Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Nichols, a Tennessee state prisoner awaiting execution, had an “oppressive and forlorn childhood, due to his father’s abuse, his mother’s illness, their poverty, and the church-dominated society into which he was born” in 1960. Nichols graduated high school; he enlisted in the Army in 1981. He was discharged two years early. In 1984, he pled guilty to burglary and assault with attempt to rape. A psychological report found nothing remarkable. He married and had a stable relationship. In 1987 Nichols returned to jail for a prowling conviction and parole violation. He was released and returned to his wife and job. He began disappearing at night. Following rapes or attempted rapes of 12 women (Pulley died as a result) in 1988-1989, police received an anonymous tip identifying Nichols. Police showed photo-arrays to four victims, each of whom identified Nichols immediately. Nichols waived counsel and Miranda rights and videotaped a confession to four rapes. After being allowed to sleep, Nichols confessed to other rapes. Additional victims identified Nichols. Nichols directed a detective to recover the board used to murder Pulley. Nichols’s wife stated that Nichols had confessed to her. A Ph.D. and an M.D. found Nichols competent to stand trial. State courts rejected his appeals and petitions for post-conviction relief. In 2005 DNA testing confirmed Nichols as the source of sperm on Pulley’s clothing. The district court rejected his federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance and multiple procedural arguments. View "Nichols v. Heidle" on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

Romo was sleeping in the driver’s seat of a parked car, intoxicated, when he was approached by Officer Largen, who arrested Romo for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, based on Largen’s observation of Romo’s having driven the car minutes earlier. Romo claimed that he had not been driving and filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claiming that Largen violated his constitutional rights and committed several intentional torts. The district court denied Largen’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified-immunity, finding that a jury could disbelieve Largen’s claim that he had seen a very similar car being driven in violation of traffic laws. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that it was bound by the district court’s finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed. View "Romo v. Largen" on Justia Law

In 2004, Akron held promotional exams for fire department positions of Captain and Lieutenant. The exams were prepared, administered and scored by an outside testing consultant. Each exam contained a 100-question multiple choice section on technical knowledge and two oral assessment exercises. The Lieutenant exam also required a written work-sample; the Captain exam had an additional oral group exercise. Candidates were placed on an eligibility list in an ordered ranking. Plaintiffs alleged disparate-impact age discrimination against 23 firefighters based on age, 29 U.S.C. 621; that the exam for Lieutenant had an adverse impact on three African-American firefighters and that the exam for Captain had an adverse impact on 12 Caucasian firefighters based on race, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law violations. The district court concluded that the exam adversely impacted 12 Caucasian Captain candidates and three African-American Lieutenant candidates on the basis of race, and adversely impacted eleven Lieutenant candidates on the basis of their age and ordered promotion of 18 candidates. Each Lieutenant candidate was awarded $9,000 in compensatory damages and $72,000 in front pay. Captain candidate were awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in front pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howe v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

In 2001 Fitzpatrick killed his girlfriend, her 12-year-old daughter, and a neighbor. There were questions about his mental health. A pretrial hearing was held because of Fitzpatrick’s confession to his cousin that the devil had made him commit the crimes. The court took no action, based on the statement of the lead investigator that officers had no concerns about competence. After opening statements, in a sidebar, defense counsel stated that Fitzpatrick had indicated his desire to plead guilty and that he recommended against such action. The trial court advised Fitzpatrick of its disinclination to accept a guilty plea. Fitzpatrick insisted that he did not want to wait or to “put his family through this.” When the judge disagreed, Fitzpatrick demanded to be taken out of the courtroom and reiterated that he wanted to stop the trial. Following some discussion of competency and inquiries directed to Fitzpatrick, the court accepted the plea. A panel sentenced him to death. Ohio courts affirmed the convictions and sentence, and denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Fitzpatrick’s statements did not give the trial court reason to believe that he did not understand the consequences of waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty. All three attorneys involved consistently represented that they thought that he was knowingly waiving his rights. View "Fitzpatrick v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

In 1986, Harrison was charged with second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during commission of a felony, but was convicted of reckless use of a firearm resulting in death (a lesser-included Misdemeanor) and felony-firearm. Harrison received consecutive sentences, although, under Michigan law, the crimes were subject to concurrent sentencing only. Released in 1990, Harrison committed another firearm offense in 1991, was convicted, and returned to prison. On collateral review of the first conviction, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in 2008, that Harrison had been improperly sentenced and ordered issuance of a corrected judgment. Harrison sued the state and other defendants, seeking damages and reduction of a subsequent, unrelated prison sentence that he was still serving. The district court dismissed, holding that some defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment; that claims against the remaining defendants were time-barred; and that a claim concerning the failure to commute his 1991 sentence was noncognizable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding no error in the rulings on sovereign immunity and commutation, but holding that Harrison’s claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not time-barred. View "Harrison v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Mendoza drove a truck from North Carolina to Tennessee with Tavera as a passenger. The truck contained construction equipment. A large quantity of methamphetamine was hidden under nails. The truck was stopped after being followed as part of a sting operation. At trial, Tavera, a roofer, testified that he did not know about the drugs and that he thought he was going to Tennessee to view a construction project. Tavera was convicted of participating in a methamphetamine drug conspiracy and sentenced to 186 months of imprisonment. He subsequently learned that days before the trial Mendoza had participated in plea negotiations in which he told Taylor, the prosecution’s trial lawyer, that Tavera had no knowledge of the drug conspiracy. Mendoza later pled guilty and changed his story. Tavera filed an appeal and a year later moved for a new trial in the district court. The district court has not ruled on the motion. The Sixth Circuit vacated the conviction, based on the “Brady” violation, calling the case “not close,” and recommended that the U.S. Attorney’s office conduct an investigation of why the prosecutorial error occurred. View "United States v. Tavera" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Corrections agreed to house LaFountain at Lakeland in exchange for dismissal of his lawsuits. LaFountain wanted assignment to Lakeland to enable family visits and avoid further retaliation from Muskegon correctional officers. After the transfer, LaFountain filed new grievances, alleging selective enforcement of housing-unit rules based on race. He was transferred back to Muskegon. When LaFountain arrived at Muskegon, his typewriter was missing. He filed another grievance. At Muskegon, he was assigned to a cell with Riley, a mentally ill prisoner. Riley threatened LaFountain and kept him awake with lights and noise. LaFountain filed a grievance, alleging retaliation. After Riley threatened LaFountain’s life, LaFountain refused to remain in his cell and spent eight days in segregations. Each new shift ordered LaFountain to continue celling with Riley. Every time that he refused, the officers cited LaFountain for major misconduct, causing forfeiture of 770 days of good-time credits. The district court reviewed his civil rights suit under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and dismissed it, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) & 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of certain of the retaliation claims based on the transfer to Muskegon, the typewriter damage, and the cell assignment. View "LaFountain v. Harry" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Blewetts were convicted of crack cocaine offenses and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 10 years each under the 100-to-1 crack cocaine law, based on the quantity of crack cocaine possessed. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as implemented by new sentencing guidelines, has substantially reduced crack cocaine sentences, including the mandatory minimum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b). If the Blewetts were sentenced today, they would not be subject to a statutory minimum because the quantity of crack involved falls below the threshold for any statutory minimum. The district court denied retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)2 and 28 U.S.C. 994(u)3. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the old 100-to-1 crack cocaine ratio has led to the mass incarceration of thousands of nonviolent prisoners under a law widely acknowledged as racially discriminatory; thousands of inmates, most black, languish in prison under the old, discredited ratio because the Fair Sentencing Act was not made explicitly retroactive by Congress. Judicial perpetuation of the discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences for those defendants sentenced under the old crack sentencing law would violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "United States v. Blewitt" on Justia Law

Smith, aged 20, took a cell phone charger. The store manager intercepted him and Smith revealed the open package, with part of the charger removed. Smith refused to stay while the manager called the police. Officers Stoneburner and Knapp interviewed store employees, reviewed a security videotape and went to the Smith house. Smith’s brother met the officers at the door, then went into the house. Stoneburner followed and asked Smith to step outside. Smith, his mother (Donnetta), and his brother complied. Smith denied stealing or cutting the charger and allowed Stoneburner to pat him down. Stoneburner found only a lighter. Stoneburner followed Smith back inside, grabbed Smith by the wrist, and pulled Smith back outside. Stoneburner collided with Donnetta, causing her to hit the side of the house. Stoneburner bent Smith over the railing. Smith stiffened himself. Stoneburner and Knapp each grabbed an arm and pressed his head against the wall as they handcuffed him. Smith pled guilty to disturbing the peace. The Smiths filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Stoneburner unconstitutionally entered their home twice and excessive force. The district court denied qualified immunity on all claims and granted summary judgment in favor of Smith on the second entry into the house. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of immunity. View "Smith v. City of Sturgis" on Justia Law