Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

New Jersey enacted the 2002 Off-Track and Account Wagering Act, N.J. Stat. 5:5-127, providing for establishment of 15 off-track wagering (OTW) facilities. The Act authorized a license for the N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority, conditioned upon NJSEA entering into a participation agreement with other entities that held horse racing permits in 2000 (ACRA and Freehold). NJSEA, ACRA, and Freehold entered into an agreement, allocating permit rights. By 2011, only four facilities had opened. NJSEA had leased control of its tracks to the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA) and another. The 2011 Forfeiture Amendment provided that permit holders would forfeit rights to any OTW not licensed by 2012, unless they demonstrated “making progress” toward establishing an OTW; forfeited rights would be available to other “horsemen’s organizations” without compensation to the permit holder. NJTHA qualified for forfeited rights. The 2012 Deposit Amendment extended the forfeiture date and allowed a permit holder to make a $1 million deposit for each OTW facility not licensed by December 31, 2011, retaining the “making progress” exception. The Pilot Program Act allowed installation of electronic wagering terminals in some bars and restaurants, by lessees or purchasers of NJSEA-owned racetracks, who could exchange unused OTW licenses to install electronic terminals. NJTHA secured such a license. ACRA and Freehold submitted challenged the constitutionality of the amendments under the Contracts, Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. The Commission determined that both ACRA and Freehold had made progress toward establishing their unlicensed OTW facilities and absolved them of the obligation to submit deposits. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on Younger abstention grounds. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, (2013), clarifying the Younger abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the action does not fit within the framework for abstention. View "Acra Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki" on Justia Law

The Winkelman brothers, have a “long and protracted litigation history” involving challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought while in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit denied certificates of appealability. The current motion, to reinstate their direct appeals, argued that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, Alleyne v. U.S. that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit denied the motion, which it characterized as “successive.” A successive section 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The Supreme Court may have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne, but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” View "United States v. Winkelman" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law

Glenn was convicted of the murder of Griffin and is currently a Pennsylvania prisoner. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought collateral review in state courts, then sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his due process rights by refusing to grant a mistrial after an eyewitness proffered contradictory testimony, opting instead to strike the entirety of the testimony and provide cautionary jury instructions and that his trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to strike other evidence in the record that referred to that witness’s identification of Glenn as the murderer. View "Glenn v. Dist. Attorney Allegheny Cty." on Justia Law

Collins, a Pennsylvania prisoner convicted in 1993 of first-degree murder, appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. The court certified two questions for appeal: whether Collins was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel “inadequately prepared for trial and completely failed to conduct any investigation, including into the ballistics evidence” and whether trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, combined with alleged errors of the trial court, cumulatively caused him prejudice. The Third Circuit affirmed, while expressing “serious doubt that trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation.” In light of the uncontroverted evidence presented against Collins at trial, the state court’s determination that Collins failed to show he suffered prejudice was not an unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington, which sets the standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Collins also did not exhaust his claim of cumulative error, which was, therefore, procedurally defaulted. View "Collins v. Sec'y, PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Sharif, an inmate housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit, punched a corrections officer. Sharif claims that C.O. Picone punched Sharif first. Picone testified that once he was struck, he attempted to protect himself and that C.O. Potance, who was helping Picone retrieve dinner trays, attempted to restrain Sharif. Sharif asserted that once Picone began to hit him, Potance and C.O. Pinto entered his cell and joined in the attack by choking him. Following the altercation, Sharif was handcuffed and moved to a “suicide cell.” He continued to cause commotion and was moved to a restraint chair. Sharif contends that while he was in the restraint chair, he was punched repeatedly by unnamed corrections officers, observed and permitted by Lieutenant Kospiah. Sharif was charged with aggravated assault, entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was convicted as charged. Sharif filed an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and moved to exclude evidence of his nolo contendere plea under Rule 410. The court admitted the evidence when Sharif took the stand and denied wrongdoing. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that Sharif’s credibility was already “suspect” and that the plea was, therefore, of minimal relevance.View "Sharif v. Picone" on Justia Law

Andrea and Aaron lived together with their infant son from 2007 until 2009, when Andrea obtained an order of protection that described Aaron’s history of violence, including incidents of choking, slapping, and giving Andrea a black eye. Aaron had a criminal history that included check fraud, intimidation of another woman with whom he had a child, and shoplifting as a juvenile. He had also been charged with “indecent assault/rape” but found not guilty. Aaron’s father, Michael, a police officer, was aware of his son’s history and that two of Aaron’s children had died under mysterious circumstances while in his custody (he later confessed to killing them). Aaron had a room in his father’s home, drove his father’s truck, and received mail at his father’s address. Five days after the order issued Aaron returned to Andrea’s apartment and threatened to “cut her up.” An arrest warrant for Aaron issued. While Michael was on vacation, Aaron went to his home, found a copy of the criminal complaint against him, drank a bottle of 99-proof alcohol, ransacked the house and found his father’s service-issued gun, then used it to kill Andrea. Aaron was later killed by police, outside his father’s house. Andrea’s estate sued Michael for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Michael’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity and statutory immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, with instructions to dismiss, finding that Michael’s conduct fell within the immunity established by the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. 922(z)(3). View "Estate of Arrington v. Michael" on Justia Law

George, a 21-year old U.S. citizen, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia to California to begin his senior year at Pomona College. George claims that at the Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, because he was carrying a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of American interventionism. The flashcards included every day words and phrases such as “yesterday,” “fat,” “thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” and “friendly,” but also contained such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.” George had a double major in Physics and Middle Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as part of a study abroad program; he then spent five weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan. He was released after about five hours. In his suit against three employees of the Transportation Security Administration and two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force members, the district court’s denied motions in which the defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they violated George’s Fourth and First Amendment rights. The Third Circuit reversed and ordered the case dismissed. View "George v. Rehiel" on Justia Law

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), states that provide special education funds are eligible for federal funds to implement state-wide special education programs that guarantee a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to eligible disabled children, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A). Pennsylvania enacted 24 P.S. 25-2509.5, its special education funding formula, under which each school district receives a base supplement, calculated by apportioning the total amount of base supplement money available among all districts based on the average daily membership of the district from the prior year under the assumption that 16% of students in each district are disabled. Plaintiffs, disabled students who attend schools in districts with a 17% or greater enrollment of special needs students and with a market value/personal income ratio of .65 or greater, claimed that Pennsylvania’s method violates IDEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act The district court found that the formula did not deprive the class of a FAPE as required by the IDEA and did not discriminate in violation of either the ADA or RA. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that any class member was deprived of a service available to nonclass members. View "CG v. PA Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Since September 11, 2001, efforts to restructure the FBI as the “domestic equivalent” of the Central Intelligence Agency have included revising internal FBI guidelines. The Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), released by the Attorney General in 2008, authorizes FBI agents to engage in limited racial and ethnic profiling when conducting proactive assessments of criminal and terrorist threats and allows the FBI to collect and map data related to “[f]ocused behavioral characteristics reasonably believed to be associated with a particular criminal or terrorist element of an ethnic community.” The ACLU launched an initiative entitled “Mapping the FBI,” including a series of coordinated FOIA requests (28 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A)) seeking records related to the FBI’s use of ethnic and racial data. One request targeted six FBI field offices in New Jersey and sought information concerning implementation of authority to collect information and map racial and ethnic demographics and behaviors in local communities. The FBI identified 782 pages of potentially responsive records, eventually released 312 pages (some of which were partially redacted), withheld 186 pages as duplicative, and withheld 284 pages as exempt from disclosure. The ACLU sought an injunction for release of the withheld records. The district court ruled in favor of the FBI. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the in camera procedure employed for determining whether reliance on FOIA exclusion provision was justified.View "Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law