Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1981, Standifer, a 23-year-old woman with diffused brain damage and mild retardation, was murdered in Knoxville, at the home of Thomas, where Miller was staying. Standifer had gone to the house, by cab, with Miller. When Thomas returned Miller was hosing the basement floor. Thomas found blood inside the house. The next day, Thomas discovered Standifer’s body in his backyard, with a t-shirt belonging to Miller stained with blood of the same type as Standifer’s. Miller was apprehended in Ohio. After waiving his Miranda rights, he admitted to hitting Standifer and dragging her outside, non-responsive and not breathing. A psychiatrist examined Miller and concluded that he did not believe Miller was insane at the time of the offense. Miller moved for appointment of psychiatric expert at state expense. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Miller was not entitled to a second medical expert. The jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Miller’s direct appeals and motions for post-conviction relief were unsuccessful in state court. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the state improperly denied him assistance from an independent medical expert and a challenge to jury instructions. View "David Miller v. Ricky Bell" on Justia Law

The Sheriff’s Office for Boyle County received an arrest warrant and emergency protective order for King, who had allegedly entered his ex-wife’s property, pointed a gun at her face, and said “I’m going to kill someone today.” The sheriff told Deputy Adams that he had seen King the week before, and that King had been acting “strange [and] violent” and to obtain assistance from the Kentucky State Police. Adams was aware that King, years earlier, had allegedly fired shots near a state trooper who entered onto King’s property. Deputies Adams and Issacs and State Trooper Taylor, who told a dispatcher that “one of us will have to kill—shoot him,” went to King’s home. Although no one answered the door, they saw King lying on a couch, knocked again, and showed badges. What happened next is disputed. Taylor claims that King aimed a gun; Taylor’s bullet killed King. King’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court ruled that Taylor had not been properly served and, in any event, was entitled to summary judgment on the merits. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that questions of immunity and superseding cause require resolution of disputed facts. View "King v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 1997, Hanna was an Ohio state inmate, 19 years into a life sentence for murder and aggravated murder when he attacked his new cellmate, Copas, in his sleep. Copas died from his injuries several days later. Although trial counsel suggested that Copas’ death was at least partially attributable to errors committed in his medical treatment, Hanna did not formally pursue an intervening cause defense. Convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death, Hanna petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of Brady violations, challenges to jury instructions, claims of ineffective assistance, and a claim of failure to discover an ineligible juror. View "Hanna v. Bagley" on Justia Law

Gassman and Wottrich went to the Hensley residenceto repossess a car. They requested police presence because Hensley’s conduct during a previous repossession resulted in an assault charge against Hensley. The deputies did not read Gassman’s documents. Sheila Hensley woke up, stated that her payments were up to date, got into the car, started it, locked the doors, and briefly dragged the towtruck. She refused to exit the vehicle, even after the car had been pulled to the road. The deputies used a hammer to break a window, unlock the doors, and pull Sheila from the car. After the car was towed, it was determined that Sheila was correct and the car was returned. Later the deputies obtained a warrant, charging assault with a dangerous weapon, based on her pulling the tow truck toward Gassman and Wottrich while they were on the ground. Sheila pled no contest to felonious assault and to misdemeanor attempted aggravated assault, then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court rejected Fourth Amendment claims, based on qualified immunity, and dismissed conspiracy and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. A reasonable jury could find that extraction of Sheila from the vehicle she was entitled to possess was unreasonable. View "Hensley v. Gassman" on Justia Law

Cleveland is serving a term of life imprisonment for the 1991 murder of Marsha Blakely. On January 21, 2010, Cleveland filed a habeas petition asserting: actually innocence; that the state presented testimony that it knew, or should have known, was false; that the state failed to disclose favorable evidence; prosecutorial misconduct; and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. He argued that his “actual innocence” of the crime mandated equitable tolling of the limitations period and that the discovery of a new factual predicate for his habeas claims entitled him to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Cleveland has presented a credible claim of actual innocence that entitles him to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year limitations period and review of his habeas petition on the merits. The court noted a witness’s unsolicited recantation, evidence that Cleveland was in New York a couple of hours before Blakely’s murder and could not have flown from New York to Ohio in time to commit the murder, and that there was no other evidence tying Cleveland to the crime. View "Cleveland v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

McCormick was pursuing a graduate degree in psychology at Miami University in Ohio when she was diagnosed with several illnesses that slowed her progress in her graduate studies. After the faculty voted against promoting McCormick to doctoral status, she filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and disability in violation of state and federal laws. To circumvent the expired two-year statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, which provides an express cause of action against state actors, McCormick asserted federal claims for racial discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed, concluding that McCormick’s discrimination claim under section 1981 was barred because section 1983 provided the exclusive means to bring a damages suit against state actors in either their official or individual capacities for violations of section 1981. The court also dismissed Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "McCormick v. Miami Univ." on Justia Law

In 1992 an Ohio jury convicted Carter of murdering a store clerk while robbing a convenience store and recommended that the court impose a sentence of death. Although Carter admitted that he entered the store with the intent to rob it, he testified that he never intended to be the one to hold the gun, although he knew the gun had bullets and that a co-defendant had showed him how to shoot it. He further admitted that before the murder they had participated in “a lot” of robberies of drug dealers that same evening. On direct review, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The district court denied habeas corpus. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of an argument that the state courts improperly used the “nature and circumstances” of the offense as aggravating, rather than mitigating, factors, but reversed and remanded with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Those claims, which concerned counsel eliciting unfavorable mitigation evidence and failing to call Carter’s mother to testify about his upbringing, were not procedurally defaulted. View "Carter v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

DEA agents and police conducted narcotics raids at two homes occupied by members of the Marcilis family. The occupants filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that: the agents and officers engaged in excessive force, illegal search and seizure, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; the township failed to train and supervise its police officers; and the agents and officers violated the “knock and announce” rule. After dismissing all claims against the federal agents, the district court granted the police officers’ motion for summary judgment on all claims except the alleged violation of the “knock and announce” rule. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs failed to allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each federal agent did to violate the asserted constitutional right. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity; a reasonable officer would not have known that the force used here would be considered excessive. View "Marcilis v. Township of Redford" on Justia Law

In 2002, EJS wanted to build a charter school at a commercial site in Toledo. The site needed to be re-zoned. After initially supporting rezoning, McCloskey, the region’s city council representative, changed his mind. The city denied re-zoning. EJS claims that McCloskey’s reversal occurred only after EJS refused to acquiesce to McCloskey’s demand that EJS donate $100,000 to a local retirement fund. McCloskey does not deny making the demand. EJS sued the city and McCloskey under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of its rights to substantive and procedural due process, to equal protection, and to petition under the First Amendment, and asserting a state-law claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Approval was a discretionary matter, so that EJS had no property interest. A property owner cannot create an interest in discretionary re-zoning simply by conveying his land to another party contingent upon obtaining re-zoning. Although “a compelling proposition,” the court declined to recognize a liberty interest in corruption-free decision making. The decision not to re-zone passes rational-basis review in light of the clearly expressed desire to maintain the area for future industrial use.

Goldberg, a medical malpractice attorney, appeared before Judge Maloney in several cases. Following complaints that Goldberg concealed assets and retained unearned fees, Maloney ordered Goldberg to pay the estates involved. Goldberg failed to do so. Maloney directed him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing, Maloney found Goldberg to be in criminal contempt and cited Goldberg for attempting to suborn witnesses, charges that did not appear on the hearing notice. Goldberg received a sentence of 18 months. An Ohio appellate court affirmed. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Goldberg argued for the first time that he had not received sufficient notice of the charges and ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to raise this notice claim. The Ohio Supreme Court declined further review. In 2004, the district court granted habeas relief on the basis that Goldberg received constitutionally inadequate notice. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Goldberg had procedurally defaulted on his lack-of-notice claim by failing to raise it in the state court of appeals. On remand, the district court determined that Goldberg had not demonstrated sufficient cause or prejudice to overcome the procedural default, and denied his petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.