Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After Racheal Wilson, a new recruit for the Baltimore City Fire Department, tragically died during a "live burn" training exercise, her survivors and estate commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging that the fire department violated Wilson's substantive due process rights by staging the exercise with deliberate indifference to her safety, so as to shock the conscience. The court concluded that because the complaint did not purport to allege that the fire department staged the live burn training exercise with the purpose of causing harm to Wilson or to any other recruit, it fell short of alleging a substantive due process violation in the context of the facts alleged, even though it might well allege causes of action under state law, as the complaint purported to do in other counts.

Plaintiff, an inmate, appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Plaintiff asserted that the North Carolina Department of Corrections at Alexander Correctional Institute's failure to enforce its grooming policy put inmates at risk for contracting various infections. Plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal, despite the fact that the district court's dismissal of the underlying claim was plaintiff's third dismissal for failure to state a claim. Because counting the district court's dismissal as a third strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) would effectively insulate the dismissal from appellate review, the court granted plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP on appeal.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint, alleging that Arlington County's sign ordinance violated the First Amendment. Plaintiff had commissioned a painting described as including "happy cartoon dogs, bones, and paw prints" and the county subsequently notified plaintiff that the painting violated the sign ordinance. The court agreed with the district court that the ordinance was a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfied intermediate scrutiny. Finding no merit to the other constitutional challenges, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, a Sunni Muslim currently incarcerated in a state correctional facility, brought this action alleging that prison officials violated the Religions Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by refusing to permit him to grow a one-eighth-inch beard in compliance with the requirements of his faith. Because the prison officials did not explain how a one-eighth-inch beard would implicate health or security concerns, they failed to satisfy their burden under RLUIPA of showing that the general grooming policy that they relied upon was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

In 2010, appellants unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the implementation of the 2011-2012 student assignment plan by the school board. On appeal, appellants argued that the district court committed legal error by failing to apply, and requiring the school board to rebut, a presumption that racial disparities in the 2011-2012 assignment plan resulted from the school board's prior unconstitutional conduct in operating a racially segregated school district. The court agreed and therefore vacated the district court's order and remanded for reconsideration.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a bail bondsman, and others, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various state law tort claims. The claims stemmed from defendant's efforts to apprehend a fugitive in and around plaintiff's home. A jury found in plaintiff's favor on her section 1983, trespass, and assault claims. Defendant appealed, challenging the jury's verdict and damages award. The court held that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where neither history nor policy supported extending the defense to bail bondsmen. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff's consent was involuntary and the court affirmed the verdict on the 1983 claim. The court further held that there was a sufficient basis to support the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was in reasonable fear of bodily harm. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion regarding the actual damages award and found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to leave the punitive damages award undisturbed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Officer Robert M. Bauer and several other defendants, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deprivation of her Fourth Amendment right to freedom from seizure without probable cause, and also asserting her state law claim for malicious prosecution. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that no prudent person would have believed that plaintiff violated the impersonation statute at issue and therefore, plaintiff's arrest lacked probable cause and was unreasonable. Thus, plaintiff's constitutional right not to be unreasonably seized was violated. The court also held that the district court did not err in ruling that Officer Bauer was not, at this stage of the litigation, entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's section 1983 claim.

Plaintiff, a minor, sustained serious injuries at birth due to the negligence of medical professionals who attended her delivery. As a result of plaintiff's injuries, DHHS, through the state Medicaid program, paid more than $1.9 million in medical and health care expenses on her behalf. Plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action in state court and eventually settled the action for a lump some of approximately $2.8 million. The settlement agreement did not allocate separate amounts for past medical expenses and other damages. DHHS subsequently asserted a statutory lien on the settlement proceedings pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat 108A-57 and 59 (third-party liability statues), which asserted that North Carolina had a subrogation right and could assert a lien upon the lesser of its actual medical expenditures or one-third of the medicaid recipient's total recovery. Plaintiff brought the instant action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to forestall payment under federal Medicaid law known as the "anti-lien provision," 42 U.S.C. 1396p. The court was persuaded that the unrebuttable presumption inherent in the one-third cap on the state's recovery imposed by the North Carolina third-party liability statutes was in fatal conflict with federal law. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the Secretary and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed a complaint in state court against defendants, contending that defendants engaged in a campaign of harassment against him and asserted several claims against them, including violations of his federal constitutional rights. Following defendants' removal to federal district court, the district court remanded the case to state court, in part based on plaintiff's status as a "three-strikes" prisoner due to his frequent legal filings. Because the court found that the district court lacked a statutory or legal basis to remand plaintiff's action to state court, the court reversed the order and reinstated plaintiff's complaint for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought this action, alleging that her former employer, the County, unlawfully discriminated against her by offering her a less favorable severance package than that offered to male employees holding similar positions. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the theory that the discriminatory denial of a non-contractual employment benefit could not constitute an adverse employment action; the district court's alternative rationale for dismissing the complaint, that she suffered no adverse employment action because the County fired her before it made its allegedly discriminatory offer, also failed because it ignored the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and because Title VII protects both current and former employees from discriminatory adverse employment actions. The court granted leave to the district court to consider, in the first instance, two additional arguments raised by the County. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.