Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Benton, a pre-trial detainee was hospitalized for seizures. Benton resisted return to jail. Officers used double handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. Gray and others escorted Benton to the jail’s Medical Unit. Benton was supposed to be placed on a bed without restraints. Benton resisted and made threats. While Benton was restrained, Gray placed Benton in a carotid restraint or a “sleeper hold.” Benton lost consciousness. Gray ordered removal of Benton’s restraints. Officers heard choking sounds, but Gray did not stop. After the restraints were removed, Gray ordered the others to leave. Benton was silent and motionless when they left. Despite a requirement that officers seek medical attention when force is used or an inmate is injured, Gray did not inform medical personnel. Minutes later, a deputy entered Benton’s cell. Benton was not breathing. Benton was later declared brain dead. Following fabricated reports, Gray lied to Internal Affairs; the coroner pronounced death by natural causes. An external investigation began four years later due to statements by a correctional officer. The coroner changed her verdict to homicide. Convicted of civil rights violations, 18 U.S.C. 242, falsifying and making false entries in a document, 18 U.S.C. 1519, and making false statements to an FBI agent, 18 U.S.C. 1001, Gray received a below-guidelines sentence of 36 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Tennessee law allows individuals with gun permits to carry handguns in public places owned or operated by the state (Tenn. Code 39-17-1311(b)(1)(H)) and defines a “handgun” as “any firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches” designed or adapted to be fired with one hand. Armed with a Draco AK-47 pistol, Embody went to Radnor Lake State Natural Area, near Nashville, on a Sunday afternoon. Dressed in camouflage, he slung the gun with its eleven-and-a-half-inch barrel across his chest with an attached loaded, 30-round clip. Embody anticipated attention and carried an audio-recording device. With assistance from police, a park ranger disarmed Embody at gunpoint to determine whether the AK-47 qualified under the law, releasing him about two-and-one-half hours later, after determining it was. Embody sued, claiming violations of Second, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted defendant summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The scope of the investigation was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop. To the extent Embody argues that the Second Amendment prevents Tennessee from prohibiting certain firearms in state parks, qualified immunity applies. No court has held that the Second Amendment encompasses a right to bear arms within state parks.

Adkins, a state prisoner, sued corrections officer Wolever under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Wolever assaulted Adkins by yanking his hands through a slot in the cell door before removing his handcuffs. Before Adkins filed suit, an inspector at the prison reviewed color Polaroid photographs of Adkins’s injuries and stationary video footage of the area. During discovery, Adkins asked Wolever to produce photographs and video footage. Prison officials could not locate the video footage or the color photographs. Because Wolever produced only black and white copies of the original photographs and did not produce the video footage, Adkins asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could presume that the missing evidence would be favorable to Adkins. The district court applied state law and denied the request; Michigan’s spoliation instruction required Adkins to demonstrate that the spoliated evidence was under Wolever’s control, which it was not. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The en banc court reversed, concluding that federal law governs spoliation sanctions in federal court litigation. On remand, the district court allowed the parties to conduct more discovery and held an evidentiary hearing, then concluded that Adkins was not entitled to the requested inference. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Werth was charged with robbing a convenience store. Before he pleaded guilty to breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny and to possession of burglar’s tools, Werth attempted at least seven times to assert his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The trial court denied his request summarily the first six times. The seventh time, the judge explained the nature of the charges against Werth, told him that she could not give him special training or treatment, and denied his request without giving him an opportunity to speak. Three weeks later, the judge denied Werth’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in which he argued duress. The Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. The district court denied Werth’s petition for habeas corpus. Applying AEDPA deference, it held that Werth waived his self-representation claim by pleading guilty. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It did not violate clearly established Supreme Court precedent for the Michigan appellate courts to conclude that Werth’s guilty plea foreclosed his challenge.

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public.

Smith filed a numerically second petition for habeas corpus that he claims is not “second or successive” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) because the claims included in the petition are newly ripe. The district court transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the transfer. A district court has jurisdiction to consider numerically second petitions that are not “second or successive” and needs no authorization. A district court may (and should) rule on newly ripe claims. The district court never ruled that Smith’s petition was successive and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. There is no rule, statute, or case that permits a lower court to transfer a case to an appellate court when it is uncertain of its jurisdiction for an advisory ruling.

Patrizi, an attorney, was at Bounce nightclub in Cleveland with her friend Baron, Baron’s brother, and his girlfriend, Mills. Officers Huff and Connole arrived in the early morning hours in response to a reported assault. They met the victim reporting the incident, Wallace and she led them inside the nightclub to identify perpetrators. The officers escorted the group, which included Mills, toward the exit. Patrizi joined the group. Connole began to question Mills and Patrizi interjected; eventually, Patrizi was handcuffed and placed under arrest. The parties dispute the interactions leading to the arrest for obstructing official business. In Patrizi’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly established that nonaggressive questioning of police officers is constitutionally protected conduct. When the facts are viewed in her favor, Patrizi’s actions fall within the protected ambit because her conduct did not cross the line into fighting words or disorderly conduct prohibiting the officers from conducting their investigation.

Hagans, a middle-aged man under the influence of crack cocaine, became paranoid and went into a rage in his yard. He refused to allow police to subdue him. Officer, Ratcliff applied his taser in drive-stun mode, directly against Hagans’ upper back. Hagans, reached back and tried to grab the taser. Ratcliff applied the taser again, to no effect, then tried, unsuccessfully to use the taser in dart mode. Ratcliff tased Hagans two to four more times in drive-stun mode, then joined two other officers in trying to subdue Hagans. The officers finally secured Hagans’ wrists and legs. A medical squad arrived. Alert at the time, Hagans lost consciousness and stopped breathing about ten minutes later. Paramedics administered CPR in the ambulance, restoring Hagans’ pulse and respiration. Hagans never regained consciousness. He died three days later. The coroner found that the cocaine starved his brain of oxygen, leading to fatal respiratory complications. The report listed hardening of the arteries in the heart as “a contributing factor.” Hagans’ estate filed suit, alleging excessive force. The district court denied Ratcliff’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Ratcliff did not violate a clearly established right.

After September 11, 2001, the FBI assigned informant Griffin to embed himself in the Toledo Muslim community. Griffin enrolled in mosque classes and obtained employment with a Muslim charity. Griffin met El-Hindi, who discussed kidnaping an Israeli soldier or politician; Amawi, who suggested recruiting Mazloum; and Mazloum, who agreed to participate in jihad training. The three were convicted of conspiracy to kill and maim persons outside the U.S., 18 U.S.C. 956(a)(1), and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in furtherance of killing U.S. nationals, 18 U.S.C. 2339A. Amawi and El-Hindi were also charged with distributing information regarding manufacture of explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. 842(p)(2)(A) and sentenced to below-Guidelines terms of 240, 144, and 100 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court upheld the district court’s decisions: to delete classified information from discovery under the Classified Information Procedures Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; to exclude defendants’ proposed expert testimony concerning Islamist culture and social norms; to reject entrapment and outrageous-conduct defenses; not to provide requested jury instructions concerning the First Amendment; and rejecting a claim of Miranda violations during interrogation that occurred on a jet returning Amawi from Jordan.

While Daugherty worked as a manager in the city’s Department of Public Utilities from January 2006 to March 2007, he complained that he was underpaid and that he was paid less than white managers. His annual salary was $48,500, his white predecessor had earned $56,000, and his white subordinate earned $49,000. In 2006, Daugherty assisted two black DPU employees with discrimination complaints against the City of Toledo and individuals. Daugherty claims he was evaluated more harshly than white employees and that, despite his position as second-in-command in his division, was not placed in charge when the supervisor was absent. He also claimed derogatory remarks by one individual. Daugherty was terminated and filed suit under state law and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court required Daugherty to present more evidence than required under the McDonnell-Douglas framework and failed to adequately analyze evidence of discriminatory comments by the mayor. On remand, the court should also conduct a hostile-work environment analysis. The court erred in excluding testimony regarding other acts of alleged retaliation by the city, basing its decision solely on whether the same person made each termination decision.