Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her former employer asserting claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-107(1)(a), (7). The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and dismissed the complaint. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the record presented genuine disputes of material fact regarding both plaintiff's claims under the NYCHRL. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for trial. View "Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290 et seq., alleging that an affair that one of her brothers had with another worker in their family business created a hostile work environment and that both of her brothers retaliated against her for complaining about the affair. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her retaliation claim. The court examined all of plaintiff's arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. Because there was no indication that plaintiff believed that her sex had anything to with her treatment or that defendants could have understood her statements as such, she failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII and the NYSHRL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng'rs., P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a New York State prisoner who had been administratively confined since 2003, appealed the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint. The complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged that plaintiff's due process rights have been violated because the decisions to continue his confinement in a Special Housing Unit (SHU) have been based on evidence that should have been expunged from his record, the periodic reviews have been perfunctory and meaningless, and the reasons given for his continued confinement have been false or misleading. Because plaintiff had previously lost a similar suit, the district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the present action was barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court concluded that the district court's applications of claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which the court reviewed de novo and in light of Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., were in large part erroneous. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Proctor v. LeClaire" on Justia Law

NOM, a nonprofit advocacy organization, appealed the district court's dismissal of its amended complaint for lack of subject-matter-jurisdiction. NOM was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that New York Election Law 14-100.1, which defined the term "political committee" for the purposes of state elections, violated the First Amendment. The court determined that NOM's case presented a live controversy that was ripe for consideration and vacated the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction. Because that conclusion prevented the district court from reaching the merits of NOM's claims, the court declined to comment on the substance of NOM's claims in the first instance. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree and subsequently pled guilty to a lesser charge for which the penalty was a one-year sentence - a jail term that he had already served. Plaintiff then brought the instant action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Brady violations against the officials who conducted his original investigation and prosecution. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiff's section 1983 claims were barred under Heck v. Humphrey. The court concluded, however, that because plaintiff was no longer in custody, and therefore could no longer bring a federal habeas suit, Heck's narrow exception to section 1983's otherwise broad coverage did not apply. Plaintiff may bring suit under section 1983 regardless of any defenses which might arise based on his subsequent guilty plea to the lesser charge. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Poventud v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under federal, state, and New York City law. Plaintiff claimed that defendants unfairly reprimanded her, observed her classroom with unusual frequency, evaluated her classroom performance negatively, and gave her less desirable classroom assignments and duties. She argued that these actions were unwarranted and motivated by discriminatory and retaliatory animus. Defendants acknowledged that they increased their supervision of and attention toward plaintiff, but they contended that they did so to address her performance and behavioral issues. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants for substantially the reasons articulated by the district court. With respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims, even if the court assumed that defendants' actions resulted in adverse employment action, no reasonable jury could find that such actions were motivated by a retaliatory animus. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "Sotomayor v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a participant in the Justice Department's Witness Security Program, brought suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, alleging that he was terminated from the Program without being afforded procedural due process. Plaintiff also alleged that following his termination he was placed in a Segregated Housing Unit (SHU) for 188 days and that this confinement violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's claim concerning his termination based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in light of 18 U.S.C. 3521(f). However, with respect to SHU detention, the district court should have sua sponte granted plaintiff leave to replead before sua sponte dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. T'Kash" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, who are supervisors or officials at the Ulster County, New York Sheriff's Office and the county jail, took adverse employment actions against them in retaliation for a parody created by one of the plaintiffs that suggested corruption among jail officials, and subsequently filing a lawsuit based upon this alleged retaliation. The court held that the district court correctly determined that none of the conduct for which plaintiffs alleged they suffered retaliation touched on a matter of public concern, and that plaintiffs as public employees, could therefore not sustain First Amendment claims under section 1983 against defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Singer v. Ferro" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are motorists who use the Grand Island Bridge but, because they are not residents of Grand Island, did not qualify for the lowest toll rate. Plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the toll discount policies violated the dormant Commerce Clause as well as the constitutional right to travel that courts have located in the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, both in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the November 28, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order of the district court, among other things, that granted judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that plaintiffs have standing under Article III, the toll policy at issue was a minor restriction on travel and did not involve "invidious distinctions" that would require strict scrutiny analysis pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court correctly used, in the alternative, the three-part test set forth in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, to evaluate both plaintiffs' right-to-travel and dormant Commerce Clause claims; and the Grand Island Bridge toll scheme was based on "some fair approximation of use" of the bridges; was not "excessive in relation to the benefits" it conferred; and did not "discriminate against interstate commerce." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Selevan, et al. v. New York Thruway Authority, et al." on Justia Law

Goldman Sachs appealed from an order of the district court denying their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims of gender discrimination. Plaintiff and others alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of discrimination based on sex against female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law, Administrative Code of the City of New York 8-107 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the arbitration clause in her agreement must be invalidated because arbitration would preclude her from vindicating a statutory right. The court disagreed and held that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration where plaintiff had no substantive statutory right to pursue a pattern-or-practice claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co." on Justia Law