Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed this action against several defendants, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights that arose out of their incarceration in New Orleans at and around the time that Hurricane Katrina struck the city. The court concluded that there was no doubt that plaintiffs suffered terribly while held in custody after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans. However, the court held that Defendant Gusman's failure to release plaintiffs fell within the emergency exception to the rule that a probable cause determination must be made within 48 hours, and Defendant Hunter's failure to allow plaintiffs to use cell phones was not objectively unreasonable in light of any clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Gusman and Hunter on all claims asserted by plaintiffs.

Appellants appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tony Arcuri and the City of San Antonio on their claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, that SAPD officers, led by Arcuri, violated appellants' Fourth Amendment rights by failing to knock-and-announce their identity and purpose prior to forcibly entering appellants' home to execute a search warrant. Taken together, the deposition testimony of officers and the City's admission that the search of appellants' home was conducted in accordance with SAPD policies, were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of municipal liability. Therefore, appellants made the requisite showing to survive summary judgment on the issue and the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff claimed and a jury found that he was constructively discharged from his UTSW faculty position because of racially motivated harassment by a superior. The jury also found that UTSW retaliated against plaintiff by preventing him from obtaining a position at Parkland Hospital after he resigned from UTSW. The court held that, although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the retaliation claim, there was insufficient evidence of constructive discharge. Therefore, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for reconsideration of plaintiff's monetary recovery and attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of Ruddy Elizondo, appealed from two separate district court orders granting summary judgment to Officer W.M. Green and the City of Garland, Texas, on their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 that Green used excessive force against Ruddy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Green's use of deadly force was not clearly unreasonable when Ruddy ignored repeated instructions to put down the knife he was holding and seemed intent on provoking Green; at the time Green discharged his weapon, Ruddy was hostile, armed with a knife, in close proximity to Green, and moving closer; and in considering the totality of the circumstances in which Green found himself, it was reasonable for him to conclude that Ruddy posed a threat of serious harm. Finally, in the absence of a constitutional violation, there was no municipal liability for the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, who was incarcerated in the custody of TDCJ-CID, sought damages under 48 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that her constitutional rights were violated when her ovary and lymph nodes were removed without her consent during a radical hysterectomy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians who performed the surgery, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. In light of the circumstances, the court could not say that the law was, or was at the time of defendants' conduct, clearly established such that a reasonable official in the physicians' positions would understand that their conduct violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Noting that the law governing claims involving unwanted medical treatment in the prison context was far from certain, the court held that plaintiff failed to rebut defendants' entitlement to qualified immunity on her Fourteenth Amendment claim and summary judgment was appropriate. The court disposed of plaintiff's other claims and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law as to his claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, loss of overtime, and for punitive damages. The court concluded that the district court correctly found that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to support his claims for retaliation, loss of overtime and punitive damages, but that the evidence presented did support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was sexually harassed and that his employer failed to promptly respond to the harassment. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law and remanded to the district court with directions to enter judgment on those claims.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that no equitable relief was appropriate either because the relief was moot or because the court determined when examining the claims for damages that no constitutional violation occurred that would support such relief. The court also held that plaintiff lacked an interest protected by procedural due process and affirmed the district court's dismissal of that cause; plaintiff's interpretation of Anderson v. Celebrezze was not applicable; plaintiff's claims were rooted in procedural due process and his substantive due process claim failed; the dismissal of the equal protection claim was reversed and remanded where further proceedings were needed to determine whether plaintiff in fact submitted a proper application and, if he did, whether the Harris County Democratic Party Chairman purposefully discriminated or simply made an error or mistake of judgment; and the challenged election statute was constitutional.

Plaintiffs, physicians and abortion providers, sued the State under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged constitutional violations resulting from Texas House Bill 15, an act "relating to informed consent to an abortion." Plaintiffs contended that H.B. 15 abridged their First Amendment rights by compelling the physician to take and display to the woman sonogram images of her fetus, make audible its heartbeat, and explain to her the results of both exams, as well as have her sign a consent form. The court held that the enumerated provisions of H.B. 15 requiring disclosures and written consent were sustainable under Planned Parenthood v. Casey, were within the State's power to regulate the practice of medicine, and did not violate the First Amendment. The court also held that the phrase "the physician who is to perform the abortion," the conflict between section 171.012(a)(4) and section 171.0122, and the provision in section 171.0123 regarding the failure to provide printed materials were not unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on any of the claims on which the injunction was granted and the court vacated the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs, Matthew Cantrell's family, filed suit against the City of Murphy and several of its officers after 21-month-old Matthew died of accidental hanging when he was found tangled up in a soccer net in the back yard of his home. This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the officers deprived Matthew of his due process rights under DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, where plaintiffs failed to establish that the officers had a special relationship with Matthew when they separated him from his mother. The court also held that because the officers had probable cause to detain Matthew's mother, the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment on this portion of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer, claiming racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer and plaintiff appealed. The court held that because plaintiff had presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning the employer's proffered reason for firing her, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a trial on the merits.