Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tying him to the crime. The testimony of Robles, Johnson’s friend, that Johnson had confessed guilt to him, was pivotal. Johnson filed multiple petitions under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, unsuccessfully claiming violations of Brady v. Maryland. He then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed, noting that it was not until discovery in Johnson’s federal habeas case that previously undisclosed evidence was uncovered, showing that, at the time Robles testified, he was under investigation for his role in a shooting, an assault, and multiple shots-fired incidents. Robles, who was never charged with any crimes despite repeated dealings with police in investigations involving guns and drugs, supplied police with information concerning an unrelated crime when his own involvement in an assault came under investigation. The jury never heard the impeachment evidence because when Johnson sought discovery of information concerning any criminal activity of Robles, charged or uncharged, the District Attorney who prosecuted Johnson represented to the state court that it had no information or police reports naming Robles as a suspect. View "Johnson v. Folino" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted of drug-related offenses. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review. Jenkins timely filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, which the trial court denied. He timely filed notice of appeal, but the superior court granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw and affirmed denial of his petition on November 10, 2009. On December 2, 2009, Jenkins filed a pro se pleading with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entitled, “Motion to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, and for the Appointment of Counsel.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court notified the Superior Court that Jenkins had filed a petition for allowance of appeal, but, on December 16, issued notice, stating that his pleading failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure unrelated to timing. Jenkins perfected his pleading on December 29, but, on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court denied his pleading without opinion. On May 7, 2010, Jenkins filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court, sua sponte, raised the issue of timeliness and ultimately dismissed as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Jenkins is eligible for statutory tolling of AEDPA’s limitation period. View "Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands" on Justia Law

Daughter, born in June 2004, suffered medical problems that stunted her growth. In October 2005, Mother took Daughter to Dr. Lindblad, who diagnosed failure to thrive. She was treated inpatient for six days and gained 50 grams per day, a gain normal for a child of Daughter’s age and condition. After returning to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only four grams per day. Lindblad again prescribed inpatient treatment and, in April 2006, concluded that Daughter’s condition was psychosocial; he feared that Daughter was neglected and noted concern about Munchausen by proxy. He spoke to a child welfare caseworker, who was already investigating the situation. A judge ordered Daughter removed to her father’s home, with Mother to have only supervised visitation. Caseworkers thought it unnecessary to hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were Daughter taken into state custody. Mother received no explanation of how to arrange for a hearing. After Daughter was removed, discrepancies in her recorded weights were discovered. Mother’s habeas petition, filed 40 days after removal, was rejected. Mother and father later agreed to share custody. The district court rejected Mother’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on procedural due process claims. View "B. S. v. Somerset Cnty." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs are five individuals with mental retardation who are institutionalized in intermediate care facilities (ICFs/MR) operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare; they allege violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act by failing “to offer and provide the opportunity to receive services in integrated, community settings that are most appropriate settings to meet their needs. Plaintiffs claimed that there are approximately 1,272 individuals who reside in five ICFs/MR. The district court certified the class, denied a motion to dismiss, denied a motion to intervene brought by nine institutionalized individuals who oppose community placement, and granted final approval to a settlement agreement. The Third Circuit vacated in part, holding that the court abused its discretion by denying intervention as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) in the remedy stage of this litigation as well as with respect to final approval of the settlement agreement. The intervenors may also challenge certification of the class. View "Benjamin v. PA Dep't of Pub. Welfare" on Justia Law

Nicole, age 15, sent a text message to a friend stating that she planned to commit suicide by ingesting ibuprofen pills. The friend called 911 and soon Officer Marshall of the Wright Township Police Department arrived at the residence, with two other officers and emergency medical personnel. When questioned by her parents, Nicole admitted that she had planned to commit suicide, but said that she had changed her mind and had not ingested any pills. Officer Marshall stated that Nicole had to go to the hospital. Her parents disagreed, but Marshall informed them that he would charge them with assisted manslaughter if something happened to Nicole because they did not send Nicole to the hospital. They relented. They initially refused to accompany her, stating that they felt unable to travel because they had taken prescription medication earlier that evening. Mrs. James eventually agreed to go to the hospital with her daughter, but later brought suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, but did not grant Marshall qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. Mrs. James was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "James v. City of Wilkes Barre " on Justia Law

Delaware State Police obtained search warrants for Pavulak’s email account and workplace after receiving information that he was viewing child pornography on his workplace computers. Evidence was seized, he was convicted of possessing, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and attempting to produce child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), attempting to entice a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and committing crimes related to his status as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment on the attempted-production conviction and to 120 months’ imprisonment on the remaining counts. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the evidence should have been suppressed. The warrants were supported by an affidavit that pointed to Pavulak‘s prior child-molestation convictions and labeled the images, which had been reported by informants, simply as child pornography. No further details concerning the images content appeared in the affidavit, which was, therefore, insufficient to establish probable cause for child pornography, but the officers reasonably relied on the warrants in good faith. View "Unted Smith v. Pavulak" on Justia Law

Giles was a prisoner in the Delaware penal system. Campbell worked at the Sussex Correctional Institution. Giles brought excessive force and deliberate indifference claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against officers, including Campbell, based on a confrontation during Giles’s transfer to Sussex and against others regarding his medical treatment after the incident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants, including Campbell, on the basis of qualified immunity, held a bench trial, and entered judgment in favor of remaining defendants. The Third Circuit remanded the summary judgment. On remand, the Delaware Department of Justice, which had represented defendants, notified the court that Campbell had died in July 2006. Giles moved to substitute the administratrix of Campbell’s estate as a defendant. Neither the suggestion of death nor the motion to substitute was served on the estate. The district court denied the motion to substitute, holding that Giles’s claim was not pending under Delaware law and was extinguished. Giles proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. The Third Circuit vacated denial of the motion to substitute, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the estate. View "Giles v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 1989, Copenhefer was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats. As to the murder conviction, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, making a death sentence mandatory. The court imposed the death sentence and consecutive sentences totaling 20 to 40 years on remaining counts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A trial court denied a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act; the Supreme Court again affirmed. In 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted habeas relief from the death sentence on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was required to find that Copenhefer’s lack of a prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the original sentence. The court rejected additional claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory that the victim lingered before dying and that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove female jurors. View "Copenhefer v. Horn" on Justia Law