Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The school district and chief of police sent an e-mail to officials and citizens instructing them "if you see this person in or around the district schools, please contact the police." Plaintiff claimed that the email used his real name and stated that he had been known to hang around schools, had not approached any kids, and that his mental status was unknown. It contained his picture, home address, the make, model, and license plate number of his vehicle, and his driver's license number. His suit, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged deprivation of freedom of movement, illegal seizure of personal records, violation of right to privacy, conspiracy, and failure to train, supervise and discipline agents. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously and, after a deadline for filing in his own name passed, dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court provided two independently sufficient reasons for dismissal: refusal to prosecute in compliance with court orders and consideration of factors concluding that plaintiff would not suffer substantial harm that might sufficiently outweigh the public interest in an open trial.

An essential witness in a rape, robbery, murder prosecution refused to testify because of threats to her family and went as far as pulling a knife on a police officer. She evaded capture during two trials and, after a second conviction was overturned, was jailed as a material witness. A February 2 trial date was continued until May 25; the witness was incarcerated for 54 days before being released. The prosecution did not notify the judge who had ordered the incarceration of the continuance and, when the witness's father died, allowed her only a short visit to the funeral home, in handcuffs. Following a remand, the district court denied the prosecutor qualified immunity with respect to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. The incarceration was a seizure, for Fourth Amendment purposes, and a reasonable jury could find the duration unreasonable. As the sole government official in possession of the relevant information, the prosecutor had a duty of disclosure that was neither discretionary nor advocative, but was a purely administrative act, not entitled to the shield of immunity,

Defendant was indicted on one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). Following indictment, arrest, and detention, the government sought to collect a DNA sample, relying on 42 U.S.C. 14135a(a)(1)(A), which permits the collection of DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted. The district court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional and prohibited the government from taking the sample prior to conviction. After determining that the matter concerned a collateral order, subject to interlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Arrestees have a diminished expectation of privacy in their identities, and DNA collection from arrestees serves important law enforcement interests; such collection is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff, arrested for violating a township public intoxication ordinance, argued that the law was superseded by or contrary to the New Jersey Alcoholism Treatment and Rehabilitation Act. The judge dismissed the charge. Plaintiff's federal suit, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law, was dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not provide a remedy because the ordinance under which plaintiff was arrested is not unambiguously invalid.

Plaintiffs, lawful permanent residents taken into custody based on past convictions, (8 U.S.C. 1182) sought a declaratory judgment that continued detention of putative class members, without bond hearings, violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause. The District Court denied class certification and dismissed the class complaint, based on 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1), which precludes class actions that seek to "enjoin or restrain the operation of" several immigration statutes. The Third Circuit reversed. The word "restrain" does not encompass classwide declaratory relief.

Following an altercation concerning auto repairs, plaintiff, an African American, found damage to his car and was threatened by a garage employee; he called 911. Garage employees also called 911. When officers responded, plaintiff and defendant, a white officer, had a verbal altercation about whether defendant was responding as he would respond to a white victim. Defendant handcuffed plaintiff, placed him in the patrol car, and spoke to the garage employees without questioning plaintiff. He arrested plaintiff and one of the garage employees. Plaintiff was acquitted. The garage employee apparently entered a plea of no contest. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, a jury awarded plaintiff $80,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. The district court overturned the verdict and entered judgment for defendant. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show unlawful seizure, equal protection violations, and that the defendant lacked probable cause for the vehicle search that followed towing of plaintiff's car.

The state notified a concert promoter that use of two names might violate New Jersey trademark laws. The promoter provided evidence of common law trademarks, but the state notified the hotel venue to advertise the shows as a "tribute" or "salute" to named groups. The promoter filed suit, claiming that the state's enforcement violated the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125 and its civil rights. The district court entered a temporary restraining order, but the state changed its position. The court did not issue an injunction and denied attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the "catalyst" theory and holding that the promoter was not a "prevailing party." Even the judge did not consider the TRO an enforceable judgment on the merits and the state's change of position mooted the constitutional issues.

The plaintiffs were subjected to raids as part of "Operation Return to Sender," implemented to apprehend fugitive aliens. The complaint included "Bivens" claims: unreasonable home entries, unreasonable searches; unreasonable seizures, all in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force by four individuals; a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim involving three individuals; and a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim by one individual. The district court denied a motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit reversed on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defendants, high-level federal Immigration enforcement supervisors, participated in the raids, adopted an unconstitutional policy, or had legally sufficient notice of the unconstitutional conduct of subordinates. They did not identify what defendants should have done differently with respect to training or other matters, that would have prevented the unconstitutional conduct. The plaintiffs may pursue official capacity claims for injunctive relief against any further intimidation or unlawful entry. The court did not address individual capacity claims for damages against the lower-ranking agents

The student was suspended for using a home computer to create an internet profile of her middle school principal, including sexual content and vulgar language. The site did not include the principal's name, but did include his picture from the school website. Other students were not able to view the site from school computers and the student made an effort to limit viewers to a few of her friends. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school on First Amendment claims (42. U.S.C. 1983). The Third Circuit reversed in part. The school violated the student's rights in suspending her for for off-campus speech that caused no substantial disruption in school and that could not reasonably have led school officials to forecast substantial disruption in school. There was no disruption beyond "general rumblings" and a few minutes of talk in class; the profile was outrageous and there was no evidence that anyone took it seriously. The court rejected the parent's Fourteenth Amendment claim of interference with their "liberty" interest in raising their child. The court affirmed that the school handbook and computer use policy were not overbroad and vague.

A student reported to her aunt, a member of the school board (plaintiff), that she had seen a teacher hugging another student. The investigation ended because the teacher and minor student denied the incident and the plaintiff raised concerns about the reporting student's credibility. More than a year later, a police officer saw the teacher and the minor student in a sexual encounter and the teacher was arrested. A copy of the report on an investigation that followed, containing plaintiff's assertions about her niece's credibility, was leaked to the press during a school board election. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that there is no Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy with respect to the information at issue. Plaintiff may not have intended wide-dissemination of her opinion but she volunteered it to others and it did not concern autonomy and independence in personal decision-making.