Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging excessive force and other Eighth Amendment and due process violations in connection with a prison yard altercation. At issue was whether a plaintiff in a lawsuit governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), was entitled to a jury trial on disputed factual issues relating to his exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court held that the Seventh Amendment did not guarantee a jury trial on factual disputes regarding administrative exhaustion under the PLRA. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff, a former probationary police officer, appealed from a judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint, brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging principally that defendants, Chief of the Middletown Police Department (MPD) and other members of the MPD, violated his First Amendment right to freedom of speech by causing the termination of his employment in retaliation for his refusals to make false statements in connection with an investigation into a civilian complaint alleging use of excessive force by a MPD officer. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Garcetti v. Ceballos and Weintraub v. Board of Education did not preclude First Amendment protection for his refusals to make false statements. The court considered all of defendants' arguments in support of affirmance and found them to be without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was vacated to the extent that it dismissed plaintiff's claims for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the matter was remanded.

Plaintiff sued defendants for various violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and parallel provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq., after defendants terminated plaintiff. A jury found that plaintiff's termination was in retaliation for complaints he made about his supervisor and it awarded compensatory and punitive damages. Both parties appealed numerous issues related to pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. The court held that it need not determine whether the district court was authorized to grant such relief since the court read the parties' joint submission as effectively stipulating to a new jury trial, the result of which was an award in the reduced amount of $190,000, rendering the district court's judgment final. The court affirmed the decision of the district court that plaintiff's original punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive. The court further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct its clerical mistake without first obtaining leave from this court to do so, but now the court granted that leave nunc pro tunc. The court finally held that because the remaining issues raised in both parties' appeals were without merit, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety.

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

Defendant appealed from the judgment of the district court granting defendants' motion to dismiss his claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding that the statute of limitations had run on the first of his two causes of action and in dismissing his second cause of action for improper venue. The court vacated and remanded on the grounds that claims brought by an inmate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 32 U.S.C. 1997e(a), were entitled to equitable tolling during the time-period the inmate was exhausting his administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. The court also vacated the judgment insofar as it dismissed some of defendants' claims for improper venue and remanded with instructions that the court transfer those claims to the Eastern District of New York if the court deemed it proper to do so upon reexamination of defendants' claims.

Plaintiffs, a father and his children, brought various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that a children's services caseworker entered their home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of the children into state custody. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that the caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all of the claims against him and granted summary judgment in his favor. The court held that the caseworker was not entitled to qualified immunity and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of the allegedly unlawful search of plaintiffs' home; plaintiffs' claims for violations of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; the father's claim for violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and the children's claim for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a federal safety inspector, sued defendant in New York Supreme Court, alleging that defendant used photographs of plaintiff for advertising purposes without his consent in violation of New York State Civil Rights Law 50 and 51. Defendant filed a notice of removal asserting federal subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of its third-party claims and plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that plaintiff's complaint contained no federal claim and therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and remanded back to state court. The court held that, because the district court's decision to remand the case rested on its determination that it was without subject matter jurisdiction, the court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review it. The court held, however, that it did possess appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's purported basis for removal was objectively unreasonable and therefore, the modest size of the award of attorney's fees and costs was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendants appealed from an order of the district court granting summary judgment to plaintiffs and entering a permanent injunction barring the Board of Education of the City of New York ("Board") from enforcing a rule that prohibited outside groups from using school facilities after hours for "religious worship services." At issue was whether the rule constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The court held that because the rule did not exclude expressions of religious points of view or of religious devotion, but excluded for valid non discriminatory reasons only a type of activity, the conduct worship services, the rule did not constitute viewpoint discrimination. The court also held that because defendants reasonably sought by this rule to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, the exclusion of religious worship services was a reasonable content-based restriction, which did not violate the Free Speech Clause. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the injunction barring enforcement of the rule against plaintiffs was vacated.

Plaintiff, an African-American, sued defendants pro se alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law where plaintiff was charged with a traffic violation by a state trooper and where plaintiff alleged that the charge was false and that the trooper's actions were motivated by plaintiff's race. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to reopen his case, which the district court had administratively closed, because of plaintiff's failure to obtain counsel. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion where the inability of an individual litigant to obtain counsel was not a basis for denying him his statutory right to pursue his case pro se.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, Nassau County, New York and/or MTA Long Island Bus ("MTA"), asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., where the gravamen of the lawsuits was that defendants implemented substantial reductions in paratransit services without allowing for the public participation of users of the services required by the ADA regulations and failed to make reasonable modifications to existing services so as to ameliorate the effect of the service reductions. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' cases on the grounds that the regulations did not apply to the service cuts in question and that the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") reasonable modifications requirement did not apply to paratransit services. The court held that 49 C.F.R. 37.137(c) of the ADA could not be enforced in a private right of action based on 49 C.F.R. 12143 where the failure to permit public participation did not constitute discrimination under section 12143. The court also read section 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulations did not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' cases.