Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought an age discrimination suit against her former employer and at issue, on appeal, was whether plaintiff's claim was time barred. The district court held that plaintiff did not experience an adverse employment action until she was finally terminated on January 2, 2008. In the alternative, the district court found that the 180-day limitations period should be equitably tolled because the employer's actions induced plaintiff not to file suit until after the limitations period had expired. The court held, however, that the limitations period began to run upon the unequivocal notification that her employment would ultimately be terminated, absent any later equivocation which did not occur here. Based upon this record, plaintiff's suit was time-barred. The court also held that plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer's actions prevented or discouraged her from filing a claim of age discrimination. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in holding that plaintiff's wrongful termination claim should be equitably tolled.

Plaintiffs, five individuals with disabilities, alleged that defendant recently built and altered sidewalks that were not readily accessible to them and requested injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(e). At issue was whether Title II and section 504 extended to newly built and altered public sidewalks. Also at issue was whether that private right of action accrued at the time the city built or altered its inaccessible sidewalks, or alternatively at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks. The court held that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce Title II and section 504 with respect to newly built and altered public sidewalks, and that the right accrued at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for his former employer on his claims of hostile work environment and for constructive discharge. The court held that summary judgment was granted in error on plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment based on age where the allegations at issue were for the trier of fact to resolve. As to the claim of hostile work environment based on religion, the court held that plaintiff had pointed to certain instances of acrimony based on religion that, based on the standard of review, supported the court's conclusion that the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was reversible error. The court further held that plaintiff's allegations regarding the claim of constructive discharge survived summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the individualized education program (IEP) of C.C., a child with a disability. At issue was whether a school district, after being declared in compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1490, in respect to a disabled child's entitlements, by an administrative hearing officer, could bring a civil action in court for attorneys' fees as a prevailing party against the child's parents on the grounds that their IDEA administrative complaint was brought for an "improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," although the parents had voluntarily dismissed their administrative complaint without prejudice. The court held that, under the plain meaning of the IDEA and its implementing regulations, the administrative proceeding through which the school district sought a declaratory ruling was a proceeding under section 1415. The court also held that the declaratory ruling favorably altered the school district's legal relationship with the parents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's legal relationship dismissing the school district's civil action and remanded the case for determination of whether the parents' administrative complaint "was delay or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation," and if so, whether the district court should, within its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the school district.

Plaintiffs brought this action for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of their minor daughter, who allegedly was deprived of her constitutional rights when she was expelled from public school and refused alternative education benefits during the 2005-2006 academic school year by defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in principal part, but reversed summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims that their daughter was deprived of her constitutional right to procedural due process when defendants denied her right under state law to continued public educational benefits through an alternative education program without some kind of notice and some kind of hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

After multiple appeals to the court and extensive trial and other proceedings, plaintiffs' Title VII class action for employment discrimination against Lufkin Industries, Inc. (Lufkin) culminated in a favorable multimillion dollar judgment and injunctive relief. Both parties subsequently challenged the district court's attorneys' fee award and Lufkin's complaint that back pay damages were erroneously authorized in an earlier appeal. The court affirmed as to the back pay damages but vacated and remanded as to the attorneys' fees. In particular, given the unrebutted evidence in the record that it was necessary for plaintiffs to retain counsel from outside the Eastern District of Texas, the district court abused its discretion in failing to use the rate counsel charged in their home district as the starting point in the lodestar calculation.

Plaintiffs sued, inter alia, the Covington County School District, its Board of Education, its president, and other persons, in their official and individual capacities (collectively, Education Defendants), as well as other known and unknown persons, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of Jane Doe's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights and various state law violations where the Education Defendants were deliberately indifferent to nine-year-old Jane's safety when they forced her into the sole custody of an unauthorized adult who took her off of the school's grounds. At issue was what were the circumstances under which a compulsory-attendance, elementary public school had a "special relationship" with its nine-year-old students such that it had a constitutional "duty to protect" their personal security. The court held that plaintiffs have pleaded a facially plausible claim that the school violated Jane's substantive due process rights by virtue of its special relationship with her and its deliberate indifference to known threats to her safety. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Education Defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, affirmed that court's qualified immunity dismissal of plaintiffs' special relationship claims against those Education Defendants sued in their individual capacities, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff sued her former employer, University Healthcare System, L.C. (UHS), for sex discrimination, retaliation, breach of oral contract, violation of the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. 206(d), and violation of the Louisiana Wage Payment Statute (LWPS), La. Rev. Stat. Ann 23:631. Both parties raised challenges on appeal relating to either the admission or discoverability of evidence. The court reversed the district court's award in favor of plaintiff under the LWPS and vacated the judgment as to that claim where there was no evidence of any completed oral contract to pay plaintiff the bonus and the jury's conclusion that such an obligation existed could not be justified based on the record. The court also reversed the award of attorney's fees related to the LWPS claim to plaintiff and vacated the judgment as to the amount of fees rewarded. The court further held that, in all other respects, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. The court remanded to the district court for a determination of the amount of attorney's fees attributable to plaintiff's EPA claim. Plaintiff's trial counsel's motion for leave to assert privilege for attorneys' fees and costs on judgment was denied without prejudice to asserting the rights claimed therein by other means.

Appellant and his wife sued Halliburton Company ("KBR"), alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, false imprisonment, and loss of consortium where the claims stemmed from the wife's work in Iraq as a civilian contractor for KBR. At issue was whether the district court erred by concluding that appellant could not, as a matter of law, maintain a loss of consortium claim because the claim arose from a civil rights violation against his wife. The court held that, under Texas law, a loss of consortium claim was derivative of the tortfeasor's liability to the physically injured person. Therefore, where appellant's loss of consortium claim derived solely from his wife's civil rights claim, his right to recover under Title VII could not be supported by his loss of consortium claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Elijah Group, Inc. ("Church") sued the City of Leon Valley ("City") alleging that the City's prohibition of the Church from performing religious services on certain properties violated Texas state law, the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc(b)(1), and both the Texas and U.S. Constitutions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Church's claims under the Equal Terms Clause of the RLUIPA. The court held that the City's imposition of its land use regulation violated the Equal Terms Clause where the ordinance treated the Church on terms that were less than equal to the terms on which it treated similarly situated nonreligious institutions. Accordingly, the district court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.