Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Government filed three applications under section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. 2701-2712, seeking evidence relevant to three separate criminal investigations. At issue on appeal was whether court orders authorized by the Act to compel cell phone service providers to produce the historical cell site information of their subscribers were per se unconstitutional. The court concluded that cell site data are business records and should be analyzed under that line of Supreme Court precedent; because the magistrate judge and district court treated the data as tracking information, they applied the wrong legal standard; using the proper framework, the Act's authorization of section 2703(d) orders for historical cell site information if an application meets the lesser "specific and articulable facts" standard, rather than the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, was not per se unconstitutional; and as long as the Government met the statutory requirements, the Act did not give the magistrate judge discretion to deny the Government's application for such an order. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to grant the applications. View "In re: Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the school district over an alleged violation of First Amendment rights because plaintiffs' third-grade son was prevented from distributing a "candy cane ink pen" with a laminated card containing a religious message. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction because it was well-established under Texas law that the district's governmental immunity was not a mere defense to suit but rather was complete immunity from suit. And because governmental immunity from suit defeated a trial court's jurisdiction, whether a trial court had jurisdiction was a question of law subject to de novo review. Section 110.06 of the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 110.001-110.012, required pre-suit notice in the form of certified mail, return receipt requested. The court concluded that the district's governmental immunity was not waived because it was undisputed that plaintiffs' demand letter did not comply with the jurisdictional pre-suit notice requirements. View "Morgan, et al. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Hays County Sheriff's Office for over twenty years, filed suit alleging constitutional violations against Hays County; the Sheriff's Office; and Sheriff Gary Cutler, in his official and individual capacities. Plaintiff claimed that the comments he made during the Sheriff's Election motivated his demotion. The court found that defendants failed to show that they would have terminated plaintiff in the absence of his protected speech and, in the alternative, plaintiff was speaking as a citizen and his letter to the editor was protected speech under the First Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute as to a material fact relating to his claim of First Amendment retaliation and that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Haverda v. Hays County, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Corpus Christi Police Department officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of unlawful arrest and excessive force, as well as state-law assault and battery claims. On appeal, the officers challenged the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on plaintiff's unlawful arrest claim where the officers' entry into plaintiff's apartment to effectuate his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, in light of the lack of exigent circumstances and where, at the time of the officers' conduct, the Supreme Court and this court had made it abundantly clear that either a warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances was required to arrest an individual in his home. The court concluded, however, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on plaintiff's excessive-force claim. The court rejected the officers' contention that section 105.006(e-1) of the Texas Family Code entitled them to immunity and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the officers' interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on these claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hogan v. City of Corpus Christi, TX, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants claimed that ATF lacked statutory authority to issue a demand letter to firearms licensees classified as a "dealer" or "pawnbroker" in certain states, and even if it possessed statutory authority, that its decision to issue the demand letter to the chosen licensees was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. 923(g)(5)(A) "unambiguously authorized the demand letter," and the court's "inquiry ends at Chevron step one." The court rejected appellants' claim that section 923(g)(1)(A), 923(g)(1)(B), 923(g)(3)(A), and 923(g)(7) must be read to limit ATF's demand letter authority; the demand letter did not run afoul of section 926(a)'s prohibition; and the appropriation rider at issue did not prohibit ATF from issuing the demand letter because it fell short of consolidating or centralizing records. The court addressed the remaining claims, concluding that ATF's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "10 Ring Precision, Inc., et al. v. Jones" on Justia Law

This case arose when the FDIC filed a complaint against appellants for sums due under various promissory notes. Appellants then entered into a Stipulated Judgment in favor of FDIC and against appellants. CadleRock moved ex parte to re-open the case to allow it to file the necessary pleadings to revive the Stipulated Judgment and the district court granted the motion. CadleRock then filed an ex parte motion to revive the Stipulated Judgment (Revived Judgment) as it pertained to appellants and the district court granted the motion. Five years later, CadleRock commenced collection and served appellants with pleadings and appellants moved to vacate and annul. At issue on appeal was the district court's order denying appellants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion to vacate. The court concluded that the Revived Judgment was not void under Rule 60(b)(4); appellants' due process challenges failed; and, given that appellants have not shown an actual conflict between federal and state law, their preemption claim failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "FDIC v. SLE, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the termination of her Medicaid benefits. At issue was the enforceability of a provision of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8), under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that section 1396a(a)(8) created a right enforceable under section 1983, and that exhaustion of Louisiana's procedure for judicial review was not required before a Medicaid claimant filed suit in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying DHH's motion to dismiss because plaintiff's claims were properly before the district court. View "Romano v. Greenstein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as next-friend to her minor daughter, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against high school softball coaches, alleging that the coaches disclosed the daughter's sexual orientation during a disciplinary meeting with plaintiff, primarily claiming the disclosure to plaintiff constituted a Fourteenth Amendment invasion of the daughter's privacy. The court held that there was no clearly established law holding that a student in a public secondary school had a privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment that precluded school officials from discussing with a parent the student's private matters, including matters relating to the sexual activity of the student. The court also held that such students have no clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right that barred a student-coach confrontation in a closed and locked room. Therefore, the court concluded that the coaches were entitled to qualified immunity that barred the federal claims against them. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated in part and remanded for entry of judgment dismissing the federal claims against the coaches. View "Wyatt v. Fletcher, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of her claim of sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court ruled that plaintiff, a volunteer firefighter, was not an "employee" within the meaning of Title VII. The court concluded that plaintiff was not an "employee" for purposes of Title VII because she failed to make a threshold showing of remuneration. Plaintiff's benefits were purely incidental to her volunteer services with District 5. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5" on Justia Law

The EEOC sued Houston Funding, alleging that Houston Funding unlawfully discharged one of its employees because she was lactating and wanted to express milk at work. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Houston Funding, finding that, as a matter of law, discharging a female employee because she was lactating or expressing milk did not constitute sex discrimination. However, given the court's precedent, the court held that the EEOC's argument that Houston Funding discharged the employee because she was lactating or expressing milk stated a cognizable sex discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. An adverse employment action motivated by these factors clearly imposed upon women a burden that male employees need not - indeed, could not - suffer. Moreover, the court held that lactation was a related medical condition of pregnancy for purposes of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-(k). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Houston Funding II, et al." on Justia Law