Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Malik Jones, an African-American male, was shot and killed by a member of the East Haven Police Department. Plaintiff Jones, mother of Malik Jones, filed suit against the town and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the town’s custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference to the rights of black people caused the killing of her son in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. At trial, the jury found in favor of the police officers, but found the town liable and awarded damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to demonstrate a custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference which caused Jones’s death.

African-American firefighters brought a Title VII discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) claim, based on 1998 and 2002 promotional examinations for the position of fire lieutenant. The district court ruled in favor of the city, finding that Buffalo had demonstrated that the test was job related and consistent with business necessity, despite the disparate impact of the 1998 examination on African Americans, and that plaintiffs were barred from challenging the job relatedness and business necessity of similarly derived examinations. The Second Circuit affirmed: an employer can show that examinations having a disparate impact on a protected class are job related and supported by business necessity when the analysis that produced the test relied on data not specific to that employer. While employer-specific data may make it easier for an employer to carry its burden in Title VII analysis, such evidence is not required as a matter of law. In this case, an independent state agency determined, based on empirical, expert, and anecdotal evidence drawn from fire departments across New York and the nation, that the job of fire lieutenant, wherever performed, involves common tasks requiring essentially the same skills, knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics; and developed a general test based on those findings.

In 1986, minority inmates commenced a class action, alleging racial discrimination in housing, job assignment, and discipline. The trial judge found a “pattern of racism” and, in 1993, issued a decision requiring that the percentage of minority inmates in “preferred” jobs, including jobs in the print shop, correspond to the percentage of minority inmates in the general prison population. In 1999, plaintiffs, inmates formerly employed in the print shop, filed complaints alleging racial discrimination by civilian supervisors and prison administrators. After four years of discovery, plaintiffs sought to file an amended class action complaint. In addition to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, the complaint claimed violations of the earlier order, and the state Human Rights Law and constitution. Plaintiffs contended that the pattern-or-practice method of proof used in Title VII class actions could be employed against individual defendants. The court denied class certification and leave to amend and analyzed plaintiffs’ individual complaints under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework generally employed in assessing individual disparate treatment claims under Title VI and granted defendants summary judgment on individual claims. The Second Circuit affirmed; the pattern-or-practice framework is ill-suited to establish liability of individual defendants named in the proposed amended complaint.

Plaintiffs, 11 Asian-Americans currently or formerly Port Authority police officers, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that they were passed over for promotions because of race. The plaintiffs asserted: individual disparate treatment, pattern-or-practice disparate treatment, and disparate impact. A jury found liability for discrimination against seven plaintiffs and awarded back pay and compensatory damages. The district court also granted prevailing plaintiffs retroactive promotions, seniority benefits, and salary and pension adjustments corresponding with hypothetical promotion dates. The Second Circuit affirmed in part. With regard to individual disparate treatment allegations, the district court properly admitted background evidence predating onset of the limitations period; there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the Port Authority discriminated within the limitations period. The district court erred in: submitting the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment theory to the jury in a private, nonclass action and concluding that the “continuing violation” doctrine applied to the disparate impact theory so that the jury could award back pay and compensatory damages for harms predating the statute of limitations. The court remanded for reconsideration of damages and equitable relief to the extent that relief was premised on failures to promote outside the limitations period.

Rivas, serving an indeterminate life sentence in New York for the second-degree murder of his former girlfriend, sought habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed the petition as barred by the statute's one-year limitations period. On remand, the district court again dismissed, after hearing evidence of actual innocence. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Rivas raised a credible and compelling claim of actual innocence, based on new information not presented to the jury that dramatically undermines the central forensic evidence linking him to the crime of which he was convicted. There was essentially unchallenged testimony from a respected forensic pathologist, that the victim was almost certainly killed at a time when he had an uncontested alibi, and not earlier. That evidence warrants an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitation period, allowing the petitioner to have his otherwise time-barred claims heard by a federal court.

Freeman was convicted in New York of second-degree assault, second-degree vehicular assault, common law driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in identifying as harmless the erroneous admission of evidence obtained from a blood draw compelled pursuant to a warrant found invalid under state law. The Second Circuit affirmed denial. The challenged harmlessness determination regarding an error of state law was itself a decision of state law that cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief.

Hearing that Warren had called him an insulting name, Darnell notified his friends to leave the area, entered the store, followed by his brother, Darryl. Darryl grabbed Warren and said “I told you to stay out of this store.” Darryl’s gun fired. Darnell drew his gun and pointed it at another. Darryl fired four more shots into Warren. After Darryl pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder, Darnell was convicted of second-degree depraved-indifference murder and sentenced to 17-1/2 years to life in prison, the same sentence received by his brother. The appellate court affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to convict Darnell as an accomplice to depraved-indifference murder. Before the conviction became final, the New York supreme court reversed a depraved-indifference murder conviction based on accomplice liability where the attack on the victim was “quintessentially intentional.” State courts rejected a motion to vacate Darnell’s conviction. He filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this was the fourth case to advance the “somewhat perverse argument” that petitioner should be released from custody because the evidence suggests he is more culpable than he was found to be.

Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, was knocked unconscious and injured when a prison transport bus, in which he was riding with his wrists and ankles shackled, took a sharp turn. He claimed defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by transporting him on a bus without a seatbelt. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. Failure of prison officials to provide seatbelts to prison inmates does not, standing alone, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.

Plaintiffs, black and Hispanic registered voters in Albany County, sued the County and the Board of Elections (collectively, defendants) for enacting a redistricting plan for the Albany County Legislature (Local Law C) in response to the 2010 United States census that allegedly diluted black and Hispanic voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, by failing to provide for five majority-minority districts (MMDs). The court concluded that plaintiffs' appeal was not moot, even though the challenged elections have not taken place. While the court identified legal error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to make the majority-minority showing required to satisfy the first step of a vote dilution claim as identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, the court identified no error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as the third majority bloc-voting step of the Gingles inquiry, or in the court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief on that ground.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appealed an order of the district court dismissing her 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for failure of timely service and a subsequent order denying her Rule 60(b) "motion to open." The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action or in denying Rule 60(b) relief, despite her attempt to effect service with the aid of the U.S. Marshals Service. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.