Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony.

Plaintiiff, a deputy serving a bench warrant, entered a garbage-filled residence. She and her partner discovered that they were covered with fleas and were directed to proceed to an Emergency Management Building. They were told to stay inside their cruiser until a superior officer arrived. About 20 minutes later, superior officers arrived and began to film plaintiff for a training video. Despite the heat and biting insects, plaintiff was told to remain in the car. Plaintiff alleges that officers laughed at her and filmed her in a semi-nude state at the hospital, taunted her because of a tattoo, and showed the video to other officers.The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit affirmed in part, with respect to unreasonable search and seizure and failure to train claims, but reversed with respect to a Fourteenth Amendment privacy claim. Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the decontamination area, particularly with respect to members of the opposite sex. A dispute of material fact exists as to which of her body parts were exposed to members of the opposite sex or filmed while she was in that area.

Plaintiff, a white male, applied for the position of Housing Development Analyst in Newark. He was rejected because he lived in Rutherford; Newark has a residency requirement for non-uniformed employees. Plaintiff claimed the rule had a disparate impact on white, non-Hispanics because Newark's population does not reflect the racial make-up of the relevant labor market in the surrounding area. In a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1),the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Third Circuit reversed. Factual issues exist as to how to define the appropriate relevant labor market. Even if the city of Newark itself is the relevant labor market, the court erred in its statistical analysis and applied an incorrect standard when analyzing the business necessity defense.

The Township proposed redevelopment that would eliminate 327-329 existing homes in a neighborhood, occupied predominantly by low-income minority residents, and replace them with more expensive housing, unaffordable to current residents. About half of the existing brick row houses, built in the 1950s, were owner-occupied. A 2000 report described the area as characterized by blight, excess land coverage, poor land use, and excess crime; the Township began to acquire properties. By 2008, 75 homes had been destroyed and 148 had been acquired and left vacant. By 2009, 110 more homes were destroyed, causing noise, vibration, dust, and debris. Residents alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3604(a)); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. 1982) ; and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment to the Township. The Third Circuit reversed. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the residents, the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHA. The court must ask whether the Township's legitimate objectives could have been achieved in a less discriminatory way. Contrasting statements about the cost and feasibility of an alternative relying on rehabilitation, create genuine issues of material fact.

Petitioner was detained for 1,072 days pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which requires that any person who is removable from this country because he has committed a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime involving a controlled substance be taken into custody and does not provide for release on bond. Petitioner, a citizen of Senegal, apparently had a state conviction for possessing a controlled substance. The district court concluded that the detention was lawful. The Third Circuit construed the pro se petition as seeking habeas corpus and reversed. The statute authorizes only detention for a reasonable period of time, after which the Due Process Clause requires that the government establish that continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of the detention statute. Detention of petitioner for nearly three years without further inquiry into whether it was necessary to ensure his appearance at the removal proceedings or to prevent a risk of danger to the community, was unreasonable.

A Caucasian former police officer claimed that disciplinary action against him and his 1999 termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, because it was retaliation for his opposition to the city's racially discriminatory treatment of minority officers. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff. The Third Circuit affirmed, using the analysis from the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Staub v. Proctor Hospital. Once plaintiff established a prima facie case that his termination was motivated by his supervisor's retaliatory animus, it was the city's burden to come forward with evidence that it terminated plaintiff for reasons unrelated to the supervisor's original biased action in preferring charges against plaintiff. The jury was properly instructed that it was plaintiff's burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was terminated after engaging in protected activity and that there was a causal connection between the termination and the protected activity.

Unlike many states, Pennsylvania allows felons to vote immediately upon release from prison. To correct widespread misunderstanding, public-interest organizations planned an advertisement encouraging ex-prisoners to vote. The Port Authority denied a request to place the ad on buses, based on a written policy, prohibiting noncommercial ads. Evidence indicated that, despite the policy, the Authority had accepted many noncommercial ads in recent years. The district court found viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the rejection was based on hostility to the ad's message and that the Authority is not now required to accept all noncommercial messages.

After an injury trial, plaintiff's attorney called jurors to ask about the award of damages and assignment of fault between the parties, apparently believing that there had been a clerical error on the verdict form. After a juror informed the magistrate judge, the judge concluded that the attorney had violated ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 by initiating post-verdict contact with a juror. The Third Circuit vacated, first holding that the attorney had standing to appeal. The judge abused his discretion and denied the attorney's due process rights by not following the disciplinary procedures outlined in Local Rule 83.2(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and by failing to give sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to finding misconduct and imposing sanctions.

The school board has a policy of praying at its regular meetings, routinely attended by students. The district court upheld the policy, based on a Supreme Court holding that Nebraska's practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer was not a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that a school board may not claim the exception established for legislative bodies and that traditional Establishment Clause principles governing prayer in public schools apply.

The Township filed disciplinary charges against an officer, which were suspended pending state investigation, and placed him on paid leave. The state and county declined to investigate. The Township reinstituted charges. Before his hearing, the officer filed suit claiming violation of due process rights by publicizing charges and failing to provide a hearing before suspension; violation of the First Amendment by retaliating for requesting a hearing. The court granted summary judgment to the Township on due process claims, but denied summary judgment on the First Amendment claim. After a hearing, the board fired the officer. Because the officer waited until just before trial, the district court denied a motion to amend. He filed a new complaint, alleging retaliatory termination. The jury found for defendants on the First Amendment claims. The court dismissed the second suit, citing res judicata. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Res judicata does not bar claims predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial complaint. The court properly instructed jurors that the township should prevail if it showed that it would have reached the same decision absent protected conduct. The officer's interest in a hearing before suspension with pay was outweighed by the township's interest in maintaining the integrity of its police force.