Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Michigan anti-begging statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 900, has existed since at least 1929 and provides that “[a] person is a disorderly person if the person is any of the following: ... (h) A person found begging in a public place.” A person convicted under section 750.167(1)(h) is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. The Grand Rapids police recorded 409 incidents of police enforcing the anti-begging law from 2008–2011. Plaintiffs, two homeless adults, were arrested. One was holding signs saying: “Cold and Hungry, God Bless” and “Need Job, God Bless.” The other, a veteran, needed money for bus fare, and asked a person on the street: “Can you spare a little change?” The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the law was unconstitutional. Begging is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment protects and the statute cannot withstand facial attack because it prohibits a substantial amount of solicitation, but allows other solicitation based on content. View "Speet v. Schuette" on Justia Law

Adamov immigrated to the U.S. in 1992 and began working at the bank in 1998. He became a district manager in Louisville, with an excellent employment record. In 2005, the bank hired Hartnack as Vice-Chairman, three levels up from Adamov. During the few times Hartnack and Adamov interacted, Hartnack made statements that Adamov found offensive, concerning his accent and being an immigrant. While giving a speech, Hartnack made the comment “I was talking to my managers and they looked at me like I was speaking Russian.” Adamov believed that he had not been promoted because Hartnack harbored animus based on Adamov’s national origin. Adamov spoke to his direct supervisor, who spoke with Hartnack and assured Adamov that Hartnack was not prejudiced against him. The bank subsequently investigated Adamov, concluded that his loans violated its ethics policy, and terminated his employment. The ethics policy went into effect after the date of the loan and no prior policy was introduced at trial. The district court dismissed Adamov’s retaliation claim, based on failure to exhaust remedies and entered summary judgment that Adamov’s discrimination claim failed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the discrimination claim. The retaliation claim should not have been dismissed because the administrative-exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. View " Adamov v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

While employed as an electrical line worker, Waldo was subjected routinely to sexual harassment. Her coworkers displayed sexually explicit materials in the workplace, locked her in a porta-potty, ridiculed her for bringing a purse to work, demanded that she “pee like a man” and clean up her male coworkers’ tobacco spit, ostracized and ignored her on job sites and during trainings, and referred to her using gender-specific demeaning language. Waldo sued, bringing six federal and state-law discrimination claims, and a state-law tort claim. Although a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the employer, the district court granted Waldo a new trial on her Title VII hostile-work-environment claim, finding that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. After a second trial, the jury found in favor of Waldo, and the district court awarded her attorney fees and costs as a prevailing plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the granting a new trial and the award of attorney fees and costs. There was clear testimony that the employer was aware of Waldo’s complaints, but that no formal response or investigation was undertaken, contrary to company policies that “[c]omplaints will be fully investigated.” View "Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co." on Justia Law

Aker’s Louisville team consisted of the project manager, Hudson; electrical and instrumentation (E&I) designers Ash, Kirkpatrick, Sharp, and Whitaker; three piping designers; an estimator/scheduler; and a drafter who was being groomed to become an E&I designer. Sharp began as a contract worker in 2003 and became an employee in 2005. In 2008-2009, several Aker employees, including Sharp, were laid off because customers had canceled or postponed projects. Sharp, then 52 years old, claimed that he was fired because of his age, citing Hudson’s decision to train Kirkpatrick, and not Sharp, as E&I design lead and noting Hudson’s alleged comments about the advancing age of the group and the need to bring in younger people. Aker asserted that Hudson and Ash considered Kirkpatrick a superior employee to Sharp. The trial court entered summary judgment for Aker in Sharp’s age-discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding adequate evidence that Hudson played a determinative role in the layoff decision to attribute his motivation to the company, that Hudson’s remarks were direct evidence of age discrimination, and that Hudson’s expression of age as a factor in his decision was not merely a proxy for a legitimate business concern. View "Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Boaz began working for FedEx in 1997, under an agreement that stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.” She began took on additional responsibilities, previously handled by a male employee, without corresponding compensation, 2004-2008. Boaz sued FedEx in 2009, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court held that, although the claims were timely under the statutes, they were barred by the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting an employee from waiving rights under those laws. View "Boaz v. FedEx Cust. Info. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Connor Group owns and manages about 15,000 rental units throughout the U.S., including about 1,900 in the Dayton area. Its rental agent posted an ad on Craigslist: 599/1br – Great Bachelor Pad! (Centerville) … Our one bedroom apartments are a great bachelor pad for any single man looking to hook up. This apartment includes a large bedroom, walk in closet, patio, gourmet kitchen, washer dryer hook up and so much more.... A fair-housing organization sued, charging violation of the Fair Housing Act’s section 3604(c) and Ohio’s Revised Code section 4112.02(H)(7), claiming that the bachelor pad ad was facially discriminatory to families and women. The court provided a jury instruction that “The question is not whether the particular advertisement discourages some potential renters from applying … but whether such discouragement is the product of any discriminatory statement or indication in the advertisement. If an ordinary reader who is a member of a protected class would be discouraged from answering the advertisement because of some discriminatory statement or indication contained therein, then the fair housing laws have been violated.” The trial court ruled in favor of the landlord. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the erroneous instruction. View "Miami Valley Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Connor Grp." on Justia Law

Jena is a 19-year-old with a genetic disorder that causes physical defects and severe mental disability. She apparently communicates at the level of a child between the ages of five and seven and has the social skills of a child between four and eight. She reportedly told a teacher that her mother, Suzanne, “hit me.” The Oakland County Sheriff’s Department and Adult Protective Services (defendants), part of the Michigan Department of Human Services investigated. APS obtained an order appointing a guardian for Jena and authorizing her removal from the family home to a group foster facility. The family alleges that the defendants gave false testimony that Jena’s father made sexual comments about Jena. Following allegedly assaultive behavior, the probate court entered an order temporarily denying the family contact with Jena. Ultimately, Jena’s father was granted full custody and charges against her mother were dropped. The district court dismissed the family’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the court was the final decision-maker with respect to Jena’s custody. The court rejected substantive and procedural due process claims and a claim of violation of First Amendment right to family association. View "Kolley v. Adult Protective Servs." on Justia Law

In 2004, Ray was convicted on five counts of conduct involving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), 2252(a)(1), and 2252(a)(4)(B), and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 180 months, 300 months, and 600 months. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court failed to adequately explain its upward departure from the recommended sentencing guideline range, but noting that the evidence of Ray’s guilt was “overwhelming.” On remand, Ray was sentenced to concurrent terms of 180 month, 300 months, and 360 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court dismissed a pro se motion to vacate the sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, in which Ray argued that there was an illegal search and seizure, because the person who consented to the search of his home lacked authority to do so, and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment without an evidentiary hearing. View "Ray v. United States" on Justia Law

A Juvenile Court standing order provided that social workers had authority to remove and provide temporary emergency care for children at imminent risk of serious physical or emotional harm and to request assistance by law enforcement officers. At a 2002 meeting, social workers determined that exigent circumstances required immediate removal of the children from Nancy’s home. A Temporary Emergency Care Order was completed in consultation with an assistant prosecuting attorney and a supervisor. A social worker, accompanied by police, went to Nancy’s home and took the children into temporary custody, and, the next day, filed a complaint for abuse, neglect, and temporary custody, with a notarized document detailing supporting reasons. A magistrate found that probable cause existed to support removal. In November 2005, Nancy and the children sued the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services, the social workers, and others. In 2010, the district court granted in part and denied in part the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity, denied the social workers’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and granted the children partial summary judgment on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to both absolute and qualified immunity. View "Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law