Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After Massachusetts rejected the petitioner's appeals from his conviction on charges relating to distribution of cocaine, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, holding that chemical analysts were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and must be available for cross-examination and confrontation. The district court denied a subsequent petition for habeas corpus and the First Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the issue is whether the state's decision violated clearly established federal law. Federal law was not clearly established at the time of the state decision.

The Puerto Rico Examining Board of Accountants required a CPA to submit to involuntary practice review and denied a requested postponement. The CPA failed to appear at a hearing. The Board did not respond to a request to reschedule, but suspended his license. Following a request for reconsideration, the Board sent notice that did not comply with statutory requirements, held a hearing, and declined to lift the suspension. The CPA completed the practice review after the deadline; the Board again declined to lift the suspension. The Board sent another non-compliant notice, held another hearing, and revoked the CPA's license. A Puerto Rico court ordered reinstatement. The federal district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual Board defendants perform functions similar to judges and are protected by immunity. They act under a statute that provides for due process and their actions are reviewable in Puerto Rico courts. Although they made serious procedural errors, the Board members had jurisdiction to take the actions at issue.

After the plaintiff publicly criticized town council policies, the council denied him reappointment to an unpaid advisory commission concerned with recreational facilities. The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed. The court assumed that the council's decision was based on the plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights and held that the plaintiff's former position and his comments related to policy. Analogizing to firings based on political party affiliation, the court held that the balance weighs in favor of the town's need to accomplish its policy objectives through loyal, cooperative individuals whom the public will perceive as sharing the administration's goals.

After a heated 2006 soccer game, the police searched all members of the mostly-Hispanic visiting team beside their bus, looking for items missing from the predominantly-white home team's locker room. The coach consented to the search, but later claimed coercion. The search was conducted in front of a hostile crowd, which, the plaintiffs claimed, yelled threats and racial insults. None of the missing items were found. The district court rejected civil rights claims and claims under Rhode Island law. The First Circuit affirmed. The officers were shielded by qualified immunity; a reasonable officer could conclude that the coach had authority to consent to the search and would not have necessarily have believed that the coach felt threatened by the crowd so that his ability to make a decision was impaired. The court noted that the officers did not act in a threatening manner and had restrained the crowd before conducting the search. The officers' actions were not motivated by race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or state law. Even if the police had no more reason to search the team than to search the crowd, there was no evidence of racial motivation on the part of the officers.

A black police officer, assigned to the drug prevention division of the Puerto Rico police department, was reassigned to a less-desirable position after a lieutenant made racial slurs and statements that she did not want him. One position that subsequently opened in the drug prevention division was not filled; another position was filled by a white person with less education than the black officer. The district court dismissed civil rights claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) and claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000) against individual supervisors. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. Failure to name the police department as a defendant did not justify dismissal under Title VII; the supervisors acted as agents of the department. The complaint plausibly alleged equal protection violations.