Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Bistrian, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, filed 108-page complaint with 114 pages of exhibits, alleging that, while he was awaiting sentencing on wire-fraud charges, prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they flubbed the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, Bistrian contends he repeatedly requested help, but no preventive measures were taken. Later, one of the inmates against whom Bistrian had cooperated, along with others, beat him while they were together in a locked recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon attacked Bistrian in the recreation pen. Bistrian also claimed that certain of the 447 days he spent in segregation violated his substantive due process, procedural due process, and free speech rights. After the district court ruled on motions, six counts survived against 28 defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. Counts that survived include: deliberate indifference to medical needs; substantive due process violations by failure to protect and by punitive detention; procedural due process; and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. View "Bistrian v. Levi" on Justia Law

Garrus was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 2001. At sentencing, the judge increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9714, the “three strikes” law. To do so, the judge made a finding that Garrus had previously been convicted of burglarizing an occupied building, when, in fact, he had only pled guilty to, and been convicted of, second degree burglary (which, under Pennsylvania law, necessarily requires that the burglarized building was unoccupied). In a habeas petition, Garrus argued that this judicial fact-finding violated the Supreme Court's 2000 holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, requiring that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court denied the petition on the basis that the highest state court determination upholding the sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Third Circuit reversed. The state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was objectively unreasonable. View "Garrus v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1986 Munchinski was convicted of two counts of first-degree homicide and two counts of second-degree homicide arising out of a pair of murders that occurred in 1977 in Bear Rocks, Pennsylvania. Munchinski later discovered that prosecutors had withheld from his counsel almost a dozen articles of exculpatory evidence. After unsuccessfully petitioning for post-conviction relief several times in state and federal court, Munchinski filed a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2244 & 2254(d), arguing that the Pennsylvania Superior Court unreasonably applied Brady, when it declined to grant Munchinski post-conviction relief. The district court granted habeas relief. The court equitably tolled the statute of limitations for some untimely claims; excused certain procedural defaults, finding that applying the procedural default doctrine would effect a fundamental miscarriage of justice; and agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied Brady. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the scope of the Brady violations was “staggering.” Munchinski demonstrated actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. View "Munchinski v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Based on DNA evidence found on furniture, McBride was charged with the murder of his wife 16 years after her disappearance. He was convicted and exhausted Pennsylvania state court appeals. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting McBride’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to certain references to his silence, in violation of his constitutional right to remain silent. There was at least a reasonable argument that trial counsel’s actions were within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance.”

In 1993 Vasquez was sentenced to 262 months for heroin offenses. In 1996, he was sentenced to 14 months, to run consecutively, for possession of a prohibited object. His projected release date is October, 2012. The Second Chance Act, which applies, increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and requires the Bureau of Prisons to make individual determinations that ensure that placement is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of success and to provide incentives for participation in skills development programs. Vasquez’s team recommended a 151-180 day placement in a Residential Re-entry Center. Vasquez had not regularly participated in educational programs during his incarceration. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the BOP failed to comply with the reentry initiative and improperly added a factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been considered for incentives that were never properly implemented. The district court rejected the petition. Vasquez was not merely challenging construction of the Second Chance Act or implementation of the reentry initiative; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. There was no abuse of discretion in how the factors were balanced with goals of the Act.

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress.

In 2008, defendants, then 18 and 16 years old, accompanied by a group of other young Shenandoah residents began partying and drinking, then encountered Ramirez and became engaged in an argument with him that involved racial slurs. The incident escalated to the savage beating of Ramirez, who died two days later as a result of injuries he sustained. They were acquitted of all but minor state charges and each served six months. Following public outcry, they were convicted of criminal violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3631, which penalizes actions taken against an individual on account of his race, color or national origin, and with the specific intent to intimidate the victim or others like him from exercising their right to housing free of discrimination. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to a jury instruction that the government was not required to prove that issues of race and occupancy were the only motivations in beating Ramirez. The court also rejected claims that double jeopardy barred the federal trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction under 3631.

Rolan was convicted in 1984 of murder and possession of an instrument of crime for a 1983 shooting death involving a drug sale. He obtained habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a retrial, the jury convicted Rolan of murder again. After exhausting appeals, he again sought habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was based on closing argument statements about the reliability of an alibi witness. The court properly allowed reading of a transcript of testimony by a witness, who died before retrial.

In 1993 Simon and others burglarized a house; the occupant arrived during the burglary and was shot dead. Simon was tried for felony murder, first degree robbery, and third degree burglary. Simon repeatedly moved to dismiss his appointed defender, Ayala. Ayala moved to withdraw claiming that Simon was hostile and was planning to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined. Ayala did not give an opening statement, call witnesses, or object to closure of the courtroom during closing arguments and jury instructions. Simon was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His direct appeals were unsuccessful. Another participant, who testified against Simon, had his sentence reduced for his assistance. Virgin Islands court rejected a petition for habeas corpus and, on appeal, Simon's attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The motion was granted and the petition was ultimately denied. The Third Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The Appellate Division did not err in applying Anders procedures to assess motions filed by court-appointed counsel to withdraw on post-conviction appeal, but erred in finding the Anders brief sufficient on its face. There were nonfrivolous issues that should be reviewed on the merits.

In 1977 defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. He was released in 1992, and, still on parole, was accused of inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter. He was convicted; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections recommended that his sentence include participation in a sex offender treatment program. He has been repeatedly denied parole based on refusal to participate. He claims that the program requirement that he admit committing the sex crime for which he was convicted would amount to self-incrimination and would have compromised his then-pending appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to address whether petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Even assuming that refusal to participate was the sole reason for denying parole, the actions of the Board did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of the program is not simply to gather information and an inmate has no right to parole. Penalties that merely alter the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amend