Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs initiated this proceeding against defendants, challenging the use of advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanners and invasive pat-downs at airport screening checkpoints in the United States. On appeal, plaintiffs maintained that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the TSA's standard operating procedures for checkpoint screenings did not constitute an "order" under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued, that section 46110's conferral of exclusive jurisdiction in a court of appeals deprived them of due process and contravened the separation of powers rooted in the Constitution. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291; on the merits, the district court did not err in ruling that the Checkpoint Screen SOP constituted an order of the TSA Administrator under section 46110; and plaintiffs' remaining contentions lacked merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blitz v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Martin and Lucky Strike appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in an action to enjoin enforcement of two South Carolina anti-gaming statutes, S.C. Code Ann. 12-21-2710 and 12-21-2712, which prohibited certain devices pertaining to games of chance. Because the statutes have a legitimate application, the court affirmed the district court's vagueness holding. The court further concluded that the statutes did not fall within the scope of Ex Parte Young's holding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Martin v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Dwayne Durham was charged and jailed in southwest Virginia for more than three months before the prosecutor realized that this was a case of mistaken identity and rectified the error. As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against, inter alia, Officer David L. Horner, alleging a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, plus a state law claim for malicious prosecution. The district court awarded summary judgment to Horner on the basis of qualified immunity, and Plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff contended that Horner was not entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on and utilized unverified information to set "forth a chain of events that would lead to the indictment and arrest of the wrong individual." Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding Plaintiff was unable to establish that his seizure was "pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause," and he could not show the essential constitutional violation underlying a 1983 claim. Because there was, as a matter of law, probable cause for Plaintiff's arrest and detention, his state law malicious prosecution claim failed too.

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs James Brooks and Donald Hamlette, corrections officers at the Correctional Unit in Rustburg, Virginia, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants unlawfully fired them for exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech. "The Supreme Court has been quite clear, . . .that 'complaints about . . . the employee's own duties' that are filed with an employer using an internal grievance procedure . . . do[ ] not relate to a matter of public concern and accordingly 'may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.'" The Fourth circuit therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment."

Centro Tepeyac a filed suit against Montgomery County, Maryland, the Montgomery County Council, the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services, and Marc Hansen, the acting County Counsel, challenging the constitutionality of Montgomery County Resolution No. 16-1252. In its complaint, it contended that in compelling speech, the resolution violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The resolution required "limited service pregnancy resource centers," such as Centro Tepeyac, to display a sign on their premises stating (1) "the Center does not have a licensed medical professional on staff"; and (2) "the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider." Violation of the resolution was punishable as a "Class A civil violation." For relief, Centro Tepeyac sought a declaratory judgment that Resolution 16-1252 was unconstitutional and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against its enforcement. Applying strict scrutiny, the district court entered an order denying Centro Tepeyac’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the first statement required by Resolution 16-1252 (regarding the medical professional on staff) and granting its motion as to the second mandated statement("the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider.") Montgomery County appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second mandated statement, and Centro Tepeyac cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for an injunction with respect to the first. For the reasons given in "Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore," (___ F.3d ___, No. 11-1111 (4th Cir. June 27, 2012)) the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction and reversed its denial of the preliminary injunction requested by Centro Tepeyac with respect to the first mandated statement. The Court concluded that the goals of the "no licensed medical professional" disclosure could readily be achieved through less speech-restrictive methods. "Such methods might include a more vigorous enforcement of laws against practicing medicine without a license."

Archbishop Edward F. O'Brien, St. Brigid's Roman Catholic Congregation, Inc., and the Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. ("the Pregnancy Center") filed suit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, challenging the constitutionality of the City’s Ordinance 09-252, which required that "limited-service pregnancy centers," such as the Pregnancy Center, post signs disclaiming that they "do[ ] not provide or make referral for abortion or birth control services." The complaint alleged that the ordinance, both facially and as applied to the plaintiffs, violated the plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the plaintiffs' rights under the Conscience Clause of Maryland's health law. The district court granted summary judgment to the Pregnancy Center on its freedom of speech count, dismissed the Archbishop and St. Brigid's as plaintiffs for lack of standing, and dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice, in view of its free speech ruling. The court held that the disclaimer required by Ordinance 09-252 is "a form of compelled speech" that "alters the course of a [pregnancy] center’s communication with a client or prospective client about abortion and birth-control" and "is based, at least in part, on disagreement with the viewpoint of the speaker." The court entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance. Upon review of the briefs submitted by both the parties and numerous amici briefs in this case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the ordinance in question was not narrowly tailored to promote the City's interest so as to justify its intrusion on the Pregnancy Center's speech.

Plaintiff brought a discrimination claim against her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., for denying her a reasonable accommodation following her foot surgery. The district court dismissed her case after concluding she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not filing her proposed accommodation with the EEOC. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies under the circumstances and reversed the district court's judgment.

This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American college, experienced problems in registering to vote in the November 2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. At issue was whether Section 8(i)(l) of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which required public disclosure of "all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters," 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(i)(l), applied to completed voter registration applications. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted Section 8(i)(l), concluding that it did not apply to such applications and holding that defendants had violated the NVRA by refusing to disclose the completed applications with voters' Social Security numbers redacted.