Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The parents and the grandmother of two black children sued the Nashville Board of Public Education on behalf of their children and all black students in the District whose school assignments were adversely affected by the elimination of the mandatory noncontiguous transfer zones. They allege that the Rezoning Plan eliminated the desirable practice of being bused to a good, racially diverse school and replaced it with two inferior choices: staying in a bad, racially isolated neighborhood school or being bused to a bad, racially diverse school. They claim that has led to resegregation in violation of the students’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court ruled in favor of the Board. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the change serves legitimate state interests in school under-utilization. The Plan actually solved the problem that many schools were operating at levels below what their resources and infrastructure would permit, while other schools were overflowing. The court stopped short of endorsing the Plan, noting that certain students in poor neighborhoods had to share textbooks; that the racial achievement gap apparently exists much as before; and that Nashville public-school students as a whole continue to do poorly after the Plan. View "Spurlock v. Fox" on Justia Law

In two trials, juries in Livingston County, Kentucky convicted Kraus of first-degree rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse involving two mentally delayed women. He is serving a prison sentence of 70 years with a life enhancement. After exhausting direct appeals and pursuing state court motions for post-conviction relief, Kraus filed two pro se petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petitions. Although the district court declined to issue a certificate of appealability, a Rule 34 panel granted Kraus a COA to review a narrow selection of claimed errors. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Kraus’s petitions “highlight serious concerns about his ability to confront the key witnesses at his trials, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the competency of his counsel at the sentencing phase.” But, despite court orders, the court was not provided with any records of Kraus’s two trials, precluding meaningful review of Kraus’s claims. View "Kraus v. KY Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that Greene performed as an exotic dancer at a 2002 party at Detroit’s mayoral residence and that Mayor Kilpatrick’s wife arrived unexpectedly and assaulted Greene. Months later, Greene was shot to death. Stevenson, initially leading the investigation, claims that rumors indicated that Greene’s death and the incident at the mansion were connected. Other officers told Stevenson that she “might get shot like Tammy.” There was some evidence of a coverup. The case was reassigned to the Cold Case squad, earlier than usual for such a transfer. Stevenson later testified that she was about to pursue leads that would have led to questioning people close to the mayor. Stevenson and others were allegedly transferred to inferior positions without credible explanation. Stevenson’s house was broken into twice, and she repeatedly observed officers near her residence. The Cold Case squad encountered many impediments and the investigation was inactive for years. Greene’s murder has not been solved. The minor children of Greene filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims of conspiracy to deny and denial of access to the courts. The district court entered summary judgment for the city and the mayor. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding exclusion of evidence of the firing of a former deputy chief and of alleged interference with an investigation by the state, and jury instructions concerning the city’s destruction of evidence. View "Flagg v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Dodd, an African-American mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, was the subject of an investigation for failing to deliver mail. He was arrested and held for seven days before charges were dismissed. He filed suit, alleging claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed Dodd’s FTCA claim because it determined that the claim was preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. 2301, and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Dodd’s Title VII claim because Dodd failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the FTCA claim, noting that the Civil Service Reform Act does not apply to postal employee, but affirmed with respect to the Title VII claim. View "Dodd v. Potter" on Justia Law

Peterson is a prisoner in Michigan’s Iona maximum-security penitentiary, convicted of murder. After a scuffle during an attempt to remove Peterson from his cell, an officer filed a major misconduct report, alleging assault and battery. Peterson appeared at his hearing, heard all the evidence, pled not guilty, provided sworn statements to support his account, called witnesses in his defense, and moved to disqualify the hearing officer for bias. The only evidence that the hearing officer did not permit Peterson to view was the video of the event, exercising his authority under Mich. Comp. Laws 791.252(h), stating that “to allow [the video’s] actual viewing would reveal the limitations and capabilities of the fixed security device.” The hearing officer gave Peterson a detailed description the video, including the time-stamped second of each event. The hearing officer imposed a sentence of 30 days in detention. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that where a disputed issue of fact is resolved at a major misconduct hearing as a necessary part of the hearing’s judgment, it has preclusive effect in collateral litigation brought by the prisoner. View "Peterson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Grigsby, a middle-age man who lived in homeless shelters, was charged with three unarmed bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Psychologists conducted examinations and filed reports that diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and stated that Grigsby was not competent to stand trial. Neither party objected. The court committed Grigsby to custody (18 U.S.C. 4241(d)(1)) to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Forensic evaluators concluded that Grigsby did not understand the seriousness of his legal difficulty; lacked ability to assist his lawyer during trial; and was not capable of waiving his constitutional rights rationally or of testifying on his own behalf. Grigsby refused to take oral medication. Because he was not gravely disabled and did not present a danger to himself, others, or the facility, he did not meet the criteria for involuntary medication. The evaluators requested an order authorizing them to inject Grigsby involuntarily with a first-generation antipsychotic drug, (haloperidol (Haldol) or fluphenazine), or a second-generation antipsychotic drug, risperidone, to restore competency. These medications can cause serious side effects. The district court granted an order under Sell v. U.S. (2003). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that special circumstances unique to the case indicate that Grigsby’s liberty interest in avoiding involuntary medication outweighs the government’s interest in prosecution. View "United States v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Officers responded to a call describing a male yelling for help outside an apartment, followed by a report that a naked male entered a nearby apartment. Approaching, Tieber encountered a naked male, Martin, age 19, running and speaking nonsensically. Martin asked for help, then “jogged away.” Tieber ran and fell on Martin’s back. Semanco dropped his knee into Martin’s side, fell on top of both men, and delivered “compliance body shots.” Martin bit Tieber; Tieber struck Martin’s face. Semanco struck Martin’s face, back, and ribs at least five times. Tieber folded his legs around Martin’s hips and gripped Martin’s chin with his arm. As Tieber and Semanco attempted to secure Martin’s arms, Zimmerman kneeled on Martin’s calves. Officers heard a “gurgling sound.” They rolled an unresponsive Martin onto his side, tried to resuscitate him, and called paramedics. Martin died. The coroner determined that Martin died from an acute psychotic episode with excited delirium due to LSD intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest. The pathologist who conducted the autopsy noted injuries suggesting asphyxiation. A pathologist hired by Martin’s estate agreed. The department had a use-of-force policy, and a “Positional Asphyxia Policy” that warns that a person, psychotic due to mental illness or drugs or alcohol, is particularly susceptible to death. Two officers said they never considered this policy. In the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied the officers summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martin v. City of Broadview Heights" on Justia Law

An officer pursued Woods’s speeding car to a parking lot. As Woods began exiting the car, the officer ordered Woods to re-enter the car and place his hands on the wheel. Woods did not comply, but reached toward the passenger side of the car. Concerned that Woods might have a weapon, the officer drew his gun. When Woods complied, the officer lowered his weapon, advised Woods that he had been caught speeding, and asked for identification. Woods provided a false name and said that he did not have identification. The officer waited for backup to arrest Woods for driving without a license. When the officers approached, Woods again reached toward the passenger side. The officers pulled him out of the car. During a pat-down, the officer felt a hard lump in Woods’s pocket and asked “What is in your pocket?” Woods stated twice that he was “bogue,” meaning “in possession of something illegal,” then stated that he had a gun in the car. Through the window, the officer observed what looked like a handgun on the floorboard. He recovered the gun and a bag containing crack cocaine. Woods’s motion to suppress was denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the officer was not required to give Miranda warnings before asking “What is in your pocket?” upon encountering a lump in Woods’s clothing during the course of a lawful pat-down incident to arrest. View "United States v. Wood" on Justia Law

A victim, who knew Daws, told deputies that Daws had crashed a shotgun barrel through a window and charged into his house. Daws thrust the gun in his face, took cash, and warned that if the victim called police, Daws would “come back and kill him.” Officers received a second call and went to another house. The occupant said that Daws and another man had come over asking to hide a weapon. The man turned Daws away. Deputies knew Daws had previous weapons convictions and served time for aggravated burglary after holding a gas station attendant at gunpoint and threatening to kill him. They wore body armor and approached Daws’s rural house, finding his friend outside, confessing on the phone that he and Daws had “done something bad.” Deputies apprehended the man, who told them Daws was inside. Deputies entered through an open door and found Daws asleep. After apprehending him, they performed a protective sweep and found Daws’s shotgun. Daws pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and was sentenced to 210 months, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a public safety exigency justified a warrantless search. View "United States v. Daws" on Justia Law

G.C. began attending school in the Owensboro Public School District as an out-of-district student in 2005. In 2009, G.C. was caught sending text messages in class. School officials confiscated his cell phone and read the text messages. Because this was the last in a series of disciplinary infractions, Superintendent Vick revoked G.C.’s out-of-district status, barring him from attending Owensboro High School. G.C. filed suit, raising federal and state-law claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on a due process claim that G.C. was denied a hearing prior to expulsion as required by Kentucky statute and a Fourth Amendment claim based on the 2009 search, in which G.C. contends that school officials violated his constitutional rights when they read text messages on his phone without the requisite reasonable suspicion. The court affirmed rejection of a Rehabilitation Act claim that the defendants failed to identify G.C. as disabled under section 504. View "Cain v. Owensboro Pub. Schs." on Justia Law