Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and felonious assault, each with a firearm specification, arising out of a 1997 apartment robbery that involved shotguns and two deaths. He was sentenced to death. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Following limited remand, the district court recommended that the Sixth Circuit grant habeas corpus based on the penalty-phase instruction, but otherwise dismissed the petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, finding no basis for relief. The penalty phase jury instruction did not violate the Eighth Amendment, either by requiring the jury to unanimously agree on the applicability of any mitigating factors or by depriving the jury of the opportunity to recommend life in prison as an alternative sentencing option to a death sentence.

Jones, a Michigan inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a prison doctor and nurses, alleging retaliation and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment to the nurses. Jones filed objections. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment to the doctor and dismissed the case. Seven days later, Jones filed a second set of objections. Eight months later, Jones filed a mandamus petition with the district court seeking to compel ruling on his objections. The district court did not construe the petition as a motion for reconsideration and denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit denied mandamus, noting that Jones may challenge the district court’s decision on direct appeal and has not shown that the district court erred. However, the objections were filed within30 days of the judgment and specify the parties involved in the appeal, meeting the requirements for a notice of appeal, so the court directed the clerk to file the objections as a notice of appeal.

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while incarcerated. Shortly after his release, plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone cancer. According to plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy and radiation are now necessary. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that plaintiff pled sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice. The doctor and nurse filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that their involvement with plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference or gross negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. Neither negligent medical care, nor delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions reflecting deliberate indifference.

Defendant was convicted of the assault of another inmate. He retained trial counsel to pursue his appeal of right, but the attorney failed to timely file. He filed delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied for lack of merit. The Michigan Supreme Court denied appeal. Defendant pursued state collateral proceedings and filed a motion for relief in the trial court, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to timely pursue appeal. The trial court denied the motion, and the higher courts denied subsequent applications for leave to appeal the denial. The district court conditionally granted a habeas petition, finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to timely pursue appeal of right. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. When counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, prejudice is presumed with no further showing. Appellate review of the denial of collateral relief is not a sufficient substitute for direct appeal; an applicant denied leave to appeal does not receive the benefit of oral argument, nor does the defendant have a right to appointed counsel on post-conviction review.

In 1978, 70-year-old Keegan was found dead on the floor of his store. Witnesses saw blood on Strouth’s hands and clothes; the medical examiner testified that the spots were consistent with his having cut Keegan’s throat; Strouth’s girlfriend testified he had confessed; and Keegan’s wound could have been inflicted by Strouth’s knife. The police found items from Keegan’s store in Strouth’s possession and Strouth’s friend testified that Strouth had confessed. Convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and felony murder, Strouth was sentenced to death on findings that the murder was “heinous, atrocious or cruel” and occurred during a robbery. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. His state habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied. In 1988, Strouth filed a federal habeas petition, which was dismissed when the Tennessee Supreme Court held the state may not use the underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance in felony murder convictions. The state court deemed the error harmless, reasoning that the jury would have imposed the same death sentence based on the other aggravating circumstance. Strouth filed a new federal habeas petition in 2000. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.

An inmate with the Michigan Department of Corrections sued several MDOC employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights when they transferred him from a Level II security facility to a Level III facility in 2000. He claimed that the increased security level and corresponding transfer were retaliation for his participation in a state-court class action regarding inmate property, as well as for his assistance to other inmates in filing grievances. Following two appeals, the district court held that participation in the class action and assistance to other inmates in filing grievances are protected activities and that the increase in security level, though not the transfer itself, was an adverse action, but entered judgment for defendants for lack of proof of causation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to two defendants and reversed with respect to others, who produced no evidence that they would have taken the challenged actions absent the inmate’s protected conduct.

Petitioner was living with her uncle and his wife, when the uncle died. No autopsy was performed. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was heart attack and the body was cremated. The death certificate was amended to list asphyxia by smothering as the cause of death, with acute alcohol intoxication as a contributing factor, based on photographs showing scrapes around the nose consistent with impressions of a woven pillow. Petitioner’s paramour informed police that petitioner told him that the wife paid to be rid of uncle and that petitioner and wife found uncle passed out and poured vodka down his throat. Petitioner apparently left and wife smothered uncle. Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter and testify against wife, but withdrew her plea. Convicted of second-degree murder, she was sentenced to 20-to-40 years, rather than seven-to-15 for manslaughter. At sentencing, petitioner stated that she would have testified, "had I not been persuaded to withdraw my plea … because an attorney promised me he would represent me." The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Petitioner established an ineffective-assistance claim. The Michigan court’s conclusion that her second attorney was not deficient in advising her to withdraw the agreement was unreasonable because the attorney failed to investigate before making the recommendation.

Herrera was hired by defendant, a construction company in 2003 and worked as a laborer until he was fired in 2008. The termination letter, referred to unsatisfactory attendance and incarceration following conviction. Herrera filed a complaint with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission, claiming that defendant garnished his wages improperly and fired him on account of his race and national origin. Herrera is a Cuban of African ancestry. An investigator with HRC, told Herrera that she found insufficient evidence to support his allegations. The agency dismissed. About 10 months later, Herrera sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KY. Rev. Stat. 344.450.1. The district court dismissed the KCRA claim as barred by an election-of-remedies provision and dismissed the federal claim because HRC had already rejected Herrera’s administrative complaint, which was based on essentially the same claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of state-law claims and the federal-law discrimination claim. Because the county agency did not adjudicate Herrera's federal retaliation claim, the court reversed as to the federal retaliation claim.

Plaintiffs, former city employees terminated after the city determined that they had tampered with their water meters, claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when city officials came to their homes to inspect their water meters, that their consents to inspection were involuntary, and that they were terminated in retaliation for asserting those rights. One plaintiff claimed that he was discharged in violation of his First Amendment right to association. The district court dismissed Fourth Amendment claims against individual officials on qualified immunity grounds and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the retaliation, right to association, and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent was not sufficient to put defendants on notice that their progressive series of questions and orders, with no attendant threat of termination, rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs were terminated for reasons related to water usage and meter inspection, not for asserting Fourth Amendment rights.

Mosholder, a corrections school officer since 2001, patrolled the school and, as necessary, disciplined inmates. In 2005, the facility began housing youthful offenders. Mosholder believed that these offenders were coddled. She claimed that during a 2008 rap competition they referred to gangs and flashed signs. Defendants claim otherwise. Mosholder sent a letter to Michigan state legislators, expressing concerns that the competition created a volatile situation, with promotion of gangs, and that loss of control over youthful offenders increased incidents at the facility. She urged legislators to attend a rap event. The warden responded to inquiries, explaining the purposes of the events. In the meantime, Mosholder had multiple run-ins with the school's new administrator, who viewed Mosholder as too strict. Inmates complained about Mosholder. Mosholder was transferred to a general corrections position, where she would come into contact with more prisoners, and no longer have weekends and holidays off. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Whatever her personal motivation, Mosholder wrote primarily on a matter of public concern; there is no indication that the letter would materially disrupt her work environment or performance of her duties.