Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2000 Ross was convicted of first degree murder in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Ross was unable to obtain a state appellate court review due to extraordinary circumstances attributable to his attorney’s extreme neglect of his case, including missing deadlines for filing document, failure to communicate with Ross, and the attorney’s misleading statements when he did communicate with Ross. The court denied his motion for appointment of a new attorney. Ross’s mental health issues, limited education, and limited cognitive ability magnified his problems and his status as an inmate placed structural obstacles in his path. Ross subsequently brought this habeas corpus case, charging that because his attorney wrongfully abandoned him, he lost his appellate rights in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Although the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), statute of limitations barred the action as untimely, the district court found that equitable tolling of the running of the statute was warranted because Ross had been diligent in pursuing his state court appellate remedies but that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control frustrated this attempt. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "Ross v. Varano" on Justia Law

Former Superior Court Judge Kendall enforced an oral plea agreement that the prosecution had attempted to withdraw; Kendall believed that the defendants could not obtain a fair trial, due to prosecutorial misconduct. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court reversed and issued a writ of mandamus. Kendall published an opinion chastising the mandamus decision and recusing himself from the case due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Justices cited Kendall for criminal contempt and found him guilty because his opinion, in their view, obstructed the administration of justice and because his recusal was a pretextual effort to avoid complying with the writ of mandamus. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment and vacated the contempt conviction, finding that the First Amendment protects a sitting judge from being criminally punished for his opinion unless that opinion presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing ongoing proceedings. Kendall’s opinion did not pose such a threat. There was insufficient evidence that his recusal was pretextual. View "In Re: Kendall" on Justia Law

Covington, a basketball official in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for more than 10 years, filed suit, alleging gender employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. 10:5-1, because she has been excluded from officiating at boys’ high school varsity basketball games. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants: the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Board 193 (Board 193), which assigns officials to officiate at regular season high school basketball games; the New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association (NJSIAA), which controls and supervises post-season tournament games and assigns officials to referee those games; the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials (IAABO), the Colonial Valley Conference (CVC), the Hamilton Township School District (“Hamilton”), a school at which Covington has officiated, and Dumont, the President of Board 193. The Third Circuit remanded to give Covington an opportunity to provide more facts as to her claim against Hamilton, Board 193, and NJSIAA, but affirmed dismissal of claims against the CVC and IAABO. View "Covington v. Int'l Assoc. of Approved Basketball Officials" on Justia Law

K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children’s Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.’s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a “substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others,” granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Byrd, an inmate at SCI-Frackville, filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint against the prison’s Superintendent, Corrections Health Care Administrator, two nurses, and the Chief Grievance Officer, alleging that they showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to provide him with prescription eye drops for his glaucoma. Byrd proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court ruled in favor of all defendants. Byrd moved to proceed IFP on appeal. The clerk’s office notified Byrd that he had “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) and had to show that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury in order to be eligible for IFP status. The Third Circuit denied his petition, noting that Byrd’s three potential strikes included two cases that were “clearly” dismissed for failure to state a claim and that the other was an appeal that was dismissed by the Third Circuit under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) as “without merit.” Byrd did not file a motion alleging imminent danger, but submitted a response arguing that the clerk’s office made a mistake in determining that he had three strikes. The court held that non-IFP dismissals can count as “strikes.” View "Byrd v. Shannon" on Justia Law

Montone was an officer with the Jersey City Police Department from 1981 until 2010, when she retired as a sergeant. Plaintiffs are present or former sergeants in the JCPD. The plaintiffs claim that retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights and discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New Jersey state law, was the basis of their failure to be promoted from the rank of sergeant to lieutenant during Healy’s tenure as mayor and Troy’s tenure as police chief. Healy’s mayoral campaign was heated and personal. Plaintiffs claim that all promotions from sergeant to lieutenant were halted by Healy and Troy to penalize Montone for her support of Healy’s opponent. Each plaintiff had passed the civil service examination required to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained concerning defendants’ motivations for their decisions. View "Montone v. City of Jersey City" on Justia Law

Gilliam was fatally shot outside a Pittsburgh bar in 1997. Grant was convicted on the testimony of one witness, who based his identification on clothing. The witness was apparently granted leniency with respect to a parole violation in exchange for testimony; the criminal history of the witness was not disclosed to or discovered by the defense. Others, who had been present and who stated that Grant was not the shooter, were not called as witnesses. There was no physical evidence tying Grant to the crime. The state court denied Grant’s petition for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding for the first time that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be raised in the first instance in post-conviction proceedings. Grant then filed an unsuccessful pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541. The federal district court denied his habeas petition. The Third Circuit remanded, directing the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the ineffective assistance claim.View "Grant v. Lockett" on Justia Law

Knoll filed suit following her termination from the city Parks Department, alleging gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 951. The district court dismissed the gender discrimination claim; the jury returned a verdict in favor of Allentown on the harassment and retaliation claims. Following Knoll’s unsuccessful motions for a new trial and for sanctions, the court concluded that the motions were frivolous but declined to order sanctions. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the court was not required to engage in a six-factor analysis before dismissal of a post-trial motion, based on procedural noncompliance. View "Knoll v. City of Allentown" on Justia Law

Denny, an inmate at the Fairton, New Jersey, Federal Correctional Institution, was punished with 60 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit after a “shank” was found in a vent between the cell he shared with another inmate and another cell. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation. Denny sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241 arguing that prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from contraband. The mere discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in that cell possessed the contraband. View "Denny v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Opponents sought to enjoin enforcement of N.J. STAT. ANN. 2 2C:58-2(a)(7) and 2C:58-3(i), the One Gun Law, as preempted by 15 U.S.C. 5001(g)(ii), which provides that no state shall prohibit sale (other than to minors) of traditional B-B, paint ball, or pellet-firing air guns that expel a projectile through the force of air pressure. The One Gun Law prohibits the purchase or sale of more than one handgun per person per month, including B-B and air guns. They also claimed that implementation of the Law violates the Due Process Clause because exemptions for certain groups, such as collectors of handguns and competitive shooters are essentially illusory. In order to purchase more than one handgun per month under an exemption, the applicant must list, on a state-provided application form, the particular handguns, by serial number, that she wishes to purchase, so that a collector must convince the seller to take a gun off the market while the application is processed. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Law is not so onerous as to be a de facto prohibition. Even if objectors have a property interest, they did not demonstrate a deprivation of that interest. View "Ass'n NJ Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law