Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Grayton was found guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. Penal Law 125.25(1), based on a 2001 shooting death, and was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment. He exhausted his state appeals and timely petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his exclusion from a Geraci hearing violated his constitutional right to presence at all material stages of the trial. Geraci hearings are held in New York state courts to determine whether a defendant has procured a witness’s unavailability by misconduct and has thus forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights in regards to that witness. The district court assumed, without deciding, that Grayton had a federal constitutional right to be present at the hearing, then determined that he had waived that right. The Second Circuit affirmed, first holding that there is a right to be present at a Geraci hearing. Grayton had at least minimal knowledge of the proceeding; if he objected to his exclusion, it was incumbent upon him to have made that known. It is not unreasonable to call failure to do so waiver.

A New York state court judge found Gibson, charged with criminal mischief, not competent to stand trial and filed a temporary order of observation, transferring Gibson to custody of the mental health commissioner for a period not to exceed 90 days, for treatment to restore capacity to stand trial. New York law distinguishes between temporary orders and final orders, which are intended to prepare the subject for release into the community. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 730.40(1). While detained, he filed a federal complaint alleging civil rights violations and requesting to proceed in forma pauperis. While federal law generally permits a court to waive fees for those who cannot afford them, the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act generally prohibits a “prisoner” who has filed three or more frivolous actions in federal court from filing another lawsuit without paying required fees, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Act defines “prisoner” as “any person . . . detained in any facility who is accused of . . . violations of criminal law.” The district court concluded that Gibson was was a “prisoner” under the PLRA, and that, based on previous frivolous filings, he was barred from filing another complaint without first paying fees. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Applicants for and recipients of Medicaid home health Services claimed that the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance and the New York State Department of Health, violated their statutory right, enforceable under 42 U.S.C.1983, to an opportunity for Medicaid fair hearings. They claimed that this right, as construed by federal regulation, entitles them to “final administrative action” within 90 days of their fair hearing requests. The district court declared that “final administrative action” includes the holding of Medicaid fair hearings, the issuance of fair hearing decisions, and the implementation of any relief ordered in those decisions and permanently enjoined the state agencies to ensure that “final administrative action” implemented within 90 days of fair hearing requests. The Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the plaintiffs have a right to a Medicaid hearing and decision ordinarily within 90 days of their fair hearing requests, and that such right is enforceable under section 1983. The permanent injunction was, however, overbroad because “final administrative action” refers not to the implementation of relief ordered in fair hearing decisions, but to the holding of fair hearings and to the issuance of fair hearing decisions.

VLiranzo was born in 1955 in the Dominican Republic. He entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1965; in 1972 his mother became a naturalized citizen and he obtained derivative citizenship, 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3) Liranzo did not know he had become a citizen and continued to renew his "green card" through 2006.In 2006 Liranzo was released from incarceration in New York for possession of a controlled substance. Before his release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement erroneously identified him as a permanent resident alien, subject to removal. He was transported to a detention center in Louisiana pending removal. During removal proceedings, it was discovered that Liranzo is a U.S. citizen, and he was released. He filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that federal immigration officials had falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Following two years of discovery, the district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no private analogue to the immigration detention suffered by plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a Fourth Amendment claim, but held that the court had jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, because there is a private analogue: false imprisonment.

Irwin appealed the district court’s denial of his petition to vacate his convictions for assault in the first degree and witness intimidation in the third degree. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had caused serious physical injury, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the above witness intimidation count.

Plaintiffs, New York inmates with complicated histories of incarceration, claimed that their release dates were incorrectly calculated. Their due process claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) were dismissed on grounds that prison system officers and employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed. The state defendants could not necessarily “fairly be said to ‘know’” that due process required that the inmate be afforded certain credits and cited precedent, by its terms, does not instruct prison administrators as to the calculation of release dates when multiple sentences are at issue.One sentencing judge’s instructions may conflict with that of another.

Harrington is serving a statutorily mandated 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court rejected his challenge to the sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed. Harrington’s vagueness challenge to the ACCA was barred because it was not presented to the district court. First degree unlawful restraint under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-95, is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, that together with two prior first-degree robbery convictions compelled imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum 15-year prison term.

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other New York State prisoners convicted of violent felonies, alleging that they were denied parole as a result of an “unwritten policy” to deny parole to violent felons, and that this unofficial policy violates the Due Process, Equal Protection Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. To state a claim for violation of due process rights, plaintiffs would have to allege that they were denied parole based on an “inappropriate consideration of a protected classification or an irrational distinction.” They did not do so. Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices, and prisoners either in the aggregate or specified by offense are not a suspect class. The rational basis for a distinction in parole determinations is preventing early release of potentially violent inmates who may pose a greater danger to others. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to guidelines that do not create mandatory rules for release but are promulgated simply to guide the parole board in the exercise of its discretion.

McGarry claimed that while he was a pretrial detainee at the Vermont Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, facing charges related to a domestic dispute, prison officials compelled him to work in the prison laundry under threat of physical restraint and legal process. His pro se complaint alleged violation of his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed, reasoning that McGarry did not allege that his work in the laundry was “like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the Thirteenth] Amendment.” The Second Circuit reversed. The complaint plausibly stated a claim; defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. Correctional institutions may require inmates to perform personal housekeeping chores such as cleaning the areas in or around their cells without violating the Thirteenth Amendment, but it is “clearly established” that requiring hard labor of pretrial detainees (persons not “duly convicted”) violates the Thirteenth Amendment. A pretrial detainee’s compelled work in a laundry for up to 14 hours a day for three days a week doing other inmates’ laundry cannot reasonably be construed as personally related housekeeping chores and officers of reasonable competence could not disagree.

Taylor, an attorney who allegedly suffers from clinical depression, lived in a private community managed by HPHA. Graser was president of HPHA’s board. For years, Taylor’s glass-enclosed patio, visible from the main thoroughfare, was described as a “pigsty.” Taylor generally declined offers to help with cleanup. While she was away, Cramp, noticed that Taylor’s garage door was open. Taylor gave him permission to retrieve her opener and close the door. Cramp, Graser, and another closed her garage door and cleaned up Taylor’s patio, consolidating items in Taylor’s garage. Taylor filed a police report complaining of trespass and burglary and filed a complaint against HPHA with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR). DHR issued a Determination that there was no evidence of disability or that the accumulation of or clearing of clutter is related to a disability. HUD affirmed. Taylor filed suit against the HPHA and Graser, claiming failure to accommodate, 42 U.S.C. 3601, trespass, and conversion. The district court rejected all claims. The Second Circuit dismissed her appeal for failure to comply with appellate rules. Calling Taylor’s FHA claim “frivolous,” the court held that HPHA and Graser were entitled to attorneys’ fees.