Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics against ten federal officers, in their individual capacities, based on their alleged roles in contributing to the death of ICE Special Agent Zapata and the serious injury of Agent Avila. The agents were ambushed and shot by drug cartel members in Mexico using weapons they allegedly obtained unlawfully in the United States. The court concluded that the district court did not explicitly rule on defendants' qualified immunity defense; the district court failed to make an initial determination that plaintiffs' allegations, if true, would defeat qualified immunity; and the district court did not identify any questions of fact it needed to resolve before it would be able to determine whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Because the district court did not fulfill its duty under Backe v. LeBlanc, Wicks v. Miss. State Emp't Servs., Helton v. Clements, and Lion Boulos v. Wilson, the court had jurisdiction to review the district court's discovery order and vacated it. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to follow the procedures outlined in Backe, Wicks, Helton, and Lion Boulos. View "Zapata, et al. v. Melson, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Cleco, alleging race discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Cleco. Plaintiff claimed that he was issued a Disciplinary Warning in retaliation for his reporting of a coworker's racially hostile statements. Cleco asserted that the warning was issued because plaintiff sent a mass email disclosing that his coworker's son overdosed on pills. The court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim based on the Disciplinary Warning where plaintiff had demonstrated that there was a genuine dispute of material fact that Cleco's stated reasons were pretextual. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliation claim arising from the Disciplinary Warning and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the remaining retaliation and discrimination claims. View "Willis v. Cleco Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against an elementary school principal who did not allow him to distribute religious material to other adults at his son's in-class winter party. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his constitutional claim based on qualified immunity. The court found that plaintiff failed to establish that a right to distribute religious gifts was clearly established for the purpose of qualified immunity analysis. Accordingly, plaintiff's allegations were not sufficient to overcome the principal's qualified immunity defense. The district court did not address the actual constitutionality of the principal's conduct and the court concluded that it need not reach the question. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Morgan, et al. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

In this nearly fifty-year-old desegregation case, the United States appealed the district court's order implementing a freedom of choice plan intended to desegregate the formerly de jure African-American middle school and high school in the Cleveland School District. At issue was the district court's adoption of a plan that abolished attendance zones and a majority-to-minority transfer program and implemented a freedom of choice plan that allowed each student in the district to choose to attend any junior high or high school. The court concluded that, given the available statistics that not a single white student chose to enroll at the schools after the district court's order, and that historically, over the course of multiple decades, no white student has ever chosen to enroll in the school, the district court's conclusion that a freedom of choice plan was the most appropriate desegregation remedy at those schools certainly needed to be expressed with sufficient particularity to enable the court to review it. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a more explicit explanation of the reasons for adopting the freedom of choice plan, and/or consideration of the alternative desegregation plans proposed by the parties. View "Cowan v. Bolivar County Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, UTHSC, on her sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to include a specific sex discrimination claim on her EEOC intake sheet and consequently did not exhaust her administrative remedies on that claim; plaintiff's subsequent claim regarding sex discrimination not based upon harassment fell outside the scope of the EEOC investigation and could not reasonably be expected to grow out of her initial charge of sexual harassment; the incidents described by plaintiff were insufficient to demonstrate pervasive hostility toward her as a matter of law, and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment for UTHSC on plaintiff's sexual harassment claim; and a jury could reasonably conclude that UTHSC's reasons for not renewing plaintiff's contract was pretextual. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hague v. UT Health and Science Center" on Justia Law

Planned Parenthood filed suit against the State for declaratory judgment and to enjoin provisions of 2013 Texas House Bill No. 2 (H.B. 2). H.B. 2 pertains to the regulation of surgical abortions and abortion-inducing drugs. Two provisions of H.B.2 were at issue: first, the requirement that a physician performing or inducing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital no more than thirty miles from the location where the abortion is provided; and second, the limitations on the use of abortion-inducing drugs to a protocol authorized by the FDA. The district court held that parts of both provisions were unconstitutional and granted, in substantial part, the requested injunctive relief. A motions panel of this court granted a stay pending appeal, and the Supreme Court upheld the stay. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that the physician-plaintiffs had standing on behalf of their patients, as well as standing to assert their own rights. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong legal standards under rational basis review and erred in finding that the admitting-privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden for a large fraction of women that it affects. The court also concluded that the district court erred in holding that H.B. 2's rejection of the off-label protocol from fifty to sixty-three days LMP (last menstrual period) facially imposes an undue burden on the abortion rights of certain women. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for the State, except that the admitting privileges requirement may not be enforced against abortion providers who timely applied for admitting privileges under the statute but are awaiting a response from the hospital. View "Planned Parenthood, et al. v. Abbott, et al." on Justia Law

The district court held that ICP had proven that defendants' allocation of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) in Dallas resulted in disparate impact on African-American residents under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a) and 3605(a). At issue was the correct legal standard to be applied to disparate impact claims under the FHA. The court adopted the HUD burden-shifting approach found in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 for claims of disparate impact under the FHA and remanded to the district court for application of this standard in the first instance. View "Inclusive Communities Project v. TX Dept. of Housing, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit as frivolous, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and for want of prosecution. Plaintiff filed suit claiming that the shower floor of the "C Dorm" was slippery and unsafe, and that he received inadequate medical care. Plaintiff had fallen three times and sustained a fractured hip as a result. The court held that plaintiff did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment with the contention that a slippery shower condition may inflict cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Defendants Sweetin, Oliver, Cowan, and Brown where prisoner slip-and-fall claims almost never serve as the predicate for constitutional violations as a matter of law. The court also concluded that Defendants Erwin and Fisher ignored plaintiff's complaints and pleas for help. Therefore, the court reversed the dismissal of these defendants and remanded for further proceedings. With regard to Defendant Lamb, however, the mere allegation that plaintiff complained of his pain and lack of official response during a disciplinary proceeding Lamb conducted on an entirely different matter did not suffice for Eighth Amendment purposes. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to raise the possibility of Defendant Hough's deliberate indifference to plaintiff and the court reversed the dismissal of Hough and remanded. Because the record was devoid of material delay or contumacious conduct, the court reversed the dismissal of Defendant McManus and remanded. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Coleman v. Sweetin, et al." on Justia Law

Brain Harris's surviving children filed suit against the city and police officers for excessive force after the officers shot and killed Harris. Officers arrived at Harris's home after his former wife called 911 when she feared that he was attempting suicide. After breaching the barricaded door to Harris's bedroom, officers saw that Harris was holding a knife in a stabbing position and fatally shot him. The court concluded that the district court properly held that under the circumstances, the officers reasonably feared for their safety at the moment of the fatal shooting; the court need not reach plaintiffs' alternate argument regarding whether Harris's possible suicide attempt constituted exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into his bedroom because officers had consent to enter; and since plaintiffs failed to show that there was a constitutional violation in this case, the district court properly dismissed the Monell claims against the city. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers based on qualified immunity and affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the city. View "Harris, et al. v. New Orleans Police Dept., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant is a Texas law firm engaged in an advertising campaign to solicit former dental patients from Kool Smiles dental clinics as potential clients. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of its Texas anti-SLAPP motion brought under the Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.001-27.011, to dismiss a claim brought by Kool Smiles. The court held that it had jurisdiction to interlocutorily consider the denial of a TCPA anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss; because Kool Smiles waived its argument that the TCPA was a procedural law that conflicted with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the court assumed that it did not; and the Supreme Court of Texas would most likely hold that defendant's ads and other client solicitations were exempted from the TCPA's protection because defendant's speech arose from the sale of services where the intended audience was an actual or potential customer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. View "NCDR, L.L.C., et al. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law