Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The petitioner, convicted in 1982 of murdering a police officer and sentenced to death, exhausted state appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court denied a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and subsequently remanded the Third Circuit's grant of relief on the sentence. On remand, the Third Circuit held that the death sentence must be vacated because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court incorrectly applied Supreme Court precedent (Mills v. Maryland). The verdict form and jury instructions, particularly a statement that â[w]e, the jury, have found unanimously . . . one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,â created a substantial probability the jury believed it was precluded from finding a mitigating circumstance that had not been unanimously agreed upon. The court noted that the form has been amended since the petitioner's conviction.

An officer issued a misconduct report against the plaintiff (an inmate) following an attack on another inmate. Although the officer had stated that the incident was recorded, a hearing officer accepted a statement that it was not recorded and accepted the victim's refusal to testify, found the plaintiff guilty, and imposed sanctions. Sanctions included loss of a prison job, disciplinary confinement, and assessment of the plaintiff's prison account; the Third Circuit later determined the plaintiff had a protected property interest in the account. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but on remand found a due process violation in the hearing officer's failure to independently evaluate the credibility of a confidential informant. The Third Circuit affirmed that due process was not violated by the decision to allow the victim not to testify, but reversed in part, holding that due process was violated by the hearing officer not seeking to view documentary evidence (the recording) requested by the inmate, absent legitimate institutional concerns. The court affirmed that damages are precluded by qualified immunity and ordered the misconduct expunged, but denied other relief. A reasonable official in the position of the hearing officer would not have known that her actions violated clearly established constitutional rights.

The governor terminated two public employees. The district court ordered reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. After examining the law of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the court determined that the employees were "career service," not exempt employees, but were not "regular" employees and, therefore, did not have a protected property interest in their jobs.

A police officer was suspended for his handling of another officer's complaint against superior officers in violation of policies governing use of the computer system. A union grievance resulted in an award of back pay and benefits to the date of the award. The Office of the Inspector General issued a report several months after the incident and scheduled a hearing, which resulted in termination. After filing another union grievance, the officer was reinstated without back pay. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, first holding that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity. Under Pennsylvania law, the officer had a protected property interest in his job and, absent extraordinary circumstances, was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing, but that right was not clearly established. Prior case law could have been interpreted as indicating that the post-suspension union grievance hearing was adequate. The notice of the termination hearing was adequate, despite not identifying the specific rules allegedly violated.

An Erie County resident had spoken during the public part of 14-15 council meetings before he attempted to object to a motion on an ordinance after the close of public comments. After being told that he was out of order, the resident continued to assert violation of the Sunshine Act and was escorted out. The chair sent a letter stating that the resident could be banned from future meetings if he was disruptive. The district court dismissed civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983), except against the chair. A jury awarded $5,000, but the court entered judgment in favor of the chair. The Third Circuit affirmed. The meeting was a limited public forum, so the council had the right to impose narrowly-tailored, reasonable content-neutral, time, place, and manner restrictions. The resident had adequate alternatives for raising objections to procedures used in adopting ordinances; the evidence did not establish that the chair intended to suppress his message because of content or personal hostility. The only difference between the resident and other speakers at the meeting was the timing of his comments. Because the resident had waived the claim, the court declined to consider whether the council satisfied the state Sunshine Act by reserving time for public comment, but held that the Act does not change the scope of First Amendment rights.

Under Pennsylvania law, 53 Pa. Stat. 46190, police officers may not be suspended or terminated without just cause. An officer, who entered charges against other officers on the police network on behalf of another, but in violation of regulations governing use of the system, was suspended without a hearing. A union grievance resulted in an award of back-pay. A report by the Office of the Inspector General, issued months later, detailed the conduct at issue and gave notice of a hearing, after which the officer was terminated. The district court held that the post-deprivation union grievance proceeding cured the lack of pre-deprivation due process and that it was not necessary that the officer be notified of the exact rules he was charged with violating. The Third Circuit affirmed. The officer had a constitutionally protected interest, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, could not be suspended without a hearing. That right, however, was not clearly established at the time of the suspension, so the officers involved in the suspension were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The notice of termination hearing gave the officer adequate information about the conduct that was the basis for action.

Harvey and her boyfriend jointly leased an apartment. After Harvey obtained an order of protection and was granted exclusive possession of the apartment, the boyfriend retrieved some of his belongings. Later, seeking to retrieve additional property, the boyfriend requested a police officer to accompany him to the apartment. The officer and the boyfriend, went to the apartment on a weekday, when Harvey was not at home, and, after the officer stated that he 'saw no problem with it' the landlord used her key to admit them. The trial court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the trial court incorrectly stated that 'in order to determine if the . . . plaintiff established her . . . claim, you must answer only one factual question, and that is did the defendant order the landlady to open the door.' Whether the officer took an active role in the entry and repossession of property so that there was state action depends on the totality of the circumstances and all of the officer's actions, not a single factual question. The court's language was highly prejudicial.