmless. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a change in venue, by introducing incarceration records during the penalty phase, and by failing to present mitigating evidence regarding juvenile incarceration, and that the trial court improperly prohibited defendant from arguing voluntary intoxication as a mitigating factor.

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison, exhausted state remedies and unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The district court rejected his petition for habeas corpus, which was based on an argument that his Confrontation Clause rights had been violated at trial when, over his objection, the government played a tape recording of his co-defendant's custodial statement without affirmatively calling the co-defendant as a witness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though the trial court may have violated petitioner's constitutional rights, the court noted that granting habeas corpus under the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), requires "that fairminded jurists could not disagree." "Four such fairminded justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court did disagree" and concluded that confrontation only requires that a declarant be made available in the courtroom for a criminal defendant to call during his own case.