Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged Section 1021(b)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (2012 NDAA), Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298, which appears to permit the President to detain anyone who was part of, or has substantially supported, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. Plaintiffs, journalists and activists, sought an injunction barring enforcement of Section 1021 and a declaration that it violated, among other things, their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. The court concluded that the American citizen plaintiffs lacked standing because Section 1021 says nothing at all about the President's authority to detain American citizens; while section 1021 had no real bearing on those who were neither citizens nor lawful residents and who were apprehended abroad, the non-citizen plaintiffs also failed to establish standing because they had not shown a sufficient threat that the government would detain them under Section 1021; and, therefore, the court vacated the permanent injunction, having no need to address the merits of plaintiffs' claims. View "Hedges v. Obama" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint challenging the constitutionality of New York State Penal Law 400.00(14). Penal Law 400.00(14) permits New York City to set and collect a residential handgun licensing fee that exceeds the maximum fee allowable under state law in other parts of New York State. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Admin. Code 10-131(a)(2), which sets the residential handgun licensing fee in New York City at $340 for a three-year license, was a constitutionally permissible licensing fee; the court need not definitively answer the question of whether Admin. Code 10-131(a)(2) should be subject to any form of heightened scrutiny because the court concluded that it survived "intermediate scrutiny" in any event; Penal Law 400.00(14) was subject only to "rational basis" review under the Equal Protection Clause because it "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class;" and Penal Law 400.00(14) survived "rational basis" review. View "Kwong, et al. v. Bloomberg, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the SPCA and others, seeking damages as a result of a search of her property and her arrest based on allegations of equine abuse. The district court applied claim splitting principles to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action because she filed a suit for tort damages based on the same facts in state court. Applying the Supreme Court's Colorado River abstention standard, the court concluded, however, that the district court's decision to dismiss the federal claim because of a similar pending state court litigation was erroneous. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton abstention could not apply when plaintiff sought damages in addition to declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the officer who arrested her, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the record established uncontroverted facts that, taken together, provided probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff. Therefore, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Stansbury v. Wertman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissal of his civil rights complaint. At issue was the interpretation of the three strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that neither the dismissal of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition seeking to vacate his conviction in the Jones v. Herbert case nor the dismissal of his appeals related to that petition constituted strikes under the PLRA. Because this holding negated three of plaintiff's five alleged strikes, the district court erred in denying plaintiff IFP status under the three strikes provision. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered the court to permit plaintiff to proceed with his complaint in forma pauperis. View "Jones v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging, inter alia, the denial of visitation rights, telephone usage, and access to a law library, and deprivation of proper temperature control, ventilation, and various amenities. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). The district court dismissed plaintiff's action with prejudice on the basis of his initial pleading, denying him leave to file an amended complaint alleging that he in fact sent his letter to the Warden complaining of prison conditions. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismissed the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity with prejudice and without leave to file an amended complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Grullon v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former New York state prisoners who brought separate actions in the district court and whose appeals have been consolidated in this court, appealed from the district court's judgment dismissing their complaints against officials of the New York State DOCS and the Parole Division. The complaints, brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for damages and declaratory relief, alleged that defendants violated plaintiffs' due process rights as announced in Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler and described in Earley v. Murray, by administratively imposing and enforcing conditions of supervision on plaintiffs following their release from prison, despite the absence of any order for such supervision by the courts that sentenced plaintiffs for their crimes. The court concluded that Earley I did not rule that the rights asserted by plaintiffs were clearly established by Wampler with respect to a defense of qualified immunity; but the court concluded that Earley I itself did clearly establish the unconstitutionality of the administrative imposition or enforcement of postrelease conditions that were not judicially imposed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Vincent v. Yelich; Earley v. Annuci" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, labor organizations and state employees, brought this action contending that defendants, state officials, violated their First Amendment right to freedom of association. The court concluded that, on the stipulated facts, defendants violated plaintiffs' rights by targeting union employees for firing based on their union membership. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants; remanded to the district court with instruction to grant summary judgment to plaintiffs on their First Amendment claim and to craft appropriate equitable relief; reversed the district court's dismissal on the pleadings of plaintiffs' claims against defendants in their individual capacities; and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland" on Justia Law

The United States brought suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging racial discrimination in the hiring of New York City firefighters. On appeal, the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and former Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta challenged the district court's order issuing an injunction against the City with respect to the hiring of entry-level firefighters. Intervenors cross-appealed a partial final judgment dismissing their federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Scoppetta. The City, inter alia, sought review of an order granting Intervenors summary judgment on their disparate treatment claim. The court concluded that (1) summary judgment was improperly entered on Intervenors' disparate treatment claims; (2) the federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg were properly dismissed, as were the state law claims against Commissioner Scopetta, but the federal law claims against Commissioner Scoppetta should be reinstated; (3) most portions of the injunction based on the unchallenged disparate impact finding were within the district court's remedial discretion, but other portions, particularly those portions based on the improper discriminatory treatment ruling, exceeded that discretion; and (4) on remand, the bench trial on the liability phase of the disparate treatment claim against the City should be reassigned to a different district judge. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The City amended it's zoning laws to prohibit the nonconforming use of non-owner-occupied multiple dwellings in various zoning districts. Plaintiffs alleged that the City's failure to notify them, as affected property owners, prior to enacting this zoning change violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the change of zoning rules did not offend the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause because the zoning amendment was prospective and generally applicable, and was therefore "legislative" in character rather than "adjudicative." View "Edelhertz v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law