Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff attempted to film a police officer as he was conducting a traffic stop, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with violating New Hampshire’s wiretapping statute, among other crimes. Plaintiff was not brought to trial. Plaintiff subsequently brought a First Amendment claim against the police officers, the police department, and the Town of Weare, alleging that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution. The officers moved for summary judgment, claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right to film the traffic stop. The district court denied the officers’ motions for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) it was clearly established at the time of the stop that the First Amendment gives citizens the right to film police carrying out their duties in public if no reasonable restriction is imposed or in place; and (2) therefore, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to the officers on Plaintiff’s claim that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment. View "Gericke v. Begin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in Massachusetts state court of drug distribution and trafficking. While Petitioner’s appeal was pending in the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. On appeal, Petitioner argued that his conviction must be reversed because the trial proceedings violated his federal Confrontation Clause rights as articulated in Melendez-Diaz. The SJC decided that there was a Melendez-Diaz error in this case but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner petitioned for habeas review in federal district court, arguing that the state proceedings had violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Melendez-Diaz. The district court denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner could not show sufficient injury under the Brecht v. Abrahamson standard of review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that under the highly deferential standard announced in Brecht, Petitioner failed to show the “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict required to set aside the SJC’s affirmance of his conviction. View "Connolly v. Roden" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Muslim and a native of Algeria, filed an amended complaint alleging that he was denied a promotion at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“Department”) based on his religion, race, and national origin. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, the Secretary of the Department, concluding that Appellant failed to rebut the Department’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for rejecting Appellant’s promotion. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded, holding that Appellant’s proffered evidence raised material disputes of fact that would allow a jury to infer that Appellant was the victim of intentional discrimination. View "Ahmed v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, her employer, pursuant to Title VII and analogous Puerto Rico law, alleging adverse employment action and a failure to hire on account of sex. After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on both counts. On appeal, Defendant (1) sought a reversal of the jury verdict, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; and (2) in the alternative, requested remittitur on the issue of damages. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim was unpreserved for appellate review; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for remittitur. View "Climent-Garcia v. Autoridad de Transporte" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Before Appellant’s sentencing, he learned of the existence of certain evidence that the government had failed to disclose to him. Appellant filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, contending that the government had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that could have been used to impeach the credibility of the key government witness against him at trial. The district court denied the motion. Appellant was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment, which was “legally required” by the quantities of cocaine at issue and by virtue of this being Appellant’s third felony drug conviction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion, holding that the suppression did not result in prejudice to Appellant; and (2) rejected the constitutional challenges Appellant raised to the district court’s imposition of a life sentence. View "United States v. Paladin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were former officers and a former cadet of the Boston Police Department (Department) who were fired after testing positive for cocaine, a current officer who tested positive and underwent rehabilitation as an alternative to termination, and a former applicant whose contingent job offer was revoked after a positive test. Each Plaintiff was black. Plaintiffs filed suit against the Department, alleging, inter alia, that the Department’s drug testing program, which used hair samples to test for illegal drug use, caused a disparate impact on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department on all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim and reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the question of whether they had proved a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII, holding that Plaintiffs proved beyond reasonable dispute a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII; and (2) otherwise affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted with one count of cyberstalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2261A. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the cyberstalking charge. Defendant was sentenced to a term of sixty months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the cyberstalking charge in the indictment and argued that his sentence above the Guidelines range was unreasonable. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) section 2261A was constitutionally applied to Defendant and is not overbroad; and (2) the district court’s decision to vary upward rather than depart downward was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Sayer" on Justia Law

Brothers Angel Ayala-Vazquez (“Alaya”) and Luis Cruz-Vazquez (“Cruz”) (collectively, “Appellants”) were arrested and indicted following a federal investigation into a wide-ranging drug trafficking organization (“DTO”) based out of two housing projects in Bayamon, Puerto Rico. Unlike dozens of other defendants who entered guilty pleas, Appellants stood trial together. Appellants were both convicted of multiple criminal charges related to their involvement in the DTO, and each Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and Cruz’s life sentence, holding (1) the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support the jury verdicts; (2) the trial judge’s comments at trial did not deprive Appellants of a fair trial; and (3) the district judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing Cruz to life imprisonment, and Cruz failed to overcome the sentence’s presumption of reasonableness. View "United States v. Ayala-Vazquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was fifty-five years old when he was hired to work as an assistant manager at Walgreens. In 2011, Walgreens terminated Plaintiff’s employment after Plaintiff failed to provide what Walgreens considered to be adequate customer service. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court, alleging that his employment was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1B). The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff (1) did not raise any genuine issue as to whether Walgreens believed the truth of its stated reason for terminating him; (2) did not demonstrate pretext through a showing that Walgreens violated its policy to uniformly enforce the rules; and (3) did not demonstrate that Walgreens’ proffered reason for terminating him was pretext designed to disguise age discrimination. View "Adamson v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

In 1997, in response to Congress’s enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which narrowed the eligibility of non-citizens for Medicaid and other federal benefits, the state of Maine extended state-funded medical assistance benefits to certain legal aliens rendered ineligible for Medicaid. In 2011, the Maine Legislature terminated these benefits. Appellants moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the 2011 legislation, alleging that the state violated their equal protection rights by providing state-funded medical assistance benefits to United States citizens while denying those benefits to similarly situated non-citizens due solely to their alienage. The district court denied Appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, holding that Appellants’ equal protection claim failed on the merits because the state of Maine was not obligated to extend equivalent state-funded benefits to Appellants in the first place, and therefore, the termination of those benefits did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "Bruns v. Mayhew" on Justia Law